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The Canadian Historical Association

Report of the Annual Meeting
Held at Montreal
May 25-26, 1939

With Historical Papers

TORONTO
THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
1939

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THE APPALACHIAN BARRIER IN CANADIAN HISTORY

Presidential Address Delivered by REGINALD G. TROTTER


Queen's University

I invite your attention this evening to a problem in historical geography. I am not proposing, however, to indulge in a philosophical discussion of the doctrines of geographic determinism. The fact is that I cannot profess that creed, for I suspect that men have been more than the mere victims of their physical environment. In the process of adapting themselves to its pressures and exploiting its resources, they have been also increasingly its masters. They have made it serve purposes and they have subordinated it to ideals with roots deep-bedded in tradition and in historic institutions. But when this has been said, it remains profitable for the student of human society to trace the relations between its growth and those factors of environment which have gone to shape its destiny. History is in vital ways the story both of man's struggle with nature and his partnership with nature. Physical features may place difficulties in the way of certain developments and at the same time in other respects may stimulate those same developments.

North American history has to do very largely with the migration of European peoples and institutions into the North American environment and the subsequent interplay of the two. The peoples of Canada and the United States and their ways of life are essentially European, but they show some characteristics that are caused by peculiarities of the environment on this continent. Certain traditions and outlooks common to both nations have contributed in both to the shaping of political institutions that are democratic and federal in form and to many other similarities that are obvious. Yet a fact of no less interest to the student of history is that there are two nations rather than one. Their separation, and the differences between them, can no more be dismissed as accidental than their similarities. I propose to explore with you tonight one corner of the very large and interesting question as to how there came into being a Canada that is so like and yet so distinct from the United States.

Three extensive natural features have become famous in North American history as barriers which man, as the hero of the historical drama, has had to overcome. These are the Appalachian highlands in the east, the Laurentian Shield in the north, and the Cordilleran mountain system in the west. Early historians rather oversimplified the dramatic roles of these sections. Barriers they assuredly were and are, but they have been a good deal more than mere obstacles to the mastery of the land and to the use of its resources.

The western ranges are the loftiest and most rugged, extending unbroken from Alaska and the Yukon to the far south-west. In the United States they occupy, with their intervening arid uplands, more than a fourth of the area of the country. In Canada they form a narrower belt, but fertile valleys and coastal lowlands are there much more restricted than in the states of the Pacific slope. To the young Dominion of Canada this barrier presented a problem that was more critical than that with which the far west confronted the more populous and powerful United States. Despite the



inhospitableness of most of the Cordilleran region to continuous settlement, its resources in both countries have richly rewarded development, while railways and recently the aeroplane have reduced what was once a formidable obstacle to intercourse between the populations lying to the east and west. Yet because of that great barrier, the communities on the west coast are still the most isolated and most precariously established sections of our North American civilization, and for that very reason the most in need of close association with larger communities possessing ampler resources and situated more securely.

The Laurentian Shield, occupying the great northern area fringed by the St. Lawrence and Mackenzie River basins, undoubtedly has been an obstacle to Canadian unity by thrusting between east and west so wide a region inhospitable to dense or continuous settlement and with a rugged terrain of rock and swamp and broken water-courses so inconvenient and expensive for railway and road transport. We have, however, been learning recently to see it more fundamentally as a unifying factor. It was so at first by virtue of its fur resources and the system of primitive east-west water transport that was adapted to the conditions of its southern fringe; and later its resources of forest and mine became increasingly factors in national wealth. The Shield, indeed, has become of late the field of the speculator's dreams as well as a favourite national theme-song of Canadian economists and historians. It is now deemed accountable for much that is distinctive in Canadian problems and achievements, from a goodly share of our railway debt, to our continental banking system and to the art of the School of Seven. Both as liability and as asset it is almost one hundred per cent Canadian, for it crosses the international border at only two places. There, however, it provides the Americans with the resorts of the Thousand Islands and the Adirondacks and the rich copper and iron deposits south and west of Lake Superior.

Much more might be said about the Cordilleran barrier and the Laurentian Shield, but I content myself with thus briefly recognizing their importance in the continental picture, before passing on to consider the third of the regions mentioned a few minutes ago, the Appalachian barrier. The theme of this paper is "The Appalachian barrier in Canadian history."

Among historians of the United States it has long been a truism that the Appalachian barrier has profoundly affected the history of that country. Hardly less momentous has been its influence on the destiny of Canada, and this despite the fact that the larger part of the barrier lies within the United States. At least one American writer has described it as terminating in the Green Mountains of Vermont. But it does not end there. On the northern coast of the Gaspé Peninsula where the highway runs cramped between the tides of the St. Lawrence and precipitous heights, today's motorist suddenly faces a sign that reads "Appalachian Mountains." The sign is justly placed. The rugged Notre Dame Mountains of the Quebec-Maine border and the Gaspé belong to the Appalachian system of highlands that stretches south-westward from the Gulf of St. Lawrence more than fifteen hundred miles to northern Alabama, within two hundred and fifty miles of the Gulf of Mexico. To the north-east it emerges in Anticosti and Newfoundland, but there is no need to bring these into the present picture. The Adirondacks, on the contrary, although geologically they are an extension of the Laurentian Shield, are so situated as to make it convenient for

the purposes of this discussion to treat them as part of the same barrier as the Appalachians proper.

The fifteen hundred mile stretch of broken upland of which I speak deserves well to be called a barrier, because of its breadth, in some parts more than three hundred miles, and the character of its topography, which is various in detail but everywhere presents a formidable obstacle in the way of ready access from coast to interior, everywhere, that is, except at about the middle of the barrier, where the level trench of the Hudson River Valley penetrates it northwards from New York to divide at Albany into two gateways past the Adirondacks, one to the valley of the St. Lawrence by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River, the other to the basin of the Great Lakes by the Mohawk cut. No other passes through the barrier are comparable with this. The headwaters of the rivers of Pennsylvania and Virginia interlace with tributaries of the Ohio, but the barrier in those latitudes is at its widest. From seaboard New England and the Maritime Provinces, such few natural ways as are afforded by river trails and portage routes cross the most rugged and least hospitable part of the whole barrier and have not been readily amenable to improvement for convenient use, although the best of them, that following the St. John and Madawaska Rivers and the Temiscouata portage, attained importance early. In the more southerly mountains of the Appalachian upland even the hill tops often have good soil, and in due time they offered hospitality to considerable settlement, but the more broken mountains and uplands that separate the St. Lawrence River from the seaboard of New Brunswick and Maine were so denuded of their soils by glaciation that in this section are still to be found the most thinly populated regions of the whole barrier.

The relation of the barrier to the Atlantic coast is important. They are roughly parallel, but in the north the coastal lowlands are narrowest, in New England and New Brunswick hardly more than fifty to seventy-five miles at best, and much broken by the irregularities of a glaciated surface. Nova Scotia has a still more broken topography. The extremities of the barrier are in marked contrast. At the south a wide belt of lowlands extends from the Atlantic around to the basin of the Mississippi. In the north the barrier presents its most forbidding aspect where it thrusts abruptly into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Here there is no easy natural way around it by land, and the salt-water route is useless nearly half the year, for the north coast of Gaspé is above the 49th parallel besides lying in the path of winds blowing over the Labrador Peninsula.

As significant as the northern latitude of the St. Lawrence River's mouth is the fact that most of the basin of that river and the Great Lakes lies well to the south. Indeed the general trend of the river and the two lower lakes, roughly a straight line a thousand miles long, is almost parallel to the general trend of the Atlantic coast from Chignecto to Chesapeake Bay, and at no point, at least this side of Cleveland, more than three hundred miles by the shortest line from Atlantic tide-water. The general direction, too, is neither north and south nor east and west, but inland waterway and sea-coast alike extend from south-west to north-east, pointing by the great circle route directly at the British Isles. On a globe either side of the parallelogram looks as directly approachable from Europe as the other. Bordering its north-west side, between Quebec and Windsor, lies the most populous and highly developed area in Canada. The history of

this region and its present relations with the outside world and with Maritime Canada have been largely determined by its position with reference to the Appalachian barrier, which crowds it on the south-east and separates it from the Atlantic seaboard except where gateways through the barrier and railways and roads across it offer alternatives to the natural highway of the St. Lawrence Valley.

Much of the history of Canadian-American relations, much indeed of Canadian history, is the story of the changing pattern of migration and settlement and methods of transport as these have been shaped by, and have shaped, the means of getting across the barrier. This does not mean that Canadian history can be interpreted satisfactorily simply by applying to it the version of the westward movement which has been worked out by historians of the United States. That version stresses the fact that the Appalachian uplands presented such obstacles to penetration that settlement during the colonial period was perforce held to the coastal region. Instead of scattering thinly into the interior, the inhabitants of the English colonies spent a century and a half occupying more densely the Atlantic seaboard. By the middle of the eighteenth century, they thus had been able to develop a group of populous communities with the variegated economy and mature institutions of a settled society. The strength of the position that was thus consolidated was a vital factor in the British victory over the French in America in the seventeen fifties and again in the defeat of Britain by the colonies, though with French aid, in the Revolution twenty years later. By this time the Americans—already they were called that—were able to swarm over the barrier into the great central basin of the continent that now lay open to them, to press across it on a broad front, and finally to leap the western mountains to the Pacific slope. Canada's story was influenced by that American westward movement, indeed certain chapters of Canadian history form part of it, notably the early settlement of Upper Canada and later some of the peopling of the western prairies, but no more in this matter than in any other can Canadian history be understood if it is thought of as a series of foot-notes and appendices to the history of the United States.

The early settlement of Canada was strikingly different from that of the Atlantic seaboard. It is not merely that the barrier, and the Iroquois, kept early settlers in the English seaboard colonies from access to Canada as it kept them from the Ohio country. Canadian history did not have to wait for its beginning till they could push through; the settlement of Canada began behind the barrier. There was early French settlement also on the seaboard, in Acadia, but the main enterprise of the French was from the first carried on behind the barrier, and well behind it. Remember that the Appalachian Mountains and the Laurentian Shield crowd close to the shores of the long St. Lawrence estuary and that the early colony was therefore virtually confined to the river from Quebec to Montreal. In many essentials early French Canada, like Quebec today, was really not a maritime but an inland community. Its river outlet to the sea was long and in winter closed. The same barrier that held the English to the seaboard kept the French behind it. The Champlain-Hudson gap would have offered them a less desirable outlet than the St. Lawrence, except in winter, even if the Iroquois had not barred its use and the Hudson had not been in the hands of Dutch and, later, English rivals. The French coastal settlements in Acadia were

of little importance except in relation to Canada's problem of winter communications with ice-free Atlantic ports and Acadia's strategic position in relation to the fisheries and control of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The Acadian settlements were never a serious threat to the more populous and more prosperous New England till after Louisbourg was built and then only in respect of strategy. More will have to be said of Acadia later in this discussion. The point here is that its importance in French hopes of empire was subordinate to that of Canada and derived mainly from the fact that Canada's position behind the barrier gave Acadia most of its value in French eyes.

Not only the location of the French settlement on the St. Lawrence, but its character as well, was determined largely by geography and available resources. Even in the middle stretch of the river, between Quebec and Montreal, the very heart of New France, the available area was cramped between the Appalachian barrier and the Laurentians. Soil, forests, difficulties of transport back from the river, all restricted agricultural activity. For a time there was thought of stimulating it by finding an export market through a triangular trade with the West Indies of the sort that early proved so easy and profitable for New England and the middle colonies. But the short season of navigation in the St. Lawrence combined with distance and with seasonal conditions of navigation in the Caribbean made such dreams impracticable. Acadia was better situated for that sort of trade but had neither the resources nor the men to compete with the better placed New England colonies.

Fur built New France. It was available in abundance and could stand the inconveniences and high costs of export around the barrier. Fur, indeed, it was that lured French settlement inland even as far as Quebec. Once established there and soon at Three Rivers and at Montreal, the fur traders could make tributary to them the great fur-bearing areas of the interior. Iroquois, jealous for the inland trade, and the white man's goods that it could bring, might destroy the rival Indian middlemen who served the French, but the latter proved able to press along the water routes past the Iroquois and tap directly the sources of fur in the heart of the continent. It was this far enterprise to the interior, from which the Atlantic seaboard settlements were barred by the Appalachians, that gave to New France its peculiar character and significance in the history of North America.

It is important to bear in mind that the main direction of French activity was not so much westward as south-westward. It is true that difficulties of navigating the Great Lakes, combined with the opposition of the Iroquois by Lake Ontario, led the French traders to prefer the Ottawa River and the comparatively sheltered route north of Manitoulin Island, but thence they turned southward through the Straits of Mackinac to Green Bay and Lake Michigan. Roberval's pilot had reported the southward trend of the St. Lawrence as offering possibilities of linking up with the lands by the Gulf of Mexico. By the end of the seventeenth century, French enterprise had made the connection and was staking out an empire stretching between the two great gulfs whose river systems give access to the heart of the continent. By that time, too, the French had begun to shorten their lines. In 1701, the very year after Iberville founded New Orleans, Cadillac established Detroit, almost midway between the mouths of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. In the next half-century the

French drew in their lines still shorter. The Iroquois were now no longer the menace that they once had been, but the English settlers were threatening the passes in the barrier. The French worked strenuously to make good their claim to the basin of the Ohio; they planted new fortified posts along the western fringe of the Appalachian uplands, trying hard to close the gaps. Only the mountains now separated their wilderness enterprise and the English settlements. Fort Duquesne, the present Pittsburgh, built where the Allegheny and the Monongahela unite to form the Ohio, was as near to tide water on the Potomac as Montreal to Portland, nearer than *Rivière du Loup* on the lower St. Lawrence to the Bay of Fundy.

Few and scattered posts had been sufficient as focal points for the organization of the fur economy of the interior and for the preservation of satisfactory political relations with the far-flung tribes whom that trade served and on whom it depended. More and stronger posts were needed to hold the inland empire now that the English were threatening it through the eastern passes. But it was too late. Wide as France's empire in North America might be, its base on the St. Lawrence was too slight, and that base was too much cut off from the sea. For the same barrier that had done so much to promote consolidated settlement in the English seaboard colonies had prevented the French from establishing correspondingly substantial settlements as bases for their interior empire. The settlements on the St. Lawrence and at the mouth of the Mississippi were too undeveloped and too far apart to afford adequate support to the scattered posts that dotted the interior, in the face of the English challenge for mastery.

When the final struggle came, the French had to hold not only their colonial settlements but also their scattered wilderness posts upon which depended the consolidation of their position behind the barrier. Unless they could keep the territories immediately behind the middle of the barrier and maintain their connections between Quebec and New Orleans, they had little or no chance of retaining any of the far interior upon which the economic survival of New France was conditioned. By that time the English colonies were ready to push through in force. Moreover, they had already pressed north-eastward into Nova Scotia, where they could effectively threaten French communications with Canada overland. English sea power, too, had now consolidated its position in Newfoundland and at Halifax. With the conquest of Louisbourg the way up the St. Lawrence to Quebec lay open. In the same year the capture of Fort Duquesne and still more the destruction of Fort Frontenac shattered the western lines and destroyed French prestige with the western Indian tribes. Attack could now be made in force through the barrier and from the sea. The French at Quebec found their position untenable. The St. Lawrence River colony was helpless economically and strategically when cut off both from the Old World and from the traffic of the continental interior. Wolfe and Montcalm played out on the Heights of Abraham the dramatic climax of an issue that was already virtually settled.

The conquest was accomplished by isolating the Canadian colony. Yet paradoxically the conquest saved it from a fate of isolation which would have left it a mere back-alley in North American life. The conquest brought to the St. Lawrence a renewed opportunity of profitable links with the interior, not merely the interior north of the Great Lakes but, what was at that time vastly more important, the interior that stretched south-west-

ward just behind the Appalachians, the very interior that French policy had tried so hard to hold for Canada against the advance of the English from the coast. As a matter of fact, British power on the St. Lawrence was the heir of French power there in respect to the rivalry of the St. Lawrence with the English colonial seaboard for trade and control in the trans-Appalachian country. And because imperial authority rather than colonial communities at the seaboard dominated the Mohawk Valley and relations with the Six Nations Indians, the only geographically easy route by which the seaboard might gain competitive access could more easily be blocked. British imperial policy proceeded to give again to the St. Lawrence a favoured position in the trade of the interior behind the barrier. The British Proclamation of October, 1763, following close on the peace settlement, barred the authorities of the old colonies from control beyond the mountains and their people from free trade and settlement there. It was hoped to maintain unified control of trade, and a single policy in those Indian relations upon which it so largely depended, both of which would be impossible if the old colonies were allowed the free hand that they claimed. British possession of Quebec, affording as it did an established back-door route into the trans-Appalachian country, was to give thus an opportunity to perpetuate a trans-montane régime competitive with that which the old colonies were ambitious to establish and consolidate. Thus, it was hoped, could the imperial position in North America be improved. But the policy proved to be an imperial boomerang. While it justified itself on grounds of immediate military and commercial advantage, it did much to alienate the English colonies. Except New England they cherished ambitions for westward expansion. Eager for free western trade and a boom in western lands and settlement, they saw in the policy an attack on their vital interests.

If the conquest of Canada had been followed by its absorption into the life of the old colonies, the whole situation might have been very different. The assimilation of Quebec in its institutions and policy to the general pattern of those older colonies, even the absorption of the French by large English-speaking immigration from them, seemed, indeed, to be envisaged in that same Proclamation of 1763, inconsistent though such assimilation might be with the western policy embodied in the same document. Nova Scotia was in process of being assimilated. Why not Canada? Representative and other institutions were foreshadowed with the intention of attracting immigration from the older colonies in numbers large enough to change the complexion of the province. But there did not occur the mass migration of agricultural settlers into the old French community along the St. Lawrence which might largely have unified its life with that of the English colonies. The few hundred traders and merchants who did come had little effect on the life of the province and their interest in western trade soon accentuated the competition between Quebec and the English seaboard. Their influence was not unifying but divisive.

The Quebec Act, eleven years after the Proclamation of 1763, was an admission that a policy of assimilation by immigration had been premature, while by its extension of the boundaries of the province to the Ohio River it confirmed the policy of controlling the western country and its trade from the province on the St. Lawrence. In other words it was still hoped, on the very eve of the American Revolution, that the trans-barrier country, at

least as far south as the Ohio, might be held tributary to the St. Lawrence community. The Quebec Act, however, instead of furthering this hope, in fact added to the already increasing American pressure against the natural barrier a bitter resentment at this new legal barrier to western expansion of the old colonies.

Imperial policy concerning the western country thus hastened the Revolution. Before the war was over the Americans were well on the way to possessing by actual occupation a good deal of the basin of the Ohio River. They succeeded in holding the Mohawk Valley and adjacent regions, forcing the loyalists among the inhabitants to move to Canada as civilian refugees or as recruits in the King's forces, in which latter capacity numbers of them revisited the frontiers of American settlement in what was, in effect, a guerilla warfare for control in the West. As for Quebec itself, ensconced in its inland valley, distance and difficulty of access overland prevented the Americans establishing a hold on the province which otherwise they might have obtained despite British sea power. On the other hand, the British hope was disappointed of using Canada as a base for major operations against the revolting colonies. Isolated behind the mountains, its communications with the sea subject to rigorous seasonal limitations, and its own resources limited, it afforded too poor a base for successful operations even by way of Lake Champlain on a more extensive scale than raiding expeditions. Thus the barrier again helped to determine the destinies of the continent.

At the close of the war the British held the St. Lawrence and the lakes, but were not in a position to insist upon a boundary further to the south than that which was agreed upon, from the forty-fifth parallel south-westward and then north-westward along the waterway. The location of that line reflects the drawn issue between the seaboard with its Hudson gateway through the barrier and Quebec with its entrance around it by way of the St. Lawrence. Yet the seaboard community, pressing up the Hudson, had now gained some advantage. Strict geography would have placed the portions of New York and Vermont lying north and north-west of the Adirondacks and the Green Mountains north rather than south of the international boundary. Running where it does, the boundary severs them artificially from neighbouring regions across the border and from their natural metropolis at Montreal. But in the historical process the French had passed this region by, partly because of the Iroquois, and perhaps even more because the routes to the interior down the inside of the Appalachian barrier led around it. Settlement from the south had found portions of it accessible following the conquest and already was pushing into it before the boundary was drawn.

On the other hand, despite the boundary laid down in the Peace of 1783, Montreal merchants and imperial authority were still ambitious to hold the trade of the hinterland south-west of the lakes. This ambition persisted even after the surrender of the posts across the line under the terms of Jay's Treaty. The Canadian fur trade was forced to turn to the country north-west of the lakes and the War of 1812 confirmed the boundary. In any event the cross-border fur trade would have been doomed by the advance of American settlement. It remained to be seen if the St. Lawrence route could capture predominance in the trade of the new states, particularly their export of grain. The competitive pull of the

more developed economy of the Eastern States, however, proved now sufficient to cope with the handicaps imposed upon them by the barrier. The usefulness of the Mohawk-Hudson route was so greatly improved by digging the Erie Canal in the 1820's as to ensure American victory in that chapter of Canadian-American competition. The Canadian answer, the Welland Canal and the St. Lawrence Canals, failed to make the region south-west of the lakes tributary to the St. Lawrence. Even if the British preference which favoured the St. Lawrence route had not gone by the board with Britain's adoption of free trade on the eve of the completion of the canals, it is doubtful if that important section of what has recently been aptly called "the empire of the St. Lawrence" could have been recaptured.

The coming of railways in the fifties did not at first seem to strengthen but rather to weaken the relative position of what was left of "the empire of the St. Lawrence." They greatly enlarged transportation facilities, not only by the naturally easy routes, but through the opportunity they gave of artificially multiplying outlets from interior to coast, outlets usable winter as well as summer for heavy hauls. The Grand Trunk Railway found its way out to an open winter port directly across the barrier from Montreal to Portland. Useful, however, as this proved to be for Canada's own traffic, that was its main value. Montreal's importance had still to depend primarily upon trade and transportation north of the international boundary. The bid for through railway traffic from beyond the Detroit River failed to draw through Montreal more than a fraction of the traffic from the American Middle West. American railways vanquished the Appalachians and ensured victory for the Atlantic states in their effort to attract the traffic of that region. Was the St. Lawrence community, its early hinterland so largely lost, doomed to become itself merely a minor or marginal part of the empire of the seaboard United States? To some observers it seemed not impossible that the conquest of the barrier through improved outlets by water and rail directly across it to American coast ports might hold that very destiny for Canada. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was a product of diverse forces and implied many things, but among its implications was certainly such a possibility.

Nevertheless the international boundary had not lost its reality. There were historical forces, which owed much for their shaping in earlier days to the presence of the barrier, and which strongly supplemented the still effective if somewhat diminished influence of geographical factors, to preserve the separation to which the international boundary gave legal expression. For even though the hinterland south-west of the lakes had been lost economically as well as politically, the Canadas themselves had been held together and at the same time been kept politically separate from the United States. Upper Canada had lain directly in the path of the American westward movement and in many aspects of its life was the product of that onward sweep of population from the American East. But the peculiar nature of the first and most significant wave of entering Americans, the loyalist migration from the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania, bitterly anti-American in political feeling, and consciously dependent upon British aid for their independent survival, did much to perpetuate the international boundary. Though settling within the borders of the old province of Quebec, these American immigrants had little direct effect on the French

Canadians because they settled so far apart from them, further in the interior. Their coming, however, hastened the granting of representative institutions, a reversing of the policy embodied in the Quebec Act seventeen years earlier. It also brought the political separation of Upper from Lower Canada, but political sentiment and economic interest alike tied the newcomers, in company with their French-Canadian neighbours down the river, to the British connection. Whatever their mutual jealousies, the two Canadas had a common interest in their competition with the Atlantic seaboard states.

The very remoteness of the inland province from centres of American life facilitated Britain's preservation of her guardianship through the perilous crisis of the War of 1812 and in the face of later threats. It was the St. Lawrence that made possible the system of defensive communications with the interior into which went so much British money. It was through the St. Lawrence that British immigration came to complete the occupation of Upper Canada and in part to neutralize "post-loyalist" influences of American tendency. And thus, though the population of Upper Canada lived in a comparatively narrow strip along the international section of the great waterway, its political independence and in a large measure its economic independence from the power to the south had been preserved.

As for Lower Canada, its international boundary still partly coincided with the natural barrier, in that region where it is more of a barrier to intercourse and continuous settlement than anywhere else. The short stretch of border along the forty-fifth parallel ran through territory which was settled late, and then the American communities which furnished many of the settlers and with which the life of that border region was closely articulated were in regions themselves off the main path of American westward progress. Travel and trade from Lower Canada followed the Lake Champlain gap to a considerable extent, but the effects of this intercourse, as well as of the newer settlements near the border, were negligible upon the character of the province. In essentials the life of French Canada was still almost as isolated from that of the seaboard to the south-east as in early days. In fact, it was not long after the middle of the century before the old stock was pushing into the border region and demonstrating that any Americanizing encroachments there, in the long view, were only temporary.

Unlike as the two sections of Canada were in many respects, they had much in common. The Appalachian barrier, which had helped to determine the growth of a separate people along the lower St. Lawrence, had also delayed the westward movement from the English seaboard till the circumstances under which Upper Canada was formed provided a basis in sentiment as well as in economic interest for unity with the older French community down the river. Consequently, even the development of convenient railway outlets to American ports across the barrier did not produce in Canada any wide complacency at the idea of surrendering either economic or political independence to the United States. The two Canadian communities, each eager to guard its distinctive traditions, were no less eager to promote their common aims by preserving a joint identity which would enable them to build together an expanding community and life of their own. But if they were to be limited to their own resources for such growth, they could no more hope to succeed than could Quebec

in the days of the old régime. Having lost hope of recovering an economic hinterland south-west of the waterway, they found that they must turn to developing a hinterland of their own north of the international boundary. Perhaps in the development of the northern portion of the continent there was still a vital and profitable role that could be played. Within the province the Laurentian Shield, which confined Canadian settlement to so narrow a belt along the international border, was already yielding timber, but its resources did not seem to offer a broad enough base for permanent independence. In former days the "Nor'Westers" of Montreal had built an inland fur trade north of the border that reached across the continent, but the merger with the Hudson's Bay Company in 1821 had diverted its traffic from the St. Lawrence to Hudson Bay. The North-West had thus ceased to be a Canadian hinterland. But now fur was doomed as the principal staple of the North-West. Before long railways would make the distant prairies available for extensive settlement and profitable agriculture. With the best lands of old Canada occupied, and with American settlement and American railways pushing perilously close to the territories of the Hudson's Bay Company, Canadian eyes turned again north-westward. Annexation of the West and the extension of Canadian railways and settlement thither might provide a hinterland such as had always been a necessity of Canada's independence from its American neighbours.

No less needed was a secure outlet to the open sea independent of frozen ports and of alien restrictions and prohibitions that American policy might impose in competitive or, so it seemed in those days, in aggressive mood. The same barrier that had done so much to produce a distinctive society and economy on the St. Lawrence made it necessary, as in the past, that the seasonal St. Lawrence route be supplemented by an overland route to the open sea that could be used, at least in emergency, the year round. The coming of railways gave added point to the problem, by opening the possibility of heavy traffic by such a route in competition with American railways. A railway to serve this purpose could be secured only by co-operation with the Maritime Provinces. The essential problem, however, was much older than railways, and to see it in perspective it is necessary to turn back briefly to earlier times.

Acadia had always been important to the power holding Canada, for emergency communications as well as in relation to control of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Its value in relation to Canada was, indeed, greater than its importance for New England, despite the fact that it was more accessible from the New England coast than from the St. Lawrence. It might be New England's outpost but it was Canada's outlet. New England was actively interested in its conquest, partly as a field for economic expansion but also to weaken the French in Canada whose possession of Acadia had strengthened their position and facilitated their border attacks on New England. Once secured as a British possession, it was too remote to become an integral portion of New England, and its resources, though less extensive than New England's, were so similar that after it had been consolidated against French recovery it was bound to become more competitive with New England than complementary to the latter's interests. In the American Revolution British sea power made possible its retention, and thereafter its competitiveness with New England was accentuated as it developed under the stimulus of imperial bounty and protection.

Between the fall of Quebec and the Revolution, Nova Scotia had been of less importance to Great Britain and to Canada because both had enjoyed the full use of the Hudson-Champlain route as well as the St. Lawrence. In the Revolution, however, Canada assumed special significance as a British base against the rebels in the seaboard colonies and Nova Scotia again became of vital strategic value. On the conclusion of peace, Nova Scotia remained a principal base of British sea power in the western Atlantic and its importance for Canada was enhanced also, as in French days, because it afforded essential means of winter communication. Appreciation of Canada's need of the overland route was increased by its use in the War of 1812 when regiments marched over it on snowshoes to augment the defence forces on the inland borders of Canada. The Legislature of New Brunswick in 1814 drew attention to the military importance of this St. John Valley route in forceful fashion. Measures for improvement of the route were thereafter periodically advocated, notably by the military commission of 1825 and by Sir James Kempt a few years later. Rude posthouses were not difficult to build, but the maintenance of the hilly thirty-seven mile portage from Lake Temiscouata to the St. Lawrence required constant care. So barren was the soil and so bleak the country along the portage that the military veterans placed there to keep the way open had to rely largely on government rations for subsistence. The route was difficult even for the couriers who traversed it with mails, though troops made their way over it again at the time of the Canadian rebellions. Arduous as this route was by Temiscouata and the Madawaska to the St. John Valley, the only conceivable alternative further east was across the base of the Gaspé Peninsula by the Matapedia River to the head of Bay Chaleur. This was so difficult and undeveloped that early settlers at Gaspé going overland to Quebec preferred the hard journey up the Restigouche and across to the St. John. It was possible to reach the St. Lawrence overland from the St. Francis, a tributary of the St. John west of the Madawaska, but in fact the Madawaska-Temiscouata route had held precedence since French days and its possession was looked upon as essential to the maintenance of communications to the ports of the Bay of Fundy.

In the famous dispute over the Maine boundary, the vital imperial and Canadian interest at stake was the possession of this route. New Brunswick settlers would have liked to secure the agricultural lands of the Aroostook and the additional timber of the upper tributaries of the St. John, but the necessity for winter communications was the vital point. This more than anything else determined the insistent British claim for the famous line westward from Mars Hill. It was an artful but to most present-day historians an unconvincing interpretation (some would say adaptation) of the terms of the Treaty of 1783 to suit the necessities of the case. Admittedly that treaty was drawn loosely and in ignorance of the detailed geography of the region; such a literal application of its terms as the American claim demanded, would unfortunately allot to the United States a salient containing the critical line of communications, and would also mean a boundary overlooking the St. Lawrence for many miles from the height of land. Britain would have had reason to be well satisfied with the line proposed in 1831 by the King of the Netherlands which the American Senate rejected, for it would have saved the route through the barrier. Eleven years later, however, the Ashburton-Webster settlement

secured a more favourable compromise. In its essentials it may indeed be described as a victory for the imperial interest which served at the same time the necessity of all the provinces. As in the former award the boundary followed the St. John River past the mouth of the Madawaska to the St. Francis, up which it turned. But south-westward from the St. Francis River the former award had accepted the American claim for a line topping the heights within a few miles of the St. Lawrence, and actually overlooking that river. The new treaty line lay well down the south-eastern slope of the mountains, cutting across the north-western tributaries of the upper St. John west of the St. Francis.

It is true that the coveted lands of the Aroostook Valley were not secured, nor much valuable timber in north-eastern Maine, but in estimating the significance of the area reputed as "lost" by the settlement, the area between the line claimed and the line established, it is pertinent to notice that that section of the Appalachian barrier did not afford any usable short cut from the St. Lawrence to New Brunswick. The north-west half of it is still almost unpopulated. Even yet, motor maps show no roads east and west across that section of Maine. If the motorist does not follow a Canadian route by Temiscouata or closer to the border by the St. Francis, he must dip to the south beyond the line of the extremist British claim. It is worthy of note, too, that the Canadian Pacific Railway, running almost due east from Montreal to the New Brunswick border, lies well south of the line of the British claim. Its present route is so much more direct and easy than any across the disputed area as to suggest that it would have been preferred even if the British claim had been realized. As for the railway projected in the 1830's between St. Andrews and Quebec, which had to be abandoned because it was to cross the disputed territory, it is extremely doubtful whether in any case it would have been sound policy to attempt to follow so direct a route as its promoters contemplated. I would suggest, then, that in attempting to view dispassionately that very controversial chapter in Canadian history, the story of the Maine boundary, it is highly advisable to keep in mind the character of the mountain barrier that was involved.

The conviction that the Temiscouata route was indispensable for the defence of Canada was vindicated during the American Civil War, when the contingent of twelve thousand troops that was hurried across the Atlantic after the *Trent* Affair would mostly have been held in the Maritimes for months, useless for the defence of the Canadian border, had it not been possible to send troops during the winter over that road, which by then had been made usable for sleighs. In so far as Britain's concrete demonstration of her intention to defend the Canadian border at that time served its purpose in preventing war with the United States, the policy that had secured that route through the barrier was more than justified. Although an alternative road was being opened by way of the Matapedia across the base of the Gaspé Peninsula, it lay through far more country that was only sparsely settled and would have been much more difficult for such use. Its only advantage was its remoteness from the American border. This advantage did lead to its being selected shortly afterwards as the route for the Intercolonial Railway.

A railway connecting the Grand Trunk with the Maritimes had long been talked about, but the difficult character of the barrier country that lay

between them was a very great obstacle in the way. Construction costs would be high, and after it was built much of the country it would pass through could provide little local traffic. But the necessity for its construction, at whatever cost, was made obvious by the Civil War in the United States, which did so much to bring into plain view the inherent potentialities of Canadian-American, as well as Anglo-American, relations and the conditions that those relations involved for Canada. It now became clear that the Intercolonial Railway was needed on grounds of economic as well as military strategy. Canada already had its direct rail outlet to Portland and normally would continue to make much use of outlets across the United States, but American threats to remove the bonding privilege enjoyed by Canadian traffic to and from Atlantic ports demonstrated the precariousness of attempting to build an independent Canadian economy without a railway to winter ports that would not be subject to the caprices of United States policy. The impending abrogation of reciprocity also stimulated a desire to promote trade among the provinces, which it was felt would require for its adequate growth the building of direct rail connections.

The task required public support. Arrangements among the separate provincial Governments and with the imperial Government were proving very difficult to make. Like the question of the North-West this problem was really national in scope. Both problems required the erection of a national state. Both helped to bring Confederation. It is further significant that because the rugged character and the far northward thrust of the barrier between the St. Lawrence and the Maritimes made necessary a railway that could hardly be expected to pay its way by the traffic it would carry, the Dominion had to begin its life with a national railway policy that recognized railways as an indispensable means for building the nation, a means which must be provided, if need be, at national expense. It is appropriate to recall that the building of the Intercolonial was vindicated on military grounds during the earlier years of the Great War, and to remember that so far as ordinary traffic is concerned the mere possession of an all-Canadian railway to winter ports has ensured continued use of United States railroads as well, and under favourable conditions.

I have been speaking from the point of view of Central Canada and the problem of building a nation by linking it with a continental hinterland and with an adequate all-year-round outlet to the Atlantic. What of the Maritime Provinces and their own interest in relation to this whole situation? These provinces well deserve their appellation maritime. Even more than in the case of New England the barrier had hemmed them in against the sea, cutting them off from the distant interior. Their settlement was mostly confined to narrow coastal lowlands and a few river valleys. Agriculture was of minor importance compared with fisheries, timber, and shipping, supplemented, particularly in wartime, by exploiting their favourable position in relation to naval maintenance and operations, both by privateering and by supplying the Royal Navy. Their importance to British sea power had stimulated not only economic growth but the rapid development of a cosmopolitan culture, particularly in Halifax. The operation of their extensive mercantile shipping brought their people into close touch with a wider world, British, West Indian, American, in fact cosmopolitan. By the 1860's Nova Scotia was enjoying a brief period of

something very near to a national life and consciousness of its own. Under such circumstances it was natural that a good many people there should look with some suspicion at proposals for a continental tie-up with Canada. Would there be adequate compensation for the lessening of independence that would be involved? The attraction of Canadian markets as a possible substitute for American reciprocity, and the desire for greater unity for defence, doubtless had some favourable effect. It was argued, moreover, that railway connections would lead much of the traffic of the continent to Maritime Province ports, thus shortening the ocean voyage and augmenting the seagoing interests of the whole region. The Intercolonial Railway was for them an indispensable condition. Imperial policy also played its significant part. From a variety of motives and with somewhat mixed feelings they entered Confederation.

Was Confederation a mistake for the Maritimes? Certainly their prosperity declined relatively in the following decades, when wood and sail gave way on the seas to steel and steam, when the consequent speeding up of ocean transport and the continuing high costs of long rail hauls nullified the hoped-for advantage from their eastern position on the front porch of the continent, and when many phases of economic life became concentrated in metropolitan centres outside their borders. I do not propose here to weigh the relative importance of factors such as these, but it does appear that the Appalachian barrier has a bearing upon the question as to whether the problems that must in any case have confronted the Maritimes could have been met by them more successfully if they had stayed out of the Dominion of Canada. What were the alternatives to Confederation? Going their own way as separate provinces or as a single colony they would have found themselves isolated from the continental hinterland upon which they would have become increasingly dependent with the decline of their position in oceanic trade. Canadian external traffic would without doubt have moved much more than it has done directly across the Appalachian barrier to the more favourably situated ports of the United States. Canada would have had little inducement to tap the public Treasury in order to provide railway facilities to Maritime Province ports on an uneconomic basis. Or consider the alternative of becoming an eastern outpost of the United States. Within the American orbit the Maritime region would have found itself even more marginal than eastern New England has become in the American system. The United States has no need for the winter ports of the Maritimes. The economy of the Maritimes, moreover, is competitive with that of New England; and it is not difficult to imagine which would have had the worse of it if they had been drawn into the same national orbit. In fact, within the American system the bargaining position of the Maritimes would have been negligible. On the other hand, the Dominion of Canada could not be formed without them. The very barrier that made them remote made them necessary. Only by their integral co-operation could its obstacles be surmounted and a nation be called into being that should possess a geographical basis for enduring independence. When these things are considered, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Maritimes, in view of their natural position and the character of their resources, were exceedingly fortunate that geography also made them necessary to a more populous and a wealthier community, since by association with it in a common national state they could secure, not it is true

all the compensations that they might like, but nevertheless some advantages that they could get in no other way. History since Confederation seems to indicate that the Maritimes have not been unaware of the advantages of the bargaining position that they thus possess.

The imperial Government gave its backing to Confederation once the project was launched, and it speeded the new Dominion's expansion from sea to sea. It did so essentially because, after having spent millions on British North American defence, it came to realize at the time of the American Civil War that the establishment of such a union had become indispensable to Canada's survival and national growth. In political union the sections of British North America might form an interdependent society with sound basis for national life in its possession of wide natural resources and adequate outlets to the sea free from alien control or interference.

The existence of formidable natural barriers between the several sections of Canada has meant and must continue to mean difficulties to be overcome in the creation and in the preservation of the necessary minimum of national unity. But in the case of at least one of these barriers, the Appalachian system, with which we have been specially concerned tonight, it is evident that its existence has also had much to do through long years with calling into being in the northern half of this continent a separate Canada and stimulating its growth into the Canada of today, stretching from ocean to ocean. Canada's natural barriers have each in its own way stimulated the development of a national economy and a national political system by which each section in union with the others might secure a larger share in a national life than would be open to any of them under any other auspices. Canadians who share a hope, as most Canadians seem to do, that Canada will endure and that Canadian unity will grow, may deplore any obstacle that perpetuates division. They will do well to recognize also that a geographical barrier separating sections may nevertheless in some ways unite them. Moreover, by requiring combined effort to surmount it, a barrier may contribute to deeper appreciation of the importance for each section of the common interests of all, to a wider recognition of the continued necessity of shouldering national burdens nationally, and by no means least to the enlargement of a common loyalty. Canadian loyalties to national ideals and institutions are finding nation-wide expression in these present weeks of the royal visit. Such loyalties do not have their basis only in political tradition. They are shaped by a history which has been founded in a very real sense on the solid rock of this continent's basic structure.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE COUREUR DE BOIS AS A SOCIAL TYPE

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At the end of the regular summer's trading with the Algonquins in 1610 Champlain and Pontgravé agreed to allow a young Frenchman to accompany a group of these Indians on their homeward journey. The young man was eager to spend the winter among the savages in order to learn their language. The advantage of having an accomplished interpreter for future dealings with the Algonquins was apparent to all, but Champlain had also in mind the exploration of the country, and the hope of future French penetration. The young adventurer was instructed "to learn what their country was like, see the great lake, observe the rivers and what tribes lived in that region, while at the same time he might explore the mines and the rarest things amongst the tribes in those parts, so that on his return we might be informed of the truth thereof."¹ The Indians were not very keen about this venture but they finally acquiesced to Champlain's urgent demands, though, in order to be on the safe side they insisted that one of their own men should go to France with Champlain. These terms were accepted and the arrangement thus became an exchange of hostages. The young Frenchman in question was Etienne Brulé who had already spent two winters at Quebec, and who now became the first of the long line of coureurs de bois.²

When Champlain returned from France the next year to meet the Indians, and to exchange the Huron, Savignon, for Brulé, he discovered that the French boy had come back dressed like an Indian and delighted with his experiences. Champlain was well pleased with the information that Brulé had brought of the interior and its inhabitants. Relations with the Indians were made easier and both sides saw the value of maintaining friendly relations through such contacts and commitments. Consequently the Hurons requested that a Frenchman be sent to spend the winter with them again this year, a proposal with which Champlain concurred. At least three men were sent, each one with a different group of Indians.³ One of these men was dispatched by a trader, named Bouvier, who, no doubt, hoped by this means to attract more Indians, more furs, and hence more profits to himself the coming season.⁴ Champlain was unable to be in New France in 1612, and when he did get back in 1613 he found the Indians so resentful of the treatment which they had received at the hands of the French traders the year previous that the bulk of them had refused

¹Samuel de Champlain, *Works* (ed. H. P. Biggar, Champlain Society, Toronto, 1922-36), II, 138-9.

²C. W. Butterfield, *History of Brulé's discoveries and explorations, 1610-1626* (Cleveland, 1898), 128, note 3; a certain number of men who might be classed as coureurs de bois appeared in Acadia but they do not seem to have been connected with the main body of the coureurs de bois of the St. Lawrence Valley, nor do they appear to have been a problem in the way that those others were. The limited area precluded so serious a development. Biencourt was described as "leading the life of a Sylvan among the Natives" in 1616 by Father Biard (*The Jesuit relations and allied documents*, ed. Thwaites, Cleveland, 1896-1901, III, 197).

³Champlain, *Works*, II, 188-217; III, 138-51. ⁴*Ibid.*, II, 201-5.

to come to the trade. In an effort to restore good feeling, and to reopen the valuable trade, Champlain decided to go to the Algonquin-Huron country himself.

On this well-known trip he took with him four Frenchmen, of whom the most important was Nicolas Vignau, who had been with the Algonquins of the Ottawa River Valley during the winter of 1611-12. He had reported to Champlain in France with a marvellous tale about the discovery of a short overland route to the Northern Sea which had excited Champlain's curiosity. On the way up the Ottawa the party met a group of Algonquins coming to trade, and one of the Frenchmen was lent to them. These Indians gave them dire warnings of dangers ahead but Champlain and Vignau pushed on. But at Muskrat Lake, Champlain communicated with the Indians through another interpreter, named Thomas,⁵ for by this time he had become suspicious of Vignau. Indian accusations of the man at this place precipitated a showdown in which Vignau was proven to be "the most impudent liar that has been seen for a long time."⁶ In disgust Champlain and his party turned back. In spite of this unfortunate episode Champlain proposed sending two young men up country with the returning Indians again this year. They demurred, fearing that another fiasco would endanger their friendly relations with the French, but they finally succumbed to Champlain's insistence though none of them would have the liar Vignau who was left "in God's keeping."⁷

What had started as an experiment had thus become an effective precedent and an established practice approved by both Champlain and the traders. Indeed, the arguments advanced by Champlain to persuade the French Government to grant a trade monopoly to his Company were that they had founded Quebec, advanced past the rapids, aided the Indians in war, and ventured "to send men there to become acquainted with the tribes, their manner of life and to see what their territory is like."⁸ New men, and more men, were sent to live with the Indians each year so that Sagard could say of his experiences in 1623-4: "there are interpreters everywhere . . . so as not to ignore any of the languages and the infinity of different words . . . and in order to hold the friendship of this people for the French, and to attract their beavers whilst procuring their salvation."⁹ There were, in fact, thirteen Frenchmen in addition to three missionaries in the Algonquin-Huron area that year.¹⁰

The Company, however, did not see eye to eye with Champlain in this matter. The traders were willing to have men learn to be interpreters, and to pay well for inciting the savages to come down to the St. Lawrence with their furs. Brulé was getting one hundred *pistoles* a year for this work.¹¹ But they had no concern to forward either exploration or permanent settlement, the former seeming, no doubt, to be needless and dangerous, and the latter inimical to the interests of the fur trade. Champlain, on the other hand, asserted in 1619 that his constant endeavour for the last fourteen or fifteen years had been ". . . to lay the foundation of a permanent edifice both for the glory of God and also for the renown of the French,"

⁵*Ibid.*, II, 255-305; III, 154-205.

⁶*Ibid.*, II, 255, 305.

⁷*Ibid.*, II, 307; III, 204.

⁸*Ibid.*, II, 221.

⁹G. Sagard-Théodat, *Histoire du Canada* (Paris, 1866), II, 336.

¹⁰Champlain, *Works*, V, 108-9.

¹¹*Ibid.*, V, 132; *Jesuit relations*, IV, 209. Brulé was also allowed to profit by doing a bit of private trading.

and that in that labour exploration and the cultivation of contacts with the Indians had been an essential element.¹² Two years later he complained that the old Company had never "bestowed the slightest reward upon explorers" but had "interposed obstacles" instead.¹³

Some of the coureurs de bois doubtless deemed it wise to adhere strictly to the business of gathering furs for the Company in view of their employers' attitude, but most of them, it would seem, found life in the woods pleasant and exploration an adventure so that they did their bit of looking around with a will. Some of them made outstanding discoveries. Rivalled by the missionaries in endurance and bravery it was, nevertheless, usually the moccasin of the coureur de bois that trod unknown Indian trails, and his paddle that broke the waters of lakes and rivers for the first time. In this respect Etienne Brulé was the leader among the coureurs de bois before 1629. First of known white men he made the long trip up the Ottawa to Lake Huron and southern Ontario.¹⁴ In 1615, having been dispatched by Champlain to aid the Hurons in persuading the Andastes to join them in a joint assault upon the stronghold of the Onondagas, he found the short-cut from Lake Huron to Lake Ontario via Lake Simcoe and either the Humber or the Credit River, so discovering the second of the Great Lakes.¹⁵ Thence he and a few Hurons made their way across the dense forests of unknown western New York to the home of the Andastes in the Susquehanna Valley. The attack upon the Onondagas was a failure and Brulé spent the winter exploring the Susquehanna Valley and part of the Chesapeake Bay area. French goods had found their way into these distant parts through Indian barter years since but no white man, with the possible exception of certain Dutch traders, had ever before set foot above the mouth of the Susquehanna. After three years Brulé was able to report to Champlain, having lived through capture and torture by the Iroquois. Later, Brulé and another coureur de bois, named Grenolle, explored the north shore of Lake Huron. It is possible though not certain that they discovered Lake Superior and the source of the Indians' red copper.¹⁶ Other coureurs de bois whose names are unknown, or merely mentioned, were filling in the details of French knowledge of this continent and its peoples every year as they penetrated further into the Indian world in search of furs and adventure.

Long journeys with the Indians and persistent dwelling at their settlements led the coureurs de bois to adopt Indian ways. In the first place, the French feared to offend the savages from whom came the valuable furs, and one means of pleasing them was the flattery of imitating their manner of life. This was not, of course, a purely one-sided process for the hatchets, kettles, blankets, and trinkets which the French traders brought to the Indians were making the latter increasingly dependent upon the French, and were thus undermining the foundations of Indian economy upon which rested Indian social structure. Indian food and Indian garb clearly suited local conditions better than the equivalent importations of the French since

¹²Champlain, *Works*, III, 14.

¹³*Ibid.*, V, 59.

¹⁴Butterfield, *Brulé's discoveries*, 20, 138-41; J. B. Brebner, *The explorers of North America, 1492-1806* (New York, 1933), 174.

¹⁵Butterfield, *Brulé's discoveries*, 48-9; Brebner, *Explorers*, 178.

¹⁶Sagard, *Histoire*, III, 589; Butterfield, *Brulé's discoveries*, 100-8; Brebner, *Explorers*, 186-7.

they were evolved to suit this environment. The coureurs de bois were quick to note this, and with all the noted receptivity of French colonizers, they rapidly assumed this food and dress as their own. The thrill of novelty may have prompted the first such changes but the utility of the adaptation was sure to appeal to common sense. On the other hand, the Indians were not slow in bringing pressure to bear upon the French in the woods to make them forsake French ways for Indian. Sagard tells an amusing story of the Petuns which illustrates this. One of the ugliest of the Petuns happened one day to see a Frenchman with a large unkempt beard go by. He was immediately all agog. He shouted to his friends, "See that dirty beard, that ugly man. Is it possible that any woman would look on him with favor. He's a bear."¹⁷ Sagard also suggests that the Indians made the French adopt "their clothes and their nudity for the sake of cleanliness."¹⁸ This seems an unlikely though not an impossible explanation for the Récollet missionary did find Frenchmen joining the Indians in their famous sweat chambers.¹⁹

The adoption of Indian manners and customs was not, however, merely a matter of externals like food and dress and baths. Champlain's "young men" were without doubt like most young men irked by the cramping restraints of conventional society, and French society in the seventeenth century was moulded to the most rigid pattern. Shipping to America was in itself an adventure, but beyond the confines of Quebec lay the endless forest with its silver web of streams, and its hordes of red people who were as untrammelled by the social conventions of Europe as they were unburdened by the pompous dress of Paris. Brulé's first winter with the Hurons revealed the possibilities, and the news spread. As the steady line of coureurs de bois paddled its way upstream into the woods year after year far from the discipline of state and church and family, this novel life of freedom was lived with ever-deepening relish. Licence reigned. Champlain might condemn, the missionaries might denounce, but such pleasures, once tasted, were not easily abandoned. In plain fact no one was in a position to stop the coureurs de bois from enjoying their liberties to the full. And the fur trade must go on. Of these conditions Sagard wrote bitterly, ". . . even the French, better instructed [than the Indians], and raised in the School of the Faith, become Savages just as soon as they live with the Savages, and lose even the semblance of the Christian. . . ."²⁰

Even at this early stage, then, most of the French who dwelt amongst the Indians were a thorn in the side of the missionaries. Indeed, the latter affirmed that the French offered as big obstacles as any to the conversion of the Indians through the evil life of some and the indifference of the majority who feared the beaver trade might diminish. They were inclined "to think more highly of beaver than of the salvation of a people. . . ."²¹ The Récollets desired to have the Indians settle permanently at Quebec for the betterment of their religious life, but a member of the Company is reported to have threatened to chase off any Indians that the Récollets should try to settle at Quebec, and to deprive them of trade with the French.²² In the woods it was worse. The missionaries would have some chance of bettering the life of the Huron women, and of improving their

¹⁷Sagard, *Histoire*, II, 350. ¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*, III, 611; *Le grand voyage du pays des Hurons*, I, 190.

²⁰Sagard, *Histoire*, I, 166. ²¹*Ibid.*, 165. ²²*Ibid.*

morals, said Sagard, "if the French who went up with us did not, out of frenzied malice, tell them the opposite (of what we did), defaming and taxing wickedly the honor and modesty of the women and girls of their [Huron] country, so that they could continue their infamous and evil life with more liberty. Hence those who should have aided and served us in the education and conversion of these people by their good examples were the very ones who hindered us and destroyed the good which we went to establish."²³ Brulé was one of the men whom the Récollet had in mind for he had the reputation of being "very vicious in character, and much addicted to women."²⁴ Possibly this had something to do with Brulé's tragic death for he was killed and eaten about 1632 by the very Hurons with whom he had lived so long. It is clear that, in casting off their conventions, and in joining the Indians in laxity, some of the French were so indiscreet as to forget that the Indians had their own conventions which it was dangerous to overstep. For instance, Frenchmen sometimes rifled Indian graves in their lust for the beaver robes which were buried therein.²⁵ By such acts they not merely endangered themselves but the lives of all the French, as in the case which the *coureur de bois*, Du Vernay, reported to Champlain in 1624. He pointed out that the French had been badly treated among certain tribes because most of them had not behaved well among those people.²⁶

Not all of these early *coureurs de bois*, it is true, fell away so fully from the regular ways of the French community. The Récollets were as pleased with the good ones as they were "scandalized by these other brutes, atheists, and sensualists."²⁷ Some of the interpreters were good enough to aid the missionaries in learning the Indian tongues but here too the religious found cause for complaint since many of these men jealously guarded their knowledge, and refused to impart any bit of it. Marsolet, the interpreter to the Montagnais, refused point blank to help Sagard, saying that he had taken an oath not to teach the language to anyone.²⁸ In 1625 the first Jesuits reported the same difficulties. Father Charles Lalemant wrote to the General of the Order, "We, meantime, learning [the Indian languages] from interpreters who were very unwilling to communicate their knowledge."²⁹ If this was partly the result of anti-Jesuit feeling in the colony, it was primarily an effort on the interpreters' part to retain the advantages attached to their monopoly. In this they were acting like the Indians who often showed a disinclination to take the secular French on their trips for fear of revealing the sources of their profitable trade, and of losing their position as middlemen.³⁰ The French in the woods whom the missionaries could regard as good and helpful were, in reality, so few that Champlain stood out as a shining exception, and Sagard could say of him, "There will be found but few men who can dwell with the savages as he did for . . . he was never suspected of evil during all the years he lived with these barbarians."³¹

In 1628 and 1629 came the crisis of the first British conquest and the disruption of the colony. Supplies ran low as the boats from France failed to arrive, and it became necessary to seek a solution to the dilemma. It

²³*Ibid.*, II, 327. ²⁴Champlain, *Works*, V, 132. ²⁵Sagard, *Histoire*, III, 647.

²⁶Champlain, *Works*, V, 129. ²⁷Sagard, *Grand voyage*, I, 123-4.

²⁸Sagard, *Histoire*, II, 333. ²⁹*Jesuit Relations*, IV, 179.

³⁰Sagard, *Histoire*, I, 227-8; *Grand voyage*, I, 75-6. Such cases may be found in all the early records.

³¹Sagard, *Histoire*, IV, 830.

was found in the sending of groups of men to live with the Indians to ease the burden at Quebec. Twenty men stayed with the Hurons during the winter of 1628-9.³² Such a solution was manifestly made possible by the practice which had accustomed French and Indians to living together in the woods for years past, since most if not all the men so sent in 1628 were doubtless men of past experience as coureurs de bois. In 1629 twenty out of thirty men dispatched with Boullée, who was carrying letters to Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIII, decided to stay at Gaspé with the Indians rather than take the risks of the voyage.³³ The uncertainties of the trip to France would not likely have seemed so threatening had not most of these men known from experience that life with the Indians was livable, even enjoyable, and hence preferable to a dangerous trip that might or might not end in France.

A few coureurs de bois were prepared to go over to the enemy. Champlain wrote in 1628: "There are not lacking perfidious Frenchmen, unworthy of the name, who go off to the Englishmen and the Dutch and give them information about our condition. . . ."³⁴ The traitors included Brulé and Marsolet, the two coureurs de bois of longest standing.³⁵ The long years of breaking with convention and tradition were exhibiting their influence. It was easy for men of this experience to break with traditional loyalties. Quitting now the life of the woods, the easy-going ways of the Indians, the profits of the fur trade, was unthinkable. They had committed themselves to a type of life adjusted to conditions of the New World, and no longer could they contemplate returning to the life of France. They had burned their bridges behind them. It was easier, by far, for them to throw in their lot with the foreigner, if that meant staying in Canada, than to think of going back to the France where they now had no roots. Merely a handful of men were involved in this decision, it is true, though some of them were among the most vigorous in the colony. Others, who cannot be classed as traitors, chose to stay in the woods with the Indians under British rule rather than go back to France. The significance of such decisions was to appear in the future since this type of man, the coureur de bois, and the sort of life which bred this type, were constantly to increase when the French régime was resumed. After all, this decision to stay in the New World even under foreign domination, though made in a more drastic and unorthodox manner, was the same choice as that made by the respected Hébert-Couillard family of settlers. They had all grown roots in the soil of Quebec, and would not now choose to leave.

With the return of the French to New France in 1632 we enter into a new stage in the development of the coureurs de bois. This may be called the period of the good coureur de bois. Relations were re-established with those who had chosen to stay in the woods during the English control, but if Brulé and Marsolet had been the characteristic coureurs de bois of the first period, it was men like Jean Nicolet and François Marguerie who were typical of the new period. Even Marsolet, hitherto unco-operative, became helpful to the missionaries though he remained suspect, naturally enough, in those quarters.³⁶

Jean Nicolet came out to Quebec in 1618, and, as one of Champlain's

³²Champlain, *Works*, VI, 41, 45, 26-7; Sagard, *Histoire*, IV, 888-9.

³³Champlain, *Works*, VI, 39-40.

³⁴*Ibid.*, V, 268.

³⁵*Ibid.*, VI, 63, 98-102.

³⁶*Jesuit relations*, V, 113.

young men, was sent immediately to live with the Indians. The attitude which he developed is as important as his well-known discoveries. He found the life with the Indians so congenial that he was one of the *coureurs de bois* who preferred to stay in the woods during the English occupation. He became so identified with the Nipissings, with whom he lived for about nine years, that he passed as one of them, took part in their councils, and had his own cabin and household among them. Nicolet was recalled to be made agent and interpreter for the Company of New France in 1633 though Father Le Jeune states that ". . . he only withdrew to place his salvation in safety by the use of the Sacraments, without which there is great risk for the soul among the Savages."³⁷ There are no other indications that Nicolet was much concerned about his religious life while with the Indians, nor that he helped the missionaries in the earlier period, though he may have been one of the good *coureurs de bois* referred to by Sagard. One of Champlain's last commissions was to dispatch Nicolet upon an exploring trip to the West. In the realm of discovery he deserves to rank with Brulé. He discovered Lake Michigan, Green Bay, and the Fox River up which he travelled until he was only three days' journey from the upper reaches of the Wisconsin River, a tributary of the Mississippi. He heard of the Great River but did not reach its banks.³⁸ Upon his return he settled as agent at Trois Rivières, then moved to Quebec, to take Olivier's place as chief agent. In these posts, and, it is to be noted, after he became established permanently in the settlements, Nicolet was of the greatest assistance to the missionaries in converting the Indians "whom he could shape and bend howsoever he would, with a skill that can hardly be matched."³⁹ His death by drowning in 1642 was regarded by Father Vimont as an event deeply "grievous for all the country" since his zeal for the Indians' salvation would "inspire even the most fervent Religious with a desire to imitate him."⁴⁰

From the recovery of the colony to the governorship of Jean de Lauzon, the writers of the *Jesuit relations* were constantly painting pictures of the model lives of the French in the settlements and in the woods. Father Brébeuf reported to Father Le Jeune from Huronia in 1635 that ". . . all our French have borne themselves, thank God, so virtuously and so peaceably on all sides, during the whole year, that they have drawn down the blessing of Heaven."⁴¹ Two years later Father Le Jeune announced ". . . the Soil of new France is watered by so many heavenly blessings, that souls nourished in virtue find here their true element . . ." and diseased souls never grow worse and often, in this "salubrious air," "far removed from opportunities for sin," grow better. It is a land that produces "heads of wheat" from "thistle-seeds."⁴² In 1639 Father Buteux informed the General at Rome that "it is proverbial among the French, that 'he who wishes to become better let him cross over to new France'."⁴³ And the next year Father Vimont told his public that "We are living here in a golden age." "Verily, one lives in these countries in great innocence,—virtue reigns here as if in its empire; vice, which pursues it incessantly,

³⁷*Ibid.*, IX, 217; XXIII, 275-81.

³⁸Brebner, *Explorers*, 191 (note).

³⁹*Jesuit relations*, XXIII, 279.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 281-3; cf. Jesuit opinion of François Marguerie in *ibid.*, X, 74-5; XXXII, 137-41.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, VIII, 149.

⁴²*Ibid.*, XI, 63.

⁴³*Ibid.*, XVII, 235.

only appears secretly and by stealth, never introducing itself without humiliation. . . . In a word, the road to Heaven seems shorter from our own great forests than from your large cities."⁴⁴

These effusive outpourings of fervent missionaries, intended for a devout audience in France, and, in part, too, as publicity for immigrants and philanthropic supporters, must be taken with a measure of reserve. Even in the *Jesuit relations* there is evidence that all was not as righteous and serene in New France as these descriptions would lead one to suppose. The baleful influence of the earlier coureurs de bois still hampered the missionaries. Father Charles Lalemant wrote to Father Vimont in 1640: "Would to God that all the French who first came to these regions had been like him [Champlain]! We would not so often blush for them in the presence of our Savages, who oppose to us their immodesties and the debauches of several, as if this were an infallible proof, that what we threaten them with, concerning hell, is nothing but fables,—inasmuch as those first Frenchmen whom they knew had no fear thereof."⁴⁵ Again and again as disease or other catastrophe threatened the Hurons they accused the French of seeking revenge of the murder of Brulé. "Brulé's . . . wounds are still bleeding," ruefully wrote Father Le Jeune in 1637.⁴⁶ In the same year he admitted that there were still "loose fellows who scandalize the Savages through their brutal language," and that the Indians often accused the French of being drunk, and of stealing from them. But, he affirmed, these faults belonged to but a very few unimportant people.⁴⁷ In 1641 the Jesuit fathers pointed out that taking French domestics, who were not bound by special vows, into the woods was a very doubtful procedure as there was no way of restraining people except by way of conscience. Evidently they felt that the dissolving influences of the woods life would reassert themselves if ever proper restraints were withdrawn.⁴⁸ Also in this period began the traffic in brandy. It started with the independent traders along the Gaspé coast, and at Tadoussac, and gradually found its way to Quebec, whence it was to travel into the woods. As early as 1636 drunkards were being punished at Quebec, and in 1637 Father Le Jeune, who blamed the whole business upon the English, confessed sadly ". . . but it is very difficult to prevent our Frenchmen from co-operating in this dissolute conduct. . . ."⁴⁹

Despite this evidence of human frailty, it seems to be certain that the bulk of the French, both the coureurs de bois and the settlers, lived throughout this period distinctly respectable lives. So true was this that the Jesuits recommended the settlement of Frenchmen among the Indians as good examples of moral and religious living. Indeed, they gave as the second most effective reason for the advancement of missionary work among the Hurons "the example of our secular French." They even agreed to allow French-Indian marriages, and pointed out that these had taken place in the past freely enough when the French had been eager "to become barbarians, and to render themselves exactly like them," but these new alliances were designed to give knowledge of the true God and his commandments, and "were to be stable and perpetual" in contrast to the previous degrading and unstable unions.⁵⁰

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, XVIII, 83-5. ⁴⁵*Ibid.*, XX, 19.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, XII, 89; X, 37, 305-11; XIV, 17. ⁴⁷*Ibid.*, XI, 75.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, XXI, 293-301. ⁴⁹*Ibid.*, XI, 197; IX, 145.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, XVII, 45; XIV, 19-21; VI, chap. III.

One is naturally led to ask the question, what made so sharp a difference in the attitude of the *coureurs de bois* of this period, as compared to those of the earlier period, towards the social and religious conventions. The answer would appear to be threefold. First, the missionaries in New France were now the Jesuits, representatives of a much stronger and wealthier order than the Récollets who had begun the mission work at Quebec. The Jesuits had arrived in 1625 but they did not become solidly established until, with the return of the colony to France, they received exclusive control of the mission. Their superior resources and organization, their greater numbers, the *donné* system of bond-servants which they utilized,⁵¹ and, particularly, their settlements in the woods of Huronia⁵² enabled them to exert a degree of control over the French in the woods and at Quebec that had been impossible for the earlier missionaries. Jesuit influence was, in turn, bolstered by the foundation of Montreal, and by the work of the Ursulines, and the nuns of the Hospital at Quebec.⁵³

Secondly, this was a period of greater co-operation and more sympathetic understanding between the Company, the missionaries, and the colonists. This change reflects the influence of Cardinal Richelieu who was keen to build a strong Catholic colony in New France. Most important was the personal supervision of the colony by Richelieu's Governor, the Chevalier de Montmagny, a strong, devout character. Under his inspiration the Company abetted settlement, even of the Indians, and aided the missionaries.⁵⁴ "For do not think," wrote Father Charles Lalemant in 1644, "that, in the nine years during which he has had the Government of it, anyone could have acted with more zeal than he has displayed, with more disinterested prudence, with more strength of mind, and with more truly Christian courage, amid the almost insurmountable difficulties which we have encountered, and that would have discouraged a heart less firm than his."⁵⁵ An act typical of Montmagny was the issuance of the regular annual presents to the Indians in the name of religion. Pleased with this gesture, Father Le Jeune stated: "It is rare prudence in these Gentlemen [of the Company] to ascribe to Religion what has been given, up to the present, almost entirely through policy. It costs nothing to offer with holy intentions that which must be given for another reason, in order to retain the friendship of these peoples. It is one of the fine expedients of Monsieur the Chevalier de Montmagny and of Monsieur de l'Isle, his Lieutenant."⁵⁶ Under this administration there was less interest in making contact with new tribes, and in exploration. The Company was satisfied if the *coureurs de bois* brought the Indian trading fleets to the established markets year by year. Consequently the *coureurs de bois* for the most part spent their time during this period in areas, and along routes, relatively well-known and controlled.

Thirdly, the constant menace of the Iroquois, reaching its climax in the destruction of Huronia, and in direct attacks upon the French settlements, forced all the French to hold together in a way that made flouting the accepted customs and standards less thinkable if not impossible.

⁵¹For a description of the *donné* system see *ibid.*, XXI, 293-305.

⁵²*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 269. In 1649 there were twenty-two religious, twenty-three *donnés*, seven servants, four boys, and eight soldiers at the Huron mission.

⁵³See Father J. Lalemant's statement in *ibid.*, XXVIII, 269-71.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, XVI, 33; XVII, 47; XVIII, 243.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 47.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, XII, 257; XXII, 311.

But if the Iroquois menace exerted for a while this beneficent influence, in the end it brought this period of the good coureurs de bois to a close. Father Le Mercier graphically pointed out in 1653, "Never were there more Beavers in our lakes and rivers, but never have there been fewer seen in the ware houses of the country." The Hurons had been destroyed. The Algonquins were depopulated, and the more distant nations were withdrawing for fear of the Iroquois. "For a year," he goes on, "the warehouse of Montreal has not bought a single Beaver-skin from the Savages," and "In the Quebec warehouse there is nothing but poverty." General dissatisfaction prevailed. It was impossible to pay the charges due, or even to meet the necessary expenses of the country. The Iroquois had dried up all the springs of trade. There was one solution and that was now taken. If the Indians could not, or would not come to the French, the French must go to the Indians. So Father Le Mercier records, "Moreover, all our young Frenchmen are planning to go on a trading expedition, to find the Nations that are scattered here and there; and they hope to come back laden with the Beaver-skins of several years accumulation."⁵⁷ With this began a new period in which men were to go to the woods in larger numbers than ever. But now Montmagny was gone, and the mission controls in the woods were gone. A new era of licence was being ushered in.

Signs had been accumulating for some time that the period of the good coureurs de bois was coming to an end. The cession of the right of trade by the Company of New France to the Company of the Habitants in 1645 gave the leading colonists a more direct interest in the fur trade than they had previously had, and their increased concern for the trade was sure to make them increasingly restive under any control that might check profits. As the Iroquois wars made it more and more necessary to send Frenchmen into the woods to persuade the Indians once again to venture to the trading centres with their furs, or else, to dispose of their furs to the coureurs de bois in the woods, it was certain that many of the habitants would join the coureurs de bois, or sponsor coureurs de bois for the sake of the trade. Soldiers who had gone to defend Huronia in 1644 had been allowed to trade for furs, and had brought back a good haul.⁵⁸ This experience was unquestionably for some of them an initiation into the attractions of the career of coureur de bois. Even from the *donnés* and Jesuit servants came men like Groseilliers to swell the ranks of the coureurs de bois.⁵⁹ Jesuit participation in the fur trade, a privilege stoutly maintained at the time of the formation of the Company of the Habitants, may have eased this transition. The brandy trade was expanding. "It is useless," wrote Father Jean Lalement in 1646, "to forbid the trade in wine and brandy with the Savages, there is always found some base soul who, to gain a little Beaver fur, introduces by Moonlight some bottles in their cabins."⁶⁰ And one of the first acts which the new Governor, d'Ailleboust, found requisite in 1648 was to issue ordinances against the liquor trade at Quebec.⁶¹ Brandy would be soon finding its way into the canoes and packs of the coureur de bois.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, XL, 211-15.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, XXIX, 77.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, XXVII, 89.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 49-51.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 229.

Symptomatic of the new period was the appearance of two coureurs de bois who were to become, in some ways, the best known and most notorious of the whole group—Médard Chouart, Sieur des Groseilliers, and Pierre Esprit Radisson. Brothers-in-law, these two men possessed a measure of bravery and ingenuity, and a knowledge of Indian customs and speech that was unsurpassed. Groseilliers had been a Jesuit *donné*, but Radisson had gained his skill through the harder course of capture, torture, and adoption by the Iroquois. He was an apt pupil, and learned to go on a tomahawking expedition and return with scalps and prisoners like any other Iroquois brave.⁶²

Intrepidly Groseilliers and an unidentified companion had pushed into the region of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior from 1654 to 1657. The exact course of their travels cannot be ascertained. In their far-flung wanderings it was brought home to them, as Professor Brebner indicates, that in the future the coureurs de bois would have to follow the Indians farther than ever before, to the Sault Ste. Marie, and the Straits of Mackinac and beyond; and that, with the destruction of the Huron villages food supplies for these long trips had become very uncertain. Hence, in the future, journeys to the up country would require two years, or else the French would have to establish supply dépôts along the routes of travel.⁶³ But beyond increasing the cost of the furs, this meant that the coureurs de bois would have to go farther into the woods, and stay longer beyond the supervision of missionary and Governor than at any previous time.

Radisson was associated with the Jesuit mission to the Onondagas in 1657-8 when a group of Frenchmen proved in their well-known exploit to escape destruction that they had learned well how to match the Indians in trickery and cunning. Shortly after the return of this group to Quebec, Groseilliers and Radisson embarked upon the great voyage to the west (1658-60) which was to do so much to restore the fur trade and the economic health of the colony.⁶⁴ Information and inspiration gained from this trip caused the two coureurs to plan a more ambitious voyage beyond the land of the middlemen to the source of the fur supply itself. Such a challenge to the Company's monopoly and to the Governor's arrangements with the Indians they naturally tried to keep secret. But the secret leaked out and they found difficulty obtaining a licence from the Governor. D'Argenson wished to send two of his own along and divide the profits equally.⁶⁵ The system of licensing coureurs de bois had been established in 1654 by Governor de Lauzon when it had become clear that the old Company system was a failure. The *congé* system was established to save the fur trade which sustained the colony and, at the same time, to keep a proper check upon all those who went into the woods.⁶⁶ Groseilliers and his unknown companion, it appears reasonably certain, were the men who made the first trip to the up country with a written *congé* from de Lauzon. In 1661, however, Groseilliers and Radisson found it impossible to come to terms with Governor d'Argenson even with the benevolent intermediation of the Jesuits who wanted the two men to fall in with a scheme of

⁶²P. E. Radisson, *Voyages* (ed. G. D. Scull, The Prince Society, Boston, 1885), 63-77.

⁶³Brebner, *Explorers*, 227; A. S. Morton, *A history of the Canadian west to 1870-71* (London, 1939), 39-40.

⁶⁴Morton, *Canadian west*, 41-2.

⁶⁵Radisson, *Voyages*, 174; Morton, *Canadian west*, 42-3.

⁶⁶*Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec pour 1924-5*, 383-4.

theirs for conquest in the empire of furs. So, one night, they slipped away without the official permit. They returned two years later in 1663 bringing with them a great fur fleet, a wealth of furs, and a claim to have made the discovery of an overland route to the northern sea, or Hudson's Bay, from the west end of Lake Superior. The two coureurs de bois had expected praise and reward for their brilliant deeds but they were received by the irate Governor with fines and punishment to their disgust. When redress was not forthcoming from France, the two men took that step which was to prove so decisive. They went over to the English, who, with the help of their knowledge and guidance, soon formed the Hudson's Bay Company, most dangerous of rivals to the French fur traders.⁶⁷ Hence have we gone a full turn. We are back to the days of Etienne Brulé. In 1663, Pierre Boucher could write harshly of "the many libertine French" among the Indians.⁶⁸ The exploits of Radisson and Groseilliers had inspired many another. The lure of the wild and the dream of profits were swelling the ranks of the coureurs de bois.

In such manner over the years since the founding of New France was created a group of men whose existence was now to constitute one of the chief worries of the royal colonial administration which, at this date, was assuming control of the colony following the abolition of the old company rule. Out of Champlain's desire for exploration and empire, out of the traders' striving for wealth, out of the labour and defence requirements of the missions, was born the coureur de bois. Life in the woods weaned these men from the life and ways of old France. Their commitments in custom, and manner of life, and ways of thought were to New France, to America, to Canada. In a more showy, more slashing, but no less certain fashion than their brothers, the habitants, they were cutting loose from their old ties. Like the habitants they were evolving a North American mentality and outlook. Unlike the habitants they cared but little for authority and tradition. Nor did they have the habitants' love of the soil and hopes for the settlements. To them what mattered was the dip of the paddle in the unknown stream, the feel of good, rich fur, the rollicking life of the Indian camp. It is little wonder that Jean Talon, bearing the responsibility of royal authority upon his shoulders, should find one of his major tasks to be the solution of the problem of the coureur de bois.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Morton said that it had been generally assumed that Radisson had accompanied Groseilliers during the latter's explorations in 1654-7; but he did not believe this assumption to be correct.

Mr. Stanley thought that too little attention had been paid to the activities of the coureurs de bois in the Maritime region.

Mr. Brebner discussed Mr. Stanley's suggestion with reference to the character of the Acadian region, which he thought was geographically ill-suited to the development of the coureur de bois type. The restricted area of Acadia, its availability to sea traffic and to contact from Europe, made impossible the special conditions which obtained in the region of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes.

⁶⁷Radisson, *Voyages*, 236, 240-5; Morton, *Canadian west*, 43-6.

⁶⁸P. Boucher, *Histoire véritable et naturelle des moeurs et productions du pays de la Nouvelle France*, 135.

LIFE AND CUSTOMS IN THE FRENCH VILLAGES OF THE OLD ILLINOIS COUNTRY (1763-1939)¹

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On August 24, 1765, Captain Thomas Stirling² left Fort Pitt with a detachment of about one hundred men of the Forty-second or Black Watch Regiment to occupy the Illinois country.³ He reached Fort de Chartres,⁴ the administrative headquarters of the region, on October 9, and the next day Louis St. Ange de Bellerive⁵ and his garrison were formally relieved, and left for St. Louis,⁶ which had been founded the year before. Thus, on October 10, 1765, British occupation of the last of the French posts in the West became a reality.⁷ More than two years had elapsed since the ratifi-

¹Accounts of the life and customs in Illinois under the French régime will be found in Clarence W. Alvord, "The country of the Illinois" (*The Illinois country, 1673-1818*, Centennial history of Illinois, Springfield, Ill., I, 1920, 190-224), hereafter cited as Alvord, *The Illinois country*; Joseph Wallace, "General description of the French colonists" (*Illinois and Louisiana under French rule*, Cincinnati, 1893, 404-16).

²Concerning Captain Thomas Stirling, see *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, 1898); *Documents relative to the colonial history of the State of New York* (Albany, 1856), VII, 786, n. 1; Clarence E. Carter, *Great Britain and the Illinois country, 1763-1774* (Washington, 1910), 46-53.

³Forts Niagara, Venango, Sanduski, Miami, Detroit, Ouiatanon, St. Joseph, Michillimackinac, and others in the interior, had been occupied by the British as early as 1760. However, between 1763 and October, 1765, they made nine different attempts before they succeeded in reaching the Illinois country, where the Indians, under the leadership of Pontiac, refused to recognize British supremacy in the West. The history of these expeditions is told in detail in Clarence W. Alvord and Clarence E. Carter, *The critical period, 1763-1765* (Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, X, British series, I, Springfield, Ill., 1915); hereafter cited as Alvord and Carter, *The critical period*. For a shorter treatment one may consult Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 259-85; Carter, "Occupation of the Illinois country" (*Great Britain and the Illinois country*, 27-45); Joseph H. Schlarman, "From Stirling to Clark" (*From Quebec to New Orleans*, Belleville, Ill., 1929, 423-51).

⁴The reader interested in the history of Fort de Chartres, for almost two generations the stronghold of French power in the upper Louisiana Valley, will find the following studies very useful: Gertrude Corrigan, "The two hundredth anniversary of Fort de Chartres" (*Illinois Catholic historical review*, II, April, 1920, 474-88); Edward G. Mason, "Illinois in the eighteenth century. I. Old Fort de Chartres" (*Chapters from Illinois history*, Chicago, 1901, 212-49); Schlarman, "Fort de Chartres," "Barthelmy de Makarty—The new Fort de Chartres" (*From Quebec to New Orleans*, 190-8; 292-8); J. F. Snyder, "The armament of Fort de Chartres" (*Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society*, IX, 219-31; hereafter cited as *Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*); Joseph Wallace, "Fort de Chartres: Its origin, growth and decline" (*Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*, VIII, 105-17). For contemporary descriptions of the fort, see Newton D. Mereness, "Journal of Captain Harry Gordon, 1766" (*Travels in the American colonies*, New York, 1916, 472-4); Captain Philip Pittman, *The state of the European settlements on the Mississippi* (An exact reprint of the original edition. London, 1770; edited, with introduction, notes, and index, by Frank Heywood Hodder; Cleveland, 1906), 88-90; hereafter cited as Pittman, *Mississippi settlements*.

⁵Walter B. Douglas, "The Sieurs de St. Ange" (*Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*, XIV, 135-46).

⁶Wallace, *Illinois and Louisiana under French rule*, 385.

⁷See the official minutes of the cession of Fort de Chartres dated October 10, 1765, and signed by Commandant St. Ange and Attorney-General Lefebvre for the French and by Captain Stirling and Commissary Rumsey for the English (Alvord and Carter, *The new régime, 1765-1767*, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, XI, British series, II, Springfield, Ill., 1916, 91-101; hereafter cited as Alvord and Carter, *The new régime*).

cation of the Treaty of Paris on February 10, 1763. The region to which Captain Stirling was bringing British rule consisted of the five villages of Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, Nouvelle-Chartres, Saint-Philippe, and Cahokia. These establishments, settled mostly by Canadians between 1699 and 1755,⁸ were situated along the eastern bank of the Mississippi in what is now known as the American Bottom, a seventy-five mile strip of fertile alluvial land⁹ beginning at a point opposite present-day St. Louis and stretching southward.¹⁰

Unfortunately, upon learning about the irretrievable loss of New France, most of the French civil and military leaders of Illinois relinquished their posts at least a year before the arrival of the British troops of occupation.¹¹ The country even lost all of its clergy, except for one priest, old and feeble Father Meurin¹² of the Society of Jesus, who was so touched by the devotion of his Indian charges that he rejoined them from New Orleans. As a result of that general exodus, the British officials found the civil and religious administration of Illinois completely disorganized when they reached Fort de Chartres in 1765.¹³ The resident military com-

⁸Charlevoix, who visited the region in October, 1721, speaks of Kaskaskia as a big village settled by "French, almost all Canadians" (*Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1744, III, 394). In his trip to the Illinois country in the 1720's, Le Page du Pratz observed that three-fourths of the inhabitants were Canadians. See *Histoire de la Louisiane* (Paris, 1758), II, 296. The investigations made by Alvord concerning the origins of the Cahokia families enumerated in the census of 1787 prove conclusively that practically all of them had come from Canada. See *Cahokia records, 1778-1790* (Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, II, Virginia series, I, Springfield, Ill., 1907), 624-32; hereafter cited as Alvord, *Cahokia records*.

⁹Since the end of the seventeenth century, the Illinois country has been known among the French as the "Paradis Terrestre." The author has heard in Cahokia and in Prairie du Rocher some of the older descendants of the early Canadian pioneers use the term with pride in speaking about the American Bottom.

¹⁰Additional information on the location of these villages may be found in Alvord, *Cahokia records*, xv-xvi; Alvord and Carter, *The critical period*, xxx-xxxi. A good map of the region, based on that published by Collot in his *Voyage dans l'Amérique septentrionale* (Paris, 1796), can be consulted in Alvord, *Cahokia records*. For eighteenth-century descriptions, see "Aubry's account of the Illinois country, 1763" (Alvord and Carter, *The critical period*, 4-5); "Jennings' journal, March 8, 1776-April 6, 1766" (Alvord and Carter, *The new régime*, 107-11), Stirling to Gage, Oct. 18, 1765; *ibid.*, 124-7, Stirling to Gage, Dec. 15, 1765; Thomas Hutchins, *A topographical description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina* (London, 1778; Hicks ed., Cleveland, 1904), 107-9; Mereness, "Journal of Captain Harry Gordon, 1766" (*Travels*, 471-7); Pittman, *Mississippi settlements*, 84-93.

¹¹Neyon de Villiers, who was then commanding officer in Illinois, expected the British to occupy the country during the winter of 1763-4. This failed to materialize and the Indians, stirred up by Pontiac, became more and more threatening. Annoyed at the situation, Neyon de Villiers sailed down the Mississippi to New Orleans on June 15, 1764. He was accompanied by sixty soldiers and eighty of the French inhabitants. St. Ange, formerly commander at Poste Vincennes, succeeded him at Fort de Chartres (Carter, *Great Britain and the Illinois country*, 35-6).

¹²Father Charles H. Metzger, S. J., has written a good biographical sketch of Father Meurin. See "Sébastien Louis Meurin" (*Illinois Catholic historical review*, III, 241-59). Father Meurin was the only priest in the Illinois country until the arrival of Father Pierre Gibault in 1768.

¹³According to Alvord and Carter (*The critical period*, xx), the only civil officials Stirling found in Illinois in 1765 were Joseph Labuxière, clerk and notary public, and Joseph Lefebvre, who acted as judge, attorney-general, and guardian of the royal warehouse. Upon the evacuation of the fort by the French garrison, both established themselves in St. Louis. The correspondence exchanged between Father Meurin and Bishop Briand, his ecclesiastical superior in Quebec, gives us a vivid description of

mander was therefore compelled to assume civil duties, a step which did not have the sanction of British law.¹⁴ Army officers inexperienced in civil administration proved incompetent. Lieutenant-Colonels John Reed¹⁵ and John Wilkins,¹⁶ who were in command at Fort de Chartres practically all the time from the beginning of the summer of 1766 until the spring of 1772, were more interested in deriving financial gain from their offices than in providing the population with an honest and efficient administration. Clarence W. Alvord, the noted Illinois historian, tells us that both charged outrageous fees for issuing writs and similar documents, even demanding exorbitant sums for receiving oaths of allegiance.¹⁷

A number of enterprising inhabitants of Kaskaskia and the surrounding villages crossed the river and settled in Spanish territory in order to escape British rule.¹⁸ The Spanish régime and institutions were quite compatible with the spirit and traditions of the French inhabitants, as the Spaniards maintained French laws in their new territory, which had been ceded to them by France a few years before. The two Illinois villages of Nouvelle-Chartres and Saint-Philippe, which had respectively forty and sixteen families in 1760, were already deserted when Captain Philip Pittman visited the region about 1766.¹⁹ In the meanwhile, the threat of an attack by the American colonists was becoming more and more imminent every day. The French who had not passed over to the western bank of the Mississippi were subjected to intense anti-British propaganda by local merchants coming from the Eastern States. To make matters worse, time

religious conditions in Illinois at the beginning of the British rule. See Alvord and Carter, *The new régime*, 521-9, 558-65, 568-9, 587-91; Alvord and Carter, *Trade and politics, 1767-1769* (Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, XVI, British series, III, Springfield, Ill., 1921), 529-35; 548-57.

¹⁴Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 264; Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British politics* (Cleveland, 1917), II, 197. The most thorough treatment of this aspect of British rule will be found in Carter, "Status of the Illinois country" (*Great Britain and the Illinois country*, 13-26).

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 55-61.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 64-76; *Historical magazine*, VIII, Aug., 1864, 258; *Documents relative to the colonial history of the State of New York* (Albany, 1857), VIII, 185.

¹⁷Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 266.

¹⁸Although they were not supposed to move to the Spanish side of the Mississippi until they had obtained the necessary authorization from the British commandant, a large number of French inhabitants during night took the ferries across to Ste. Genevieve and St. Louis. "Many of them coming from over the other side brought with them not only all they possessed that was movable, but in many cases even dismantled their houses and took along the doors and windows, planking, in fact everything that could be moved, leaving but the logs and the chimneys" (Frederick J. Billon, *Annals of St. Louis*, 2 vols., St. Louis, 1886, 1888; quoted by John Rothensteiner, "Kaskaskia—Father Benedict Roux," *Illinois Catholic historical review*, I, April, 1919, 201), Commandant Dabbadie of New Orleans wrote in 1764 that the latest census showed a population of about 1,400 inhabitants in Illinois. See Alvord and Carter, *The critical period*, 209, D'Abbadie to the Minister, Jan. 10, 1764. According to Lieutenant Fraser, there were about 2,000 white persons on the British side of the Mississippi in the summer of 1765. See *ibid.*, 492, Fraser to Gage, May 15, 1765. Pittman, who was stationed in Illinois some time between 1765 and 1767, also estimated the population of the region at approximately "2000, of all ages and sexes" (*Mississippi settlements*, 102). However, the census of 1767 sets the population of Illinois at about only 1,000 (Alvord and Carter, *The new régime*, 469). This is undoubtedly the most reliable of all the figures given up to this point.

¹⁹Pittman, *Mississippi settlements*, 88 ff., 91. The information given by Pittman is corroborated by Mereness, "Journal of Captain Harry Gordon, 1766" (*Travels*, 472 ff.).

passed and the authorities neglected to accede to the popular demand for civil courts.²⁰ Philippe François de Rastel, Chevalier de Rocheblave,²¹ a former French officer who had become commander of Ste. Genevieve in Spanish territory about 1766, threw in his lot with the British administration some time in the seventies and was appointed commandant of the Illinois country in 1776. He knew that he was surrounded by French and British sympathizing with the Americans. The officers of the militia in Kaskaskia and Cahokia spoke openly of receiving without opposition any rebellious troops which might be sent against them.²² Rocheblave begged Governor Carleton for help to cope with this critical situation.²³ He soon realized that reinforcements would not be forthcoming and stoically awaited the fatal arrival of the colonial soldiers, an event which he expected to take place at any time. Ironically enough, when George Rogers Clark and his "Long Knives" entered Kaskaskia during the evening of July 4, 1778, they found him asleep in his bed.²⁴ The Illinois country had been wrested from the British without the firing of a single shot.²⁵

The new régime began under the most favourable auspices and raised great hopes in the hearts of the French. Clark assured the Canadian priest, Father Pierre Gibault,²⁶ that the Americans had no intentions of interfering with the people's form of worship,²⁷ and later informed the inhabitants that France had signed a treaty of alliance with the colonists.²⁸ The French villages rallied at once to the defence of the American cause and contributed

²⁰See Carter, "The struggle for a civil government" (*Great Britain and the Illinois country*, 145-63).

²¹George E. Mason, "British Illinois: Philippe François de Rastel, Chevalier de Rocheblave" (*Chicago Historical Society, Collections*, IV, 1890, 360-81), and "Rocheblave papers" (*ibid.*, 382-419); Alvord "Introduction" (*Cahokia records*, xxv-xlvi).

²²The text of Rocheblave's request for aid is to found in Mason, "Rocheblave papers," 416-17.

²³Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 321-2.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 326.

²⁵The career of George Rogers Clark and the story of his winning of the North-West is told by himself in James, *Clark papers*, 114-54, Letter to Mason, Nov. 19, 1779, and "Memoir, 1773-1779" (*ibid.*, 208-32). See also Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 323-57; Temple Bodley, *George Rogers Clark: His life and public services* (Boston and New York, 1926); J. P. Dunn, "The Hannibal of the West" (*Indiana: A redemption from slavery*, Boston and New York, 1891, 131-76); William H. English, *Conquest of the country northwest of the River Ohio, 1778-1783, and life of Gen. George Rogers Clark*, 2 vols. (Indianapolis and Kansas City, 1897); James, "Introduction" (*Clark papers*), and *Life of George Rogers Clark* (Chicago, 1928); Frederick Palmer, *Clark of the Ohio* (New York, 1929); Schlarman, *From Quebec to New Orleans*, 491-556.

²⁶Alvord, "Father Pierre Gibault and the submission of Post Vincennes, 1778" (*American historical review*, XIV, 544-7); Alvord, "The oath of Vincennes" (*Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*, XII, 270-6); J. P. Dunn, "Father Gibault: The patriot priest of the Northwest" (*Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*, X, 15-34); John Rothensteiner, "Father Pierre Gibault, the patriot priest" (*History of the Archdiocese of St. Louis*, St. Louis, 1928, I, 132-9); Joseph J. Thompson, "Illinois' first citizen, Pierre Gibault" (*Ill. Catholic historical review*, I, July, 1918, 79-94; Oct., 1918, 234-48; Jan., 1919, 380-7; April, 1919, 484-94; II, July, 1919, 85-94; VIII, July, 1925, 3-28; Oct., 1925, 99-105).

²⁷James, *Clark papers*, 121, Clark to Mason, Nov. 19, 1779.

²⁸The treaty of alliance between France and the United States was signed on February 6, 1778. Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia, the state under whose auspices the conquest of the North-West was accomplished, wrote to Clark on December 15, of the same year: "I send you a Copy of the French Alliance and some other papers, by seeing which the people will be pleased, and attached to our Cause" (James, *Clark papers*, 87).

to it generously in men, money, and provisions.²⁹ Father Gibault pledged his entire personal fortune to aid Clark and used his influence to induce his flock to renounce their allegiance to the British flag,³⁰ incurring thereby the displeasure of his ecclesiastical superior, Mgr Briand.³¹ Out of one hundred and seventy men who left Kaskaskia on February 5, 1779, to recapture Vincennes, almost half of them belonged to the French militia.³² There was such perfect harmony and mutual understanding between the local population and the colonial troops that when this little army was about to leave on its famous expedition, Father Gibault granted a general absolution to all its members at the request of George Rogers Clark.³³ This enthusiasm did not last, however. Disappointment and unrest soon developed among the quiet and peace-loving French, particularly in Kaskaskia. The official records³⁴ present us with a very gloomy picture of the conditions which prevailed in that village in the 1780's. The great esteem which the French had for Clark was equalled only by the utter contempt in which they held the undisciplined soldiery, the unscrupulous merchants and land speculators who plagued the land. It was not long before these simple peasants discovered that they were no match for the aggressive backwoodsmen from Virginia and Kentucky. The situation bordered on anarchy in Kaskaskia, where civil courts proved a poor protection against the greed and rapacity of a garrison left to its own devices and compelled to plunder in order to live.³⁵ In a letter written to Bishop Briand on June 6, 1786, Father Gibault

²⁹ Alvord, *Kaskaskia records, 1778-1790* (Springfield, Ill., 1909), 116, and James, *Clark papers*, 360-1, List of contributors, made by Patrick Kennedy, Assistant Commissary, Aug. 31, 1779.

³⁰ Father Gibault advanced the Americans 7,800 livres in goods in addition to using his personal prestige and influence to win the French to the new régime. The paramount importance of the role which he played during those critical times was recognized by the American authorities. In the instructions sent to Clark on December 12, 1778, the Virginia Council referred to "Mr Gibault, the Priest (to whom this Country owes many Thanks for his Zeal and Services" (James, *Clark papers*, 80). On December 15, of the same year, Patrick Henry wrote to Clark: "I beg you will present my Compliments to Mr. Gibault and Doctor Lafong and thank them for their good Services to the State" (*ibid.*, 87). Yet the patriotic priest was never reimbursed as much as a cent of the money which he had lent the Americans in their hour of need. In 1790, he petitioned Governor St. Clair for some compensation in the form of a small grant of land in the village of Cahokia. See *American state papers: Public lands* (Washington, 1834), II, 14, 15-16. Father Gibault's request was transmitted to Congress, but no action was ever taken on it.

³¹ Rothensteiner, "Father Pierre Gibault," 132-9. For Gibault's answer to the accusation of sedition directed against him, see Alvord, *Kaskaskia records*, 541-2, Father Gibault to the Bishop of Quebec, June 6, 1786, and also, *ibid.*, 50-1, Jean Bte. Laffont to George R. Clark, Aug. 7, 1778.

³² Célestin-Pierre Cambiaire in his book *Le Rôle de la France dans l'expansion des Etats-Unis* (Paris, 1935), 43-63, attempts to show that approximately half of the soldiers who captured Vincennes were French. A careful study of the available evidence gives some credence to his thesis. Cambiaire overlooked, however, an interesting passage in a contemporary document: "Our party was 130 strong when the attack was made on the fort about 60 of which was [*sic*] French volunteers from the villages on the Massipia who behaved very well and spirited" (James, *Clark papers*, 345, John Rogers to Jonathan Clark, July 7, 1779). John Rogers was a cousin of Georges Rogers Clark (*ibid.*, 139, n. 1).

³³ "We were conducted out of the Town by the Inhabitants; and Mr Jeboth the Priest, who after a very suitable Discourse to the purpose, gave us all Absolution . . ." (James, *Clark papers*, 139, Clark to Mason, Nov. 19, 1779; *ibid.*, 269).

³⁴ Alvord, *Kaskaskia records, 1778-1790* (Springfield, Ill., 1909), xlix, 681 pp.

³⁵ Alvord, "The country of the Illinois" (*The Illinois country*, 329-57), and "The period of the city states" (*ibid.*, 358-78); Alvord, "Introduction" (*Cahokia records*);

describes the injustice, the violence, the poverty, and the wantonness which prevailed in that unfortunate village.³⁶ In their longing for order and stability, most of the French leaders and many of their followers went to live in Spanish territory. To mention only a few of the leaders, Antoine, Jean Baptiste and Vital Bauvais, François Carbonneaux, Gabriel Cerré, the elder Charlevilles, François Corset, Father Pierre Gibault, Charles Gratiot, Dr. Jean-Baptiste Laffont, Pierre Langlois, Jacques Lasource, Father Jacobin Le Dru, Timothé de Monbreun, and Father Paul de Saint-Pierre, all left Illinois for the Missouri communities of Ste. Genevieve and St. Louis.³⁷ When Clark reached Kaskaskia in 1778, it had approximately five hundred inhabitants.³⁸ In 1787, it had only one hundred and ninety-one male residents.³⁹ Between the years 1787 and 1790, which marked the most troubled period in the history of the village, the French population was further depleted and reached the low figure of forty-four heads of families.⁴⁰ The other two villages of the region, Prairie du Rocher and Cahokia, escaped most of this crisis. Prairie du Rocher was a very small settlement devoted almost entirely to agriculture. It found, moreover, a firm leader in Captain Jean Baptiste Barbau.⁴¹ As for Cahokia, it was not garrisoned after 1780 and had only three or four English-speaking inhabitants until 1790.⁴² Its population was therefore more homogeneous and better disciplined than that of Kaskaskia.⁴³ It even enjoyed great prosperity since it developed into a very active fur-trading centre about that time.⁴⁴

It is a simple matter to reconstruct the intimate life of that village during the early days of American rule. The minutes of the court of Cahokia from October 29, 1778, to April 1, 1790, were published in 1907 by Clarence W. Alvord under the title *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library*, vol. II, *Virginia series*, vol. I, *Cahokia records, 1778-1790*.⁴⁵ This volume constitutes a precious source of information not only on the administrative machinery of the village, but also on the business transactions, the

Alvord, "Introduction" (*Kaskaskia records*); James, "Finances and government" (*Clark papers*, xcvi-cvi). As can be seen upon perusing the *Kaskaskia records*, the inhabitants complained repeatedly about the spirit of brigandage of the soldiers, the exactions of the officials, and the failure of the courts to maintain discipline. In order to realize the intense dissatisfaction of the French between 1779 and 1790, one has only to read their letters of protest to the local magistrates and officials and the numerous petitions for redress which they sent to Congress. See particularly the following documents: 1779, 88-93, 136-40, 140-2; 1780, 183, 189-92, 207-9; 1781, 233-40; 1782, 284-91; 1783, 329-40, 340-4; 1784, 362-8, 369; 1786, 381-2; 1787, 447-8; 1788, 454-62, 462-5, 466-8, 475-9, 491-3; 1789, 509-11.

³⁶Alvord, *Kaskaskia records*, 543 ff.

³⁷Alvord, *Cahokia records*, cxliv.

³⁸*Ibid.*, xvi.

³⁹Alvord, "Census of Kaskaskia, 1787" (*Kaskaskia records*, 414-19). The severe flood of 1785, "l'année des grandes eaux," also took a considerable toll of inhabitants, who went over to Ste Genevieve. See Louis Houcks, *A history of Missouri* (St. Louis, 1908), I, 351, and Perrin du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes* (Paris, 1805), 171.

⁴⁰Edward G. Mason (ed.), "Early Illinois citizens" (*Early Chicago and Illinois*, Chicago Historical Society, Collections, IV, 209).

⁴¹For Captain Barbau's opinion on the state of lawlessness in Kaskaskia, see Alvord, *Kaskaskia records*, 398.

⁴²Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 376.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 376.

⁴⁴John Reynolds, *Pioneer history of Illinois* (Belleville, Ill., 1852), 102 ff.

⁴⁵Springfield, Ill., 1907, clvi-663 pp. + one map.

gossip, the quarrels, and even the scandals which must have provided the loquacious Creole with an inexhaustible source of prattle. Nobody seems to have taken full advantage of these documents which throw a vivid light on so many details of everyday life in the West and the end of the eighteenth century.

We learn from them that the court arrogated to itself dictatorial powers, whenever it felt it imperative for the general welfare of the community. In 1782, Jean Baptiste LaCroix, a local merchant, was granted a permit to trade with the Indians who might come to his house. It was understood, however, that all meats, tallow, bear's oil, and deer-skins which he received in trade, after keeping a provision for himself, were to be sold at a price set by the court to any inhabitant of Cahokia who presented himself within twenty-four hours after the departure of the Indians. At the expiration of this time limit, LaCroix could sell to outsiders.⁴⁶ Is not such a procedure on the part of the court strangely similar to that of modern governmental price-fixing agencies? The court also anticipated twentieth-century moratoria on private debts. On October 1, 1785, the magistrates assembled, and, after careful deliberation on the unhappy conditions of the time, when there were neither crops nor money, they decreed that no creditor should have any debtor's property sold except at a fair price set by arbitrators and appraisers. If this arrangement did not satisfy the creditor, he then had to allow the debtor more time with the stipulation that the latter pay interest.⁴⁷

The Cahokia records constitute a most interesting collection of *faits divers* such as one might read today in a small town newspaper. These unimportant items allow us, however, to probe much deeper into the popular mind than the more impressive events of formal history. On August 25, 1780, François Saucier sued Ignace Chatigny, who had made abusive remarks about the court and had said that all magistrates were fools. The defendant admitted having made the slanderous remark, but added that he had not meant it to be repeated. Nevertheless, he was condemned to spend a week in jail and to pay a fine of 50 *livres* to the church.⁴⁸ Nine years later, François Saucier was no longer a plaintiff but a defendant. While intoxicated, he had insulted several persons by challenging them and using improper expressions. The magistrates sentenced him to twenty-four hours' confinement in prison and to a fine of six *piastres* to be paid to the church.⁴⁹

Trivial incidents such as the following help us also to reconstruct the intricate mosaic of contemporary life. In 1780, Baptiste Saucier's pigs entered Louis Pillet's field and ate some of his wheat. Saucier was ordered to give the plaintiff six *minots* of wheat, the quantity which the pigs were supposed to have eaten.⁵⁰ The same year, on November 16, Pierre Martin asked that the pig which Charles LaCroix had taken in the Prairie du Pont and shut up at his house be returned to him.⁵¹ In 1782, Jean Baptiste LaCroix complained that Charles Lefevre had broken three of his axes while mending them. After a careful investigation, referees reported that the axes were worth nothing and should not be paid for.⁵²

It seems that, with the coming of the Americans, Cahokia was not entirely devoid of quarrelsome elements, for in 1788 Robert Jones com-

⁴⁶ Alvord, *Cahokia records*, 125-7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 202-3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 64-5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 396-9.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 46-7.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 76-7.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 108-11.

plained that Samuel Morris, who owed him some money, had maimed him. Morris claimed, however, that Jones had begun the trouble by throwing at him a rock weighing four or five pounds and which would have killed him if it had struck him. Morris added that, in order to protect his life, he had been obliged to go into a house. When he came out, they caught hold of each other. Jones held him by the hair and stuck his thumb in his mouth. The pain became unbearable and Morris had to bite his enemy's thumb. The court dismissed the case and condemned each party to pay his share of the costs.⁵³

Some of the things which happened in that little frontier village had a really humorous touch. For instance, in January, 1782, Isaac Levy, a merchant by profession and a doctor by avocation, sued Michel Buteau for a sum of 400 *livres* in payment of medical care which he had given the defendant. Buteau answered that he was not cured, but only relieved from his ailment. Thereupon the court instructed the pseudo-doctor to continue treating his patient until complete recovery.⁵⁴ A few weeks later, Levy accused Buteau of not following his prescriptions. The sick man had received sixty pills; he was to take seven the first day, and then increase the number by one each succeeding day until all were used up. But instead of taking the pills, according to the doctor, the patient allowed the children to scatter them about the house. The defendant told the court in all seriousness that he had taken all the pills, but that, since they had not cured him as quickly as he had wished, he had exhausted the whole supply in two days. The magistrates were incredulous and sentenced him to pay Levy the 400 *livres* promised him at the beginning of the treatment.⁵⁵

Such were the common people of Cahokia. There was nothing heroic or inspiring about them, but in spite of their frailties they were a pretty fair lot. We find among them no confirmed criminals, and few, if any, great sinners. Their magistrates, men of little learning but of sound sense, were benevolent and yet firm in their administration of justice. They showed unstinted devotion to their office and, contrary to what happened in less fortunate Kaskaskia, their community enjoyed prosperity and contentment.⁵⁶

As for Kaskaskia, its prolonged period of storm and stress came to an end only when Arthur St. Clair, recently appointed governor of the territory west of the River Ohio, reached the Illinois country in 1790. The village never did recover the peace and the serenity which it had once enjoyed before the British and the American régimes. Its later career was a very checkered one, marked by only a short period of prosperity. It was a very dismal place in the last years of the eighteenth century. The French botanist, André Michaux, who visited it in 1795, painted for us a depressing picture of the poverty into which it had fallen at that time. ". . . Nothing is to be seen but houses in ruins and abandoned," he wrote.⁵⁷

⁵³*Ibid.*, 332-5. ⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 112-15. ⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 118-19.

⁵⁶Alvord, *The Illinois country*, 378.

⁵⁷"Travels into Kentucky, 1793-1796" (*Early western travels, 1748-1846*, edited with notes, introductions, index, etc., by Reuben Gold Thwaites, III, Cleveland, 1904, 70; hereafter cited as *Early western travels*). Michaux's diary contains the following interesting item about the population of the various settlements in Illinois at the end of the eighteenth century: "Sunday the 20th . . . [1795]. Kaskaskia 45 families; Prairie du Rocher from 22 to 24 families. St. Philippe 3 American families. Fort de Chartres in ruins, Kaskias [Cahokia] 120 families. Americans at Corne de Cerf and at Bellefontaine 35 families. St. Louis flourishing . . ." (*ibid.*, 71).

About 1800, its population consisted of only forty-five families. According to Reynolds, a contemporary, these were all French, except for seven or eight.⁵⁸ Then, between 1810 and 1820, the town enjoyed a period of great activity. It became the rallying centre of thousands of emigrants to the West, who made it their temporary headquarters.⁵⁹ It had the honour of being the capital of the territory of Illinois from 1812 to 1818 and also of the state from 1818 to 1820. At that time, its most illustrious citizen was Pierre Ménard, who was born in Saint-Antoine, a little village in the region of Montreal, and settled in Illinois in 1790, after spending a few years in Vincennes, Indiana. Ménard had the honour of being the first Lieutenant-Governor of the state (1818-22). His brilliant career revived for a while the prestige of the French.⁶⁰ He lived in Kaskaskia until his death in 1844, and some of his direct descendants are still to be found near Fort Gage, Illinois.⁶¹ By 1820, other towns came into existence and Kaskaskia slipped back into obscurity. Its history from the beginning of the third decade of the nineteenth century can be sketched in a brief paragraph. General Lafayette visited the village in 1825 and spoke with Creoles, who long remembered this occasion as the most remarkable event of their lives.⁶² In 1834, Sisters of the Visitation from Georgetown, D.C., established Ménard Academy, transferred, incidentally, to St. Louis in 1844.⁶³ In 1838, the whole south-west angle of the church, built in 1753,⁶⁴ crumbled during High Mass without, however, causing any casualties. The building was torn down the same year and replaced by a large brick one.⁶⁵ The great flood of 1844 brought havoc and destruction to this locality. In 1849, the seat of Randolph County was transferred from Kaskaskia to Chester, situated a few miles away. Except for the flood of 1857, no event worthy of record seems to have taken place until 1881, when the Mississippi cut through the mainland to merge with the Kaskaskia River, obliterated most of the site of the village, and formed an island. Whatever was left of Kaskaskia at that time was washed away by subsequent floods about 1900.⁶⁶ A few years previous to that date, the parish seat had to be

⁵⁸Reynolds, *My own times* (Belleville, Ill., 1855), 33.

⁵⁹*Combined history of Randolph, Monroe and Perry Counties* (Philadelphia, 1883), 307; E. J. Montague, *A directory, business mirror, historical sketch of Randolph County* (Alton, Ill., 1859), 47-8; Stuart Brown, "Old Kaskaskia days and ways" (*Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*, X, 139).

⁶⁰H. S. Baker, "The first Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois: An address" (*Early Chicago and Illinois*, Chicago Historical Society, Collections, IV, Edward G. Mason, ed., 1890, 149-61); Edward G. Mason, "Pierre Ménard, the first Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois" (Fergus historical series, no. 34, 1890, 17-24); Edward G. Mason, "Pierre Ménard papers" (*ibid.*, 25-43), and also: *Early Chicago and Illinois* (Chicago Historical Society, Collections, IV, 162-80); William S. Merrill, "Pierre Ménard of Illinois" (*Mid-America*, XIV, July, 1932, 15-38); John Reynolds, *Pioneer history of Illinois* (Belleville, Ill., 1852), 242-6; Joseph Tassé, "Pierre Ménard" (*Les Canadiens de l'Ouest*, Montreal, 1878, II, 55-72).

⁶¹Letter from A. L. Ottesen, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Chester, Ill., May 16, 1939.

⁶²A. Levasseur, *Lafayette en Amérique en 1824 et 1825, ou Journal de son voyage aux États-Unis* (Paris, 1829), II, 292-5.

⁶³Helen Troesch, "The first convent in Illinois" (*Illinois Catholic historical review*, I, Jan., 1919, 351-71).

⁶⁴For a description of the old church, see Edmund Flagg, "The far west: or, A tour beyond the mountains, 1836-1837" (*Early western travels*, XXVII, Cleveland, 1906, II, 62-4; hereafter cited as Flagg, "The far west").

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, II, 33, n. 6.

⁶⁶J. H. Burnham, "Destruction of Kaskaskia by the Mississippi River" (*Tr. Ill. Sta. Hist. Soc.*, XX, 1914, 95-112).

transferred to the newly formed island, where a church was built in 1894 on a spot called New Kaskaskia.⁶⁷ The old commons land, a grant of about 12,000 acres given to the Parish of the Immaculate Conception of Kaskaskia by the King of France in the early eighteenth century, was divided into lots and sold by the state in 1911. The proceeds from the investment of the fund thus created are used for the support of the schools on Kaskaskia Island.⁶⁸

Coming back to the other two French settlements of the region, we find that Cahokia had lost its old prestige about 1820 with the decline of the local fur trade. It is now a small village which does not even have a post-office.⁶⁹ As for Prairie du Rocher, formerly the least important of the French communities of Illinois, it has today a population of approximately five hundred inhabitants, or twice as many as Cahokia.

It is impossible to study the destinies of those three small colonies after 1790 without attempting to find out what became of their French inhabitants. With the administrative organization of the West as established by the Ordinance of 1787 and carried out in 1790,⁷⁰ the Creoles disappeared from the political scene. The French-speaking citizens of southern Illinois who held county or state offices during the last years of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth did not descend from the old families. Pierre Ménard, from Kaskaskia, Jean De Moulin,⁷¹ Charles Gratiot,⁷² Nicolas Jarrot,⁷³ John Hay,⁷⁴ and Jean-François Perrey,⁷⁵ from Cahokia, were born either in France, in Switzerland, in Canada, or in the Eastern States. Yet the Creoles did not merge at once with their neighbours, but remained as a distinct ethnic group. In 1819, the Philadelphia doctor, Richard Lee Mason, travelling to Kaskaskia, pointed out that French was the common language of the region and even found many persons who could not speak English at all.⁷⁶ The Scotsman James Stuart visited Cahokia in April, 1830, and wrote three years later: "The people still speak French. They lead an indolent life in this fine climate. They can support themselves by working two or three days in the week. They dance and fiddle during the rest of it."⁷⁷ The early American writer, Edmund Flagg, spent some time in southern Illinois in 1836. He informs us in his book, *The Far West*, that the people still spoke French there. Some of the older inhabitants continued to wear the *capot* or blanket-coat. The moccasins, instead of shoes, the blue handkerchief as headdress, and the long queue had not yet entirely disappeared.⁷⁸ Flagg

⁶⁷The old church bell cast in France in 1741 is still to be seen in the church at New Kaskaskia, but it is no longer in use. Other relics of old Kaskaskia have been given to St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri (Letter from the Rev. Chas. G. Frankovich, Pastor of the Parish of the Immaculate Conception of New Kaskaskia, May 21, 1939).

⁶⁸Letter from A. L. Otteson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Chester, Ill., May 16, 1939. In 1900 Kaskaskia had a population of 177 inhabitants. See Pittman, *Mississippi settlements*, 84, n. 2.

⁶⁹Cahokia is now on United States Rural Mail Route no. 1, East St. Louis, Ill.

⁷⁰Jay A. Barrett, *Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, with an account of the earlier plans for the government of the Northwestern Territory* (New York, 1891).

⁷¹Reynolds, *Pioneer history of Illinois*, 173-5.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 255-9. ⁷³*Ibid.*, 175-9. ⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 188-93. ⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 240-2.

⁷⁶*Narrative of Richard Lee Mason in the pioneer West, 1819* (New York, 1915), 53 ff.

⁷⁷James Stuart, *Three years in North America* (Edinburgh, 1833, ed. 2, revised), II, 314. The first edition of this book was also published in 1833.

⁷⁸Flagg, "The far west," II, 55-6; Reynolds, *My own times*, 63.

adds: "Their chief *amusement* ever has been, and, probably, ever will be, the *Dance*, in which all, even from the least to the greatest, bond and free, unite."⁷⁹ The remark that Creoles were light of heart and nimble of feet is one that recurs almost invariably in the writings of contemporaries who came into contact with them during the first half of the nineteenth century.⁸⁰ In 1841, Lewis Foulke Thomas wrote that nine-tenths of Cahokia's population was French.⁸¹ Over half of the names listed for Prairie du Rocher in Montague's *Directory of Randolph County*, published in 1859, are French.⁸² Still more revealing is the fact that French sermons were preached until a late date. In Prairie du Rocher they were abandoned only in 1889,⁸³ while in Cahokia, the last priest to use French in church was Father Berbenbrok, pastor of that parish from 1903 to 1912.⁸⁴

Naturally, French continued to be spoken for some time even after it was no longer used in church. In July of 1935 and 1936 and during the Christmas vacation of 1935, I visited the American Bottom with the purpose of ascertaining whether some vestiges of French still existed in that region. In Cahokia, in Prairie du Rocher, and on Kaskaskia Island, I met at least a score of older persons who were still conversant with the language of their Canadian ancestors and welcomed the opportunity to speak it. In Prairie du Rocher several inhabitants between the ages of forty and forty-five, no longer fluent in French, told me that they had not spoken a word of English until they began to attend grade school. This proves conclusively that in Cahokia and Prairie du Rocher French disappeared from fairly common usage only at the beginning of the present century.

On my trips to southern Illinois, it was my good fortune to spend much of my time in Prairie du Rocher, one of the most historic spots of the region on account of its proximity to the ruins of Fort de Chartres, only three miles away. The village was founded about 1733.⁸⁵ Its population is mixed today, but Allards, Aubuchons, Barbeaus, Bienvenues, Blais, Boyers, Doirons, Duclos, Godères, Lachances, Lachapelles, Langlois, Leclercs, Louviers, Michauds, Noëls, Pouparts, Roberts, and Roys, descendants of the early pioneers, still live there. The farmers still own the commons, an extensive tract of grazing land which was given to their ancestors by Louis

⁷⁹ Flagg, "The far west," II, 56.

⁸⁰ See, for example, the interesting remarks made by Reynolds, *My own times*, 62-3, and *Pioneer history of Illinois*, 52.

⁸¹ *The valley of the Mississippi illustrated in a series of views*, edited by Lewis Foulke Thomas, painted and lithographed by J. C. Wild; accompanied with historical descriptions, published monthly . . . (St. Louis, 1841), 103.

⁸² Montague, *A directory . . . of Randolph County*, 193-5.

⁸³ Letter from Captain Noah C. Duclos, Prairie du Rocher, Ill., Feb. 17, 1939. Captain Duclos, who is very much interested in local lore, was given this information by the older inhabitants of the village.

⁸⁴ Letter from the Rev. Father J. A. H. Mueller, Parish Priest of Cahokia, May 17, 1939.

⁸⁵ On September 1, 1721, the Mississippi Company assigned Boisbriant, then the officer in command at Fort de Chartres, a grant of land a square league on the site where now stands Prairie du Rocher. At some unknown date, but previous to 1734, Boisbriant transferred his rights to his nephew, Jean Ste Thérèse Langlois, an officer of the troops, who established a village upon this grant. As a chapel of ease to Ste. Anne's Church of Fort de Chartres was built at Prairie du Rocher in 1733, the foundation of the village goes back to at least that date. See *American state papers, Public lands* (Washington, 1834), II, 183. For additional information on the early history of Prairie du Rocher, see Montague, *A directory . . . of Randolph County*, 60-7.

XV in 1743. Some of the older residents, particularly Messrs Frank Louvier, Michel Duclos, and Alexis Palmier, gave me some interesting information on the history of their village. They spoke wistfully about old-time customs, the Christmas *réveillon*, the *Guillonée* carolling on New Year's Eve,⁸⁶ the gay family reunions on New Year's Day, the King's Balls,⁸⁷ the Pancake Supper on Shrove Tuesday and the burlesque serenading of the *Charivari*.⁸⁸ They still remembered the day when one sang old French folk-songs to while away the time during winter and heard sermons in French on Sundays. I shall never forget a delightful Christmas Eve spent at the home of Captain Noah C. Duclos, who had also invited for the occasion his father, Mr. Michel Duclos, Mr. Frank Louvier, and the two Pascahels, father and son, descendants of slaves brought to the Illinois country in the eighteenth century.⁸⁹ We spoke an archaic and picturesque variety of French and sang old folk-songs in that language. The classical song of the natives is *La Guillonée*. The custom itself of *La Guillonée*, or *Guignolée* as it is called in Canada,⁹⁰ one of the most interesting brought to the New World by the French pioneers, has survived to this day in Prairie du Rocher. On every New Year's Eve, a group of men and youths spend the whole evening going from house to house. When they enter a house, their leader strikes up the first verses of the lively carol of *La Guillonée*. As soon as the song is over, the host serves drinks and cakes.⁹¹

The village of Cahokia, founded in 1699 and therefore the oldest community in Illinois, is located six miles south-east of St. Louis and has two hundred and forty-seven inhabitants according to the latest available statistics. As it is in the midst of a rich agricultural district, the parish itself is much more considerable than one might infer from the small population of the village. As one enters its elegant rock church, erected in 1889, and looks at the cards on the pews, one is struck by the number of French names: Chartrand, De Lorme, Didier, Godin, Jérôme, Julien, Lacroix, La Motte, Lemieux, Nadeau, Plouffe, Touranjau, etc.⁹² Next

⁸⁶Reynolds describes the age-old custom of the *Gionée* (*sic*) as it was celebrated at the beginning of the nineteenth century. See *Pioneer history of Illinois*, 52. The *Guillonée* was until a very recent date probably the most popular of all songs in the old French establishments of Ste. Genevieve and Old Mines, Mo., and Vincennes, Ind. The reader interested in the history of the *Guillonée* in Missouri may consult Joseph M. Carrière, *Tales from the French folk-lore of Missouri* (Northwestern University studies in the humanities, no. I, Evanston and Chicago, 1937), 6-7, Ward A. Dorrance, *The survival of French in the old Sainte Genevieve district* (University of Missouri studies, X, April, 1935, 121-2).

⁸⁷Reynolds, *Pioneer history of Illinois*, 52-3.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 145-6.

⁸⁹Mr. Michel Duclos, Mr. Frank Louvier, and Mr. Pascahel, Sr., have all died since 1936. The last survivors of the generation acquainted with the days when the community had a distinctly French flavour are fast disappearing. In another ten or fifteen years none will be left.

⁹⁰The *Guillonée* used to be very popular in Canada, where it was known as *La Guignolée*. See Ernest Gagnon, *Chansons populaires du Canada* (deuxième éd., Québec, 1880), and E.-Z. Massicotte, *Bulletin des recherches historiques*, XXVIII, Dec., 1922, 364-8.

⁹¹Song and custom were in great danger of being forgotten in Prairie du Rocher a few years ago, but they have been given a surcease of life, thanks to the solicitude of Captain Noah C. Duclos, who has succeeded in making the celebration of the *Guillonée* an affair of community-wide interest as it used to be in the old days.

⁹²In 1914 there were one hundred and seven families in the parish of Cahokia; of these seventy-five were of French extraction. See Frederick Beuckman, *History of the Diocese of Belleville* (Belleville, Ill., 1914), 7. In a letter dated May 16,

to this imposing building stands the old church begun in 1789 and finished in 1799.⁹³

After the powder magazine of Fort de Chartres, constructed in 1755, and the ancient Court House of Cahokia,⁹⁴ which goes back to 1795, it is probably the oldest building in the American North-West. The treasures of the parish include a missal printed in 1668, a monstrance wrought in France in 1717, a set of candlesticks and a bell from the early part of the eighteenth century. The monstrance and a chalice acquired in the early days of the parish were taken from the sacristy, on May 24, 1838, by Tom Terrien, a half-witted farmer. With these sacred vessels and a large German Bible, which he mistook for a Latin missal, Terrien attempted to offer mass for himself and his family the next morning. Later in the day, as he feared detection, he threw the monstrance and the chalice far out into Lake Pittsburg, near which his house stood. The monstrance alone was recovered.⁹⁵

During my sojourns in Cahokia, I met several "old-timers" who spoke melancholically of the distant days when game was plentiful and people were gay and carefree. At the other end of the American Bottom, some sixty-five miles from St. Louis, I found the few French living today on Kaskaskia Island an insignificant minority submerged among the descendants of German immigrants. Victims of absentee ownership, the French of Kaskaskia Island are rather unambitious. But as they live on some of the richest land in the state, they can satisfy their frugal needs without undue strain. They live in the past. The days of Pierre Ménard and the old village which used to be on the mainland are still very much present with them.⁹⁶

The history of Cahokia, Prairie du Rocher, and Kaskaskia represents a remarkable phenomenon. Since many of the more ambitious inhabitants left their native villages to seek their fortune elsewhere, the French population of southern Illinois probably never rose above fifteen hundred.⁹⁷ Unnoticed and forgotten by their neighbours of Anglo-Saxon and German stocks, the descendants of the early Canadian pioneers continued to cling to their language and traditions for four generations after the beginning of American rule. Some of their folk, transplanted to the isolation of the Missouri Ozarks at the end of the eighteenth century, and at the beginning of the nineteenth, have shown an almost incredible atavistic persistence. In Old Mines, a small community of the Missouri hinterland, they have preserved

1939, the Rev. J. A. H. Mueller wrote to the author that today 47 per cent, or approximately half of his congregation have a French family background and that 85 per cent of these belong to mixed families.

⁹³Robert Hynes, "The old church at Cahokia" (*Illinois Catholic historical review*, I, April, 1919, 459-63).

⁹⁴This building stood for years in Jackson Park in Chicago, to which place it had been removed. It has been taken back to Cahokia a few months ago.

⁹⁵Beuckman, *History of the Diocese of Belleville*, 7.

⁹⁶Charles Neely, *Tales and songs of southern Illinois*, edited with a foreword by John Webster Spargo (Menasha, Wis., 1938), 4.

⁹⁷"It is doubtful if there were more than fifteen hundred people of French descent in Illinois in 1818 and practically all of these belonged to the habitant class" (Solon J. Buck, *Illinois in 1818*, Illinois centennial publication, introductory volume, Springfield, Ill., 1917, 93-4). With the expansion of the western trade, the opening of other sections of the state, and the development of the mining industry in Missouri early in the nineteenth century, the French population of Illinois did not increase, but remained stationary at best.

the ingrained provincialism of Old-World peasants until the last ten or fifteen years.⁹⁸ All these facts indicate clearly that the last grey shades of the twilight of the French survival in Illinois were to be seen in the first years of the twentieth century and not during the period of 1810-20, as historians often tell us. Although the French of the Illinois country have now been finally integrated into the general pattern of American life, the role which they played in the development of the North-West has not been forgotten. The foundation last year of the Cahokia Historical Society, whose main project is the complete restoration of the village as it stood in the heyday of its prosperity,⁹⁹ proves eloquently that the present generation is not unmindful of the labours and the sacrifices of the early pioneers.

⁹⁸It is not generally known that six hundred families of French extraction live in the region of Old Mines—still commonly called *La Vieille Mine* by the natives—a small village in the foothills of the Missouri Ozarks, some sixty-five miles south of St. Louis. These people, who call themselves *Créoles*, descend from Illinois pioneers who migrated to the western bank of the Mississippi towards the end of the French régime, at the time of the British rule in Illinois and later at the beginning of the American régime. At the end of the eighteenth century and during the first decades of the nineteenth, many settled in the rich mining districts of the Missouri lead belt. Until fifteen or twenty years ago, the Creoles of Old Mines had had very little contact with the outside world. They clung to the language and customs of their ancestors, so that, in the years 1934, 1935, and 1936, it was possible for the writer to study their dialect and to collect seventy-three folk-tales, which local *conteurs* told him in their "thorny" but picturesque French. See Carrière, *Tales from the French folk-lore of Missouri*, and his studies, "La Survivance de l'esprit français dans l'ancien pays des Illinois" (*Deuxième Congrès de la Langue Française au Canada, Mémoires*, Québec, 1938, III, 96-101), and "Creole dialect of Missouri" (*American speech*, XIV, April, 1939, 109-19); Dorrance, *The survival of French in the old Sainte Genevieve district*; William M. Miller, "Missouri's 'Paw-Paw' French" (*French review*, III, Jan., 1930, 174-8).

⁹⁹"News and comment" (*Illinois State historical review*, XXXI, Sept., 1938, 372). In this connection, one should call the attention of the reader to the valuable work of historical interest which has been done by the Division of State Parks of Illinois. For instance, in the American Bottom, the home of Pierre Ménard, near Fort Gage, and the powder magazine, the main gates, the foundations of the outer walls and of the buildings of Fort de Chartres have been restored and are preserved as precious relics of the history of the region.

WHEN A WHOLE ROYAL FAMILY CAME TO AMERICA

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This is a year of royal visits to America. Yet they are all rushing, fleeting affairs, made by tourists, not by settlers. In that respect they differ from the most important trans-atlantic royal passage ever made, for there is one case of a whole royal family transferring itself from Europe to America, not knowing when the return trip would be made, or even whether it would ever be made. I refer to the migration of the Portuguese court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in the winter of 1807-8. That event was part of Canning's strategy in the conflict with Napoleon, and was carried out under British pressure and protection. It opened the doors of Brazil to foreign traders. It lifted Rio from the status of a sleepy colonial outpost to the dignity of an imperial capital. It stimulated the development of Brazilian economic life and political self-consciousness, sowed the seeds of nationalist discontent, and hastened the coming of independence. Thus the effect on Napoleon's plans, on British foreign policy and commerce, and on South American history justifies us in examining this chapter in what Professor Hale Bellot would call Atlantic History.

Let me first set the stage. Portugal was a small land with two large assets. The first was her position on the map, which made her a valuable naval base with a good harbour, as well as a military base for attacking Spain. Her second asset was her oversea empire. By 1700 the oriental part was almost gone, but the occidental—which meant Brazil—was rich in gold, diamonds, coffee, sugar, cotton, and dyewoods. Yet Portugal was too small and weak to protect or exploit what she had picked up largely by being first on the spot. Her industries were few and insignificant, except those producing wine, wool, and cork. Her royal family, the Braganza line, was weak physically, mentally, and morally. Intermarriage between its members was common; nieces wed elderly uncles, aunts married young nephews. Insanity, lethargy, cruelty, and irresolution were outstanding family traits.

Such a country was bound to be dependent for its existence and welfare on the attitude of others: it could have little attitude of its own. Portugal was therefore a pawn on the chessboard of European power politics. If the players were Spain vs. Holland, the Dutch took the oriental empire because Spain had taken Portugal. If the game was between England and Spain, England helped Portugal to regain her independence, and as a reward claimed great commercial privileges in Lisbon and in the colonies. The biggest game, England vs. France and Spain, was played at least three times—in the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years' War, and the Napoleonic War. In all three cases, Portugal found herself in the same dilemma. If she sided with France and Spain, Britain would seize her colonies and blockade her ports. If she sided with Britain, France and Spain would invade her, pushing aside her incompetent army; it would take time for British troops to come to her aid, and meanwhile the country would be overrun and plundered. If she sided with no one and remained neutral—well, she could not do that. The belligerents would not let her. Three-horned dilemmas were not diplomatically recognized.

Faced with two unpleasant alternatives, Portugal always finally came to the same decision—to side with Britain. Several treaties had forged an alliance between the two countries, and given each country economic preference in the markets of the other. By them Britain became Portugal's best customer for wine; Portugal and her empire were among Britain's best customers for cloth and hardware, and for Newfoundland fish. British merchants dominated Lisbon and Oporto, enjoying extra-territorial privileges, shipping in British wares for local consumption or for re-shipment to Brazil, and sending out port wine and Brazilian gold. In effect, Portugal was nearly a British colony.

This dependence annoyed some Portuguese, and during the third quarter of the eighteenth century Pombal, a would-be Colbert, did his utmost to free his country from British control. He achieved some success; the Portuguese market was made less attractive to British merchants, and London therefore turned from Lisbon to Paris. An Anglo-French trade agreement had been wrecked in 1713 by those who said Portugal was more important commercially than France. A similar agreement could be reached in 1786 because France now seemed the better market of the two.

This revolution in British commercial policy was speedily undone by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The old normal alignment was restored when the curtain rose on the last act of the Second Hundred Years' War. Again Portugal had to ask "What shall I do?" or rather "What will the antagonists force me to do?" The Queen was insane. John, the Prince Regent, was "an obese prince royal who suffered from a chronic case of indecision."¹ The court was divided between pro-French and pro-British cliques. John's wife, a Spaniard, was eagerly devoted to Madrid, and in 1805 she plotted with the pro-French group to have her husband declared insane, so that she could take the throne. John discovered the plot, and went off to sulk in a monastery, eighteen miles from Lisbon.

During the first war, 1793-1802, Portugal sought to be neutral and yet retain her alliance with Britain. She thereby offended France, and in 1793 Paris discussed the question of attacking her and her colonies. In 1796 the Lisbon court and counting houses wondered what they could do "should the Rascals visit Portugal." In 1801 Spain finally said John must choose one side or the other, and when the usual choice was made Portugal was invaded. But peace came in time to spare the country from serious damage.

During the brief truce of Amiens, John announced that if the war was resumed he was going to be neutral. He promised to pay France a subsidy, and Napoleon replied, in effect, "That's a good boy; I'll guarantee and respect your neutrality, and here's the Legion of Honour." Easier said than done; for when hostilities began, Portugal said she was neutral, but British ships used her harbours, and British merchants still ran most of her foreign and imperial trade. To Napoleon this seemed a queer brand of neutrality, and he determined to deal with John when the right time came. It soon came. Defeated at sea but victorious everywhere on land, Napoleon launched his Continental System to strangle British trade on the continent. That meant closing the ports, and soon there was only one door open between Gibraltar and Scandinavia. In 1807 Napoleon decided to slam it shut.

¹A. K. Manchester, *British Pre-eminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline* (University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 54.

Events now moved rapidly to a showdown. In August the French and Spanish ambassadors in Lisbon demanded that Portugal join them. John must declare war on Britain. He must close his ports to British vessels, imprison all British residents in the country, confiscate their property, and let his fleet join the Franco-Spanish navies. The deadline was September, and meanwhile Junot and his army of the Gironde were at Bayonne, ready to march.

This blunt demand made any further display of real or sham neutrality impossible. Portugal must go one way or the other, but the court was divided concerning the direction, and John was often away hiding in the monastery. Strangford, the British Ambassador, worked hard on him and on the ministers, and Canning told him that if he resorted to bribery, any bills he drew on the Secret Service Account would be honoured. The story is a tangled one, but the essentials can be told briefly. John was willing to go part of the way toward Paris. "There is . . . but one prudent line of conduct to follow," he said, "that of following the System of the Continent." He would close the ports to British ships: he would forbid Britons to leave—after having given them a quiet hint to get out quickly; he would seize their property—after having given them plenty of time to get their movables away. But he would not declare war on his "ancient and royal ally," or add his fleet to that of France and Spain.

This compromise pleased neither side. France said "Either you declare war on Britain or we will declare war on you." Canning said, in effect, "If you close the ports, that would be tantamount to a declaration of war on us; but in view of your peculiar circumstances, of your deficiency of the means of resistance, and of the remembrance of our ancient alliance, we will let you close the ports without retaliating. If, however, you go a single step beyond this line of modified hostility by imprisoning our nationals or taking their property, we shall be forced to the extremity of actual war. We shall blockade your harbour, and take your fleet and colonies. If France declares war on you, we shall still take the fleet and colonies in order to prevent them from falling into French hands; and we shall then be indifferent as to your own fate. But if you will transfer your government to Brazil, we will help you in carrying out 'this noble resolution'; we will restore Portugal to you at the end of the war, and we will never recognize as king any prince who is not the legitimate heir of the House of Braganza. Therefore do please get out of Europe; the sooner the quicker."

This unwelcome advice John was loath to take, and his ministers were even more reluctant. Perhaps, after all, Napoleon could be placated and exile might be averted. At least it was worth a trial. On November 8, therefore, John, or his ministers, closed the ports to British ships; forbade the remaining British residents to leave; ordered the confiscation of such property as was left; and asked Strangford to go. The Ambassador had expected the first decree, but not the others; he was so angry at this abandonment of "modified hostility" that he took the British coat of arms off his gate and asked for his passports. Yet he continued to urge evacuation. He knew well the pressure to which John was being subjected by those who wished him to stay. Monks were having visions, nuns were pouring out prophecies. The women in the royal household were exposing the hapless ruler to "*criaillerie continuelle*," which the dictionary translates

as "bawling, squalling, clamouring, outcry, scolding." In the streets outside the palace placards and manifestoes "of the most threatening nature" appeared on the walls. Eventually, Strangford despaired of being able to get the Regent away. He therefore quitted Lisbon on November 16 in a fishing boat, and after thirty hours of stormy weather climbed aboard the flagship of Sir Sydney Smith.

Smith had been sent out by Canning to do one of two things: either to help the exodus or to blockade the harbour and capture the fleet. When Strangford came aboard, the two men agreed that the second task must be undertaken at once, and Smith sent a sloop up to Lisbon to inform John that his harbour was now blockaded. But Strangford, hoping against experience, decided to go back with the sloop for one last appeal. Smith agreed, and the ex-ambassador went off under a flag of truce.

When he reached Lisbon on the night of the 27th, he found that no appeal was needed. Napoleon had succeeded where he had failed. During the ten days which had elapsed since Strangford's departure, John had learned three bits of bad news: first, that Junot had crossed the border with 23,000 men and was approaching fast by forced marches without meeting with any opposition; second, that Napoleon had published his decision to dethrone the Braganzas; and third, that France and Spain had signed a treaty partitioning Portugal between themselves. John had therefore been forced to decide to emigrate a few hours before Strangford arrived; and when the Ambassador was given an audience he found the Prince Regent "directing all his apprehensions to a French army and all his hopes to an English fleet." Would Britain forgive, forget, and help him even at 11.59? Strangford replied with a smile, and with the most explicit assurance that "His Majesty would generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility to which His Royal Highness' consent had been extorted."

The pace now became *prestissimo agitato*. By bedtime on the 27th, the Prince Regent, his mad mother, his Spanish wife, his seven children, and other members of the royal family—about fifteen in all—were on board. They were joined "by a multitude of faithful subjects and adherents," of nobles, servants, officials, and hangers-on. The total number of *émigrés* was 8,000 according to the lowest estimates and 15,000 according to the highest; but I suspect even the lower figure is far too high. Some palace furniture was shipped; so also were some archives, and the royal treasury was emptied, though I find it hard to accept the estimate that \$60,000,000 of precious metal was put aboard. On the morning of the 28th John issued a pathetic proclamation, announcing and explaining his departure to his sullen, disillusioned, and bitter subjects. On the 29th the fleet of thirty-six warships and merchantmen left Lisbon and moved toward the mouth of the Tagus and the open sea.

The emigrant ships passed through Smith's squadron, and, wrote Smith, "salutes of 21 guns announced the friendly meeting of those who but the day before were on terms of hostility, the scene impressing every beholder . . . with the most lively emotions of gratitude to Providence that there yet existed a power in the world able, as well as willing, to protect the oppressed." On the Prince Regent's ship was Strangford: he "had the honour to accompany H.R.H. in his passage across the Bar, having resolved not to lose sight of H.R.H. until the measure of departure should

be thoroughly accomplished." When the bar was passed Strangford returned to Smith's flagship, and that night penned an eloquent despatch to Canning, vivid in its narrative and realistic rather than modest in its estimate of the part played by its author. "The Prince Regent has effected the wise and magnanimous purpose of retiring from a Kingdom which he could no longer retain except as a vassal of France. This grand and memorable event," and so on, till the pen ran dry of capital I's.

If John and his fleet had delayed their departure another day, or even another two hours, they would have been unable to get out; for the wind changed, and a storm swept the Tagus estuary for two or three days. They escaped literally at the very last possible minute, for as the ships began to move, Junot appeared on the hilltops beyond Lisbon. In his forced march he had shed most of his 23,000 men; only a vanguard of fourteen and a regiment of 1,200 staggered and scrambled up the last slope separating them from a view of the doomed capital. From that vantage point Junot saw the fleet moving out to the Narrows and heard the salute from the British guns. The birds had flown.

As the fleet approached the open waters of the Atlantic the storm battered and scattered it. When calm returned, Smith gathered the ships together, helped to repair them, transferred some of his provisions to them, detailed four British warships to escort them, and then bade them god-speed. Strangford went aboard the Regent's ship for a last word. He found the exiles "suffering the greatest distress and inconvenience. It is not possible to describe the situation of these illustrious personages, in want of every comfort, yet bearing all with patience and resignation. The Prince Regent said he submitted to destiny without a murmur." Had John known what Strangford thought of that destiny he might at least have groaned: for in a final despatch summing up the whole episode Strangford wrote: "I know his mind and turn of temper and his feelings of gratitude towards His Majesty, and I am convinced that by calling them forth on this occasion I have intitled England to establish with the Brazils the Relation of Sovereign and Subject, and to require Obedience to be paid as the Price of Protection." Strangford probably chuckled as he wrote this; and Canning certainly did as he read it.

The crossing was a long-drawn out misery. The ships had been hastily prepared and provisioned. The Prince's vessel carried 1,600 passengers, packed like sardines, and the other ships were no better off. The water supply ran out, the provisions were inadequate, and plague appeared. The fleas and lice were so harassing that the ladies cut their hair short in order to reduce the hunting area. When they reached Rio the colonial women thought that bobbed hair was the latest fashion, and followed it. A storm scattered the fleet. The Prince's ship and some others reached Bahia on January 21, 1808, seven weeks after leaving Lisbon; but the rest of the fleet sighted Rio on January 17, and promptly set to work to prepare for its ruler's arrival. The Viceroy's house was not fit for use as a palace, so the mint, a prison, and a Carmelite convent were united and renovated to provide a makeshift royal residence. No local vehicle was good enough for a royal coach; but a chaise had been rushed on board in Lisbon. When John arrived on March 8, some semblance of a welcome could therefore be attempted. Two bony mules were harnessed to the chaise; an old

retainer took the reins, and a troop of ragged soldiers, mounted on unshod, lame, blind, or galled horses provided a bodyguard.

What John thought of his new home we do not know. By July he was saying that he did not expect to return to Europe. If he ever indulged in such an expectation, Strangford, who had followed him across the Atlantic, threw cold water on it. Canning had told him to do so in a most forceful despatch. "You will endeavour on all occasions to direct the attention of the Brazilian government to the care and cultivation of those ample and improveable resources which its American dominions afford rather than encourage them in looking back with unavailing regret to their European territory, or in indulging an expectation not likely to be realized, of recovering it from the grasp of the enemy." Canning in 1808 felt, as Kitchener is said to have felt in 1914, that peace was a long way off, and John was diligently guided to the same conclusion. If this be true, then there was much to be done to make Rio bearable and Brazil productive.

Society and government, as John found them, possessed mingled elements of *opéra comique* and outright farce. The viceroys had been proud but poor, firm on etiquette but weak on efficiency. Their subjects had been taught to show outward respect for authority, and no civilian dare pass even a common soldier or read a public notice without performing some act of obeisance. But provided the motions were made, the individual had wide latitude in matters of personal conduct. When the police went into action they alternated between slow motion and still life. The customs service we will inspect in a moment. The army can be described by recounting one episode. The troops went 800 miles up country to fight some rebels. A supply of ammunition was sent after them and eventually caught up with them. But when the soldiers faced the enemy they found that the shot were too large for the muskets. To fix bayonets and charge an enemy that was mounted and skilled in the use of the lasso was impossible. The battle was lost—and so also was the best park of artillery in Brazil—without the firing of a single shot, and three months elapsed before a supply of proper missiles reached the front.

From the few descriptions which are available we get a tawdry picture of social and domestic life. The population was said to be gay and pleasure-loving. European fashions were copied by the *élite*; the stores abounded "with every species of British manufacture": and the wearing of swords, cocked hats, breeches, and buckles on formal occasions was popular. But most of the descriptions harp on the less pleasant aspects of relaxation. Then meals were eaten without cutlery, and the meat and vegetables were rolled into balls by using fingers. Ladies searched without ceremony for vermin in each other's hair, and "filled their vacant hours with this elegant entertainment." Nearly all men suffered from "a certain cutaneous disorder," which led them to scratch themselves almost incessantly, forced tailors and shirtmakers to provide adequate apertures, and made long pointed thumbnails fashionable. Elephantiasis was wellnigh universal, as British hosiers discovered when the stockings they sent out failed to fit or find buyers. Of the five religious houses, none was said to be remarkable for its austerity.

The task of turning this grubby outpost into an imperial metropolis was bound to be long, costly, and arduous. Yet when John left Rio to return to Lisbon in 1821 he could claim that much had been accomplished.

Gradually the social life of the city acquired some polish. The court took on magnificence. Levees became frequent and dignified. Court dress became general, and servants obtained better liveries. A nuncio from Rome reformed the church, religious festivals and ceremonies became more lavish, and the combined effect of court and church was reflected in cleaner houses, better furniture, more fashionable clothes, neater vehicles, improved theatres, a widening range of comforts and luxuries, better manners, and a narrowing range of untidy *déshabillé*. A royal library was built up and thrown open to the public. Botanical gardens were laid out. An operatic troupe was imported from Italy, and a party of French artists, landscape gardeners, and skilled craftsmen was given free bed and board. The police began to protect the innocent and catch the guilty. The first steps were taken toward a public health service, and the army obtained better training as well as new uniforms.

When the old Queen died in 1815 John turned the colony into a kingdom, and by that date it had shed many of its colonial characteristics. Commercial life was quickened by throwing the ports open to direct trade with all friendly nations; by the demands for goods for the immigrants; by the expanding production and export of cotton, sugar, coffee, gold, hides, dyewoods, etc.; and by the influx of foreign merchants. Until 1815 these merchants were nearly all British; but when peace came, traders from Spanish America, the United States, France, Germany, and Italy added life and variety to the port. The British stuck to wholesale trade; but the French were unable to make much headway in that field and turned to retail trade. They filled a whole street in Rio with French shops, brought out female shop assistants to operate them, and gradually won the Portuguese back to their old love of French wares. Swedish miners penetrated to the gold-fields, Swiss came to develop the dairy industry, and Americans arrived to buy sugar and coffee. Roads were constructed, harbours were improved, and coastal trade grew. When John left, most internal transportation was still conducted on the heads of humans or the backs of mules; yet many of the one-time impenetrable barriers to trade and transport had been surmounted, and many great estates had abandoned that self-sufficing economy in which they had produced all the things they needed except slaves, agricultural implements, and luxury goods. To Rio by land came mule trains bearing goods which might have come 300 to 1,000 miles from the interior; to Rio by sea came 450 merchant vessels in 1821, against possibly one-third that number in 1808.

Of that merchant fleet of 450, nearly 200 were British; 125 were Portuguese; and the rest were American, French, Hanseatic, Swedish, or Dutch. If we had figures for 1808 or 1814 we should find that nearly all the ships then were British or Portuguese; and I want to devote the rest of my time to describing the British political and economic domination of Brazil during the early years of the exile. Napoleon forgot John when the Prince Regent slipped through his fingers; but Canning did not. John in Lisbon had been a threat of military or naval loss; John in Rio was a promise of economic gain, and Canning was not too busy with Europe to consider how Brazilian commercial policy might be framed to benefit British trade. Commerce between Britain and Brazil might be even greater and more profitable if it was carried on directly than it had been when it was run through Lisbon. The opportunity for side trips into Spanish

American markets might be richer. And if Brazil could be persuaded to give British traders a substantial preference over rivals from other nations, the exodus might prove to be a smart stroke of business as well as of strategy.

The Prince Regent began to enunciate his trade policy as soon as he set foot on Brazilian soil. At Bahia in January, 1808, he issued a proclamation opening all the ports of the country to the commerce and navigation of friendly foreign ships and traders. It was a remarkable document, for it swept almost the whole colonial system into the discard at one stroke. Goods could be imported from anywhere, in foreign or in native ships, on paying a duty of 24 per cent. Natives and foreigners could export most kinds of Brazilian produce to any part of the world on paying an export duty of 4 per cent. This freedom of export did not extend to dyewoods, gold, and a few other commodities which were the subject of royal monopolies; and there were some limitations on imports in order to protect the Portuguese East Indian interests. But the old restriction of traffic to the Brazil-Lisbon route vanished, and the navigation laws were virtually scrapped, since foreign-borne and native-borne goods paid the same duty. This act of liberation was apparently inspired by a Brazilian civil servant and ex-professor, who had studied Adam Smith and written about commercial freedom. He got at John's ear while the Regent was in Bahia. But when John reached Rio and was surrounded by his old ministers and a swarm of Brazilian merchants, the decree seemed too revolutionary. It was therefore amended to admit imports in Brazilian ships at 16 per cent, against 24 per cent on goods which arrived in foreign ships.

The first decree pleased the British consul in Rio, though he said it would have "afforded greater satisfaction" if it had "authorized the admittance of British vessels and British manufactures on terms more advantageous than those granted to other foreign nations." The second decree, reviving preference to goods carried in native ships, made Canning very angry. "I cannot sufficiently express my astonishment. . . . Make the most forcible representations, and signify His Majesty's just expectation that the decree [be repealed], and that such commercial regulations as may replace it may be consonant to that liberal policy which has been observed by this government towards the commerce of the Brazils."

Canning made his general desires very clear in a remarkable series of instructions which were handed to Strangford when that hero of the exodus was sent as ambassador to Rio. He wanted low tariffs on British goods going to Brazil. He would like preferential rates for them, since that "would undoubtedly be advantageous." "Yet if the exaction of such a stipulation appears likely to excite much repugnance," don't press it. It would be enough if Britain secured most-favoured-nation treatment and low duties; and "low" meant something far less than the 24 per cent rate now prevailing. There was no reason why Brazil, which had no manufactures to protect, should charge prohibitive duties. Plentiful imports would mean abundant customs revenue, especially if the country became "an emporium for the British manufactures destined for the consumption of the whole of South America." Goods would flow through Brazil on their way to entry, legal or illegal, into Spanish America; and this traffic with the Spanish colonies would be helped if John would establish a free port on some island

off the coast, in which British ships could meet Spanish buyers for extra-legal trade.

But suppose Brazil asked reciprocity and sought the same easy access for her produce into the British market as she was asked to give British wares in her own? The rub there was that some Brazilian products would compete with British East Indian goods on the one hand and British West Indian staples on the other. Such competition could not be allowed; yet it would be limited to sugar and coffee, and the rest of Brazil's staples would be non-competitive. "Cotton we should welcome in any quantities at a moderate duty," while hides, timber, tobacco, drugs, dyewoods, hemp, and other raw materials, far outweighing sugar and coffee in value, would find in Great Britain an unrestricted and almost unlimited market. We should be willing to reduce almost to vanishing point the difference between the duties on these goods when carried in Portuguese or in British ships. The sale of these goods in Britain would be further aided if John would abolish the monopolies sold to Portuguese traders or granted to them in return for loans, and let British traders handle the goods now in the hands of the monopolists. If the Regent says he cannot do without the money obtained from the monopolists or is unable to repay his debts to them, suggest that he might be helped to raise a loan in London which would enable him to rub out the debts and the monopolies.

If Strangford could secure all these concessions, he need not insist on the full measure of extraterritoriality which had been enjoyed by the British "factory" in Lisbon. That factory was the counterpart of the Hansards' Steelyard in London or the Italian *fondaci* in medieval trading outposts; and the large measure of self-government which its members enjoyed had roused resentment among patriotic Portuguese. There need be no factory in Rio, provided that British residents were given the same protection as the factory had afforded them. They must have a special court to deal with cases in which they were involved; their property must be safe if they died intestate; and they must be allowed to worship free from "all interference by the Tribunals of the Inquisition." These essential safeguards must be retained; they are already enjoyed by Portuguese living in England, not by the existence of a special court or factory, but "by the acknowledged excellence of the British jurisprudence."

As you read Canning's instructions to Strangford you feel that the Ambassador was being given a task calling for the combined qualities of Hercules, Joe Louis, the Serpent, and Machiavelli. Yet he succeeded, or rather he exceeded; for the treaty which was signed in early 1810 probably went far beyond the expectations of the Foreign Office, and was secured in face of bitter opposition and countless distractions. The opposition of the anti-British faction at court was persistent and grew in strength, though the minister in charge of the negotiations was friendly to London and to Strangford. The Brazilian and Portuguese merchants in Rio fought every suggested concession to their British rivals. The nuncio threatened John with "the most terrible exertions . . . of the vengeance" of Rome if he agreed to let Protestants worship publicly. Many natives resented their exclusion from all public office, disliked the complete domination of the Government by the *émigrés*, and therefore felt that one bunch of Europeans was bargaining with another without any thought for the welfare of Brazil.

In addition to fighting these opponents, Strangford often had to turn aside to cope with delicate and annoying situations, many of them created

by his own fellow-expatriates. For instance, there was the trouble caused by Sir Sydney Smith, who was now on the Brazilian coast. He had little to do, and the devil therefore took pity on his idle hands by tempting him to cut a big figure at court. His "audacity and imperious demeanour, his interference in all public affairs, his avowed contempt for the usages of this Court, and above all the circumstances that are supposed to attend that intercourse with the Princess, which is indiscreetly and vainly paraded with a needless publicity"—all this worried Strangford. The Admiral and the Princess—who was John's wife—apparently spent much time together discussing foreign affairs, and decided it would be pleasant and profitable to capture some of the adjacent Spanish colonies. The Prime Minister, de Souza, agreed with them, and much time and money were spent trying to capture parts of the Argentine by military action. But Strangford knew that London would oppose any use of the British navy for such a goose-chase, and spent painful hours trying to discipline Smith and dissuade de Souza.

Or again, there was de Souza's constant harping on his need for money and a British loan. The Treasury was always nearly or quite empty, and London was expected not merely to refill it with a good large loan but also to advance money in anticipation of a formal flotation. Strangford had to speak bluntly on the matter, and Canning set him the example. "You will have no scruple," said one despatch, "in stating that the moment when the trade of this country with Brazil is burdened with extraordinary and depressing imposts is not a moment peculiarly propitious for negotiating pecuniary assistance." De Souza had to be told this, and was. There is probably some connection between the loan of £600,000 which was eventually made and the level of duties which was fixed on British goods.

Finally, there was Gambier, who had been consul-general in Lisbon and now occupied the same post in Rio. In Rio he developed a grandeur complex, and tried to secure the privileges reserved for the *corps diplomatique*. He bombarded the Prince Regent with letters asking for admission to court levees. When he was refused he crashed the gates of the palace on two or three occasions and made scenes in the royal presence. Strangford could not restrain him, and therefore sent Canning a pathetic appeal for help. Canning replied with a letter to Gambier, rebuking him, and warning him that if he offended again "I have reason to believe that I shall receive His Majesty's commands to signify to you your recall from Brazil."

But Gambier's real offence was that he was vigorously and bluntly backing the British merchants in their crusade for better harbour facilities and more liberal customs regulations. The merchants had come out in droves, and the goods had arrived in mountains; between them they had strained to breaking point the leisurely small-scale red-taped machinery of a sleepy colonial port. The merchants had descended on Rio even more heavily than they had dropped on Montreal and Quebec sixty years before, for they were desperate as well as eager. Napoleon had shut them out of the Continent: Lisbon was closed, and the Embargo Act of 1807 foreshadowed the collapse of demand from the United States. The transfer of the royal family to Rio was therefore a well-timed godsend, or what I believe psychologists used to call a compensating fantasy. One Yorkshire mill-owner records in his diary that the clothiers of his village "are sending upwards of £10,000 of goods to the Brazils. It makes people venture very

hard now, as there is no port scarce open but it for cloth." Huge shipments went out with the first convoys in the spring—shipments far beyond the possible effective demand of the new capital. Yet before the unwelcome news of a glutted market could be got back to England, a second flood of goods was despatched. During the last five months of 1808, \$3,000,000 of British goods went out in British ships alone. The whole first year's shipments may have been worth at least \$5,000,000.

With them or ahead of them went British merchants and commission agents by the score. By September, 1808, it was possible to get sixty-two British firms in Rio to sign a petition; yet these comprised only "a very large majority of the respectable merchants resident here": so if we add the minority and the non-respectables, we may reach a total of a hundred firms in Rio, plus many in other ports. They came from all parts of the British Isles; some of them were refugees from Lisbon; and one of them was Canadian born. He was Carleton Allsopp, son of the George Allsopp who had come to Quebec nearly sixty years before. George had christened him Carleton in honour of the new Governor, but must have regretted this when the time came to fight the merchants' cause against Carleton and Haldimand. Here was a case of like father like son, for Carleton Allsopp was soon in the thick of a fight to improve the commercial conditions and procedures in Rio.

Those conditions certainly needed improvement. There were no wharves fit to receive ocean-going vessels, and cargoes must be brought ashore in lighters. There were only two lighters, both owned by the same person. Vessels might therefore have to wait days, even weeks, piling up heavy anchorage dues, before their turn came to be unloaded. When the lighters reached the solitary ramshackle wharf, the goods were lifted ashore by an old wooden crane, and carried to one of the three small customs warehouses; but if these were full the overflow was left in open sheds, on the beach, or in the street. There were no warehouse officers to receive or discharge goods, and a merchant who wished to get at a bale knew only that it was "somewhere in the warehouse, buried perhaps among ten thousand others."

Then came customs inspection, conducted by officers in full vestments—gala uniform, cocked hats, small swords, and powdered hair or wigs. They did their work in an upper room, approached up a flight of twenty steps, and up those stairs all goods had to be carried. Here the containers were completely emptied; every single article was examined and a lead seal was attached to it. No pair of socks, no roll of tape, ball of wool, or bottle of wine could be displayed for sale unless it had this seal affixed. Before sealing, the imports were valued and the duties levied. Invoice prices might mean little, for some official might remember that he had seen a similar article on sale in a store at such and such a price; and on that retail price the duty might be fixed. It must be paid in cash before the goods were released.

From the upper room the goods were carried downstairs to a shed; here every article was re-checked, re-counted, and then passed out into the street, there to be packed up, and carried to the merchant's warehouse or store. In busy times there was a scarcity of packers and porters, and as the goods emerged from inspection they lay on the street, "part of one mingled mass of cassimeres, muslins, lace, butter, fish, and oil." When

they reached the merchant's warehouse they might enjoy a long rest, for the glut of goods depressed prices, and those dealers who were not willing to sacrifice their wares at bargain prices or at auction had large stocks left on their hands. What to do with these unsalable wares they scarcely knew; but they did know that still more goods were at that moment speeding across the Atlantic, and that the arrival of the next convoy would demoralize the market still further. Perhaps these wares could be sent on to some other market or returned to England. Excellent idea, said the customs officers; but first you will pay the 24 per cent import duty on them and then the 4 per cent export duty.

Against these slow, arbitrary, and vexatious procedures the merchants revolted. Private bribes could work wonders; but public protest must also be made. The merchant class had learned the technique of protest in Boston, Quebec, London, Lisbon, and a score of British provincial towns. If there had been a *Who's Who* in the early nineteenth century, many a merchant would have described his recreation as "Attending public demonstrations, going to committee meetings, and signing petitions." So it was at Rio. A committee was soon formed, and another one came into being in London. Each brought pressure to bear on the Brazilian and British ministers and officials, and each reported to the other. By April, 1808, the men in Rio were complaining, and by September they had a standard list of grievances that must be redressed. It included the scarcity of lighters, quays, and warehouses; the delays in unloading, the lack of warehouse keepers, the heavy anchorage bills, the ridiculous procedure of inspection, the arbitrary methods of valuation, and the demand for import as well as export duties. Gradually, with painful slowness in face of official resistance and inertia, they obtained redress. By June, 1809, one Yorkshire merchant was able to write, "I am happy to say that the English have become masters of the Customs House, that they regulate everything, and that orders are given for the officers to pay particular attention to the directions of the British consul." This verdict was far too optimistic, for the gap between a decree and its administration was often wide; but at least some progress had been made.

For this triumph Gambier, the aggressive Consul-General, had been largely responsible, but his bullying and blustering tactics had often offended Strangford and de Souza. Yet the Ambassador's own triumph was not long delayed, for in early 1810 a treaty of commerce and navigation was signed in Rio. It was full of good things for British traders. The chief boon was a reduction of the tariff from 24 per cent to 15 per cent. Since foreign traders continued to pay 24, and since goods coming in Portuguese ships paid 16, the preference was substantial over foreign rivals and even prevailed in a small degree against native ships. Special magistrates were provided to deal with cases involving British residents. Valuations were to be made by a joint committee of British and Portuguese merchants. Goods could be re-exported on payment of only a transit duty. The island of St. Catherine's was made a free port, from which trade with Spanish America could be conducted. Religious freedom was granted, and places of public worship could be erected. But these must be built in such a manner as externally to resemble dwelling houses; bells must not be rung; and preachers must neither proselytize nor declaim publicly against the Roman Catholic Church on pain of deportation.

Portugal got some concessions, but not many. If treaty-making is horse-trading, Strangford got by far the better animal.

With the achievement of the merchants' programme and the signature of the trade agreement, we can hurry the story to its close. The treaty was resented by the anti-British exiles and by the Portuguese and Brazilian merchants. In 1811 the friendly de Souza died, and his successor disliked Strangford intensely. The Brazilians were becoming increasingly hostile to the British colony, and only a little less so to the *émigrés*, since the latter had kept tight hold on all public posts. Strangford therefore decided that John ought to return to Lisbon, now free of French troops, since he would be more easy to handle there. John said he would go home, and a British convoy was sent for. But by the time the ships arrived the ministers had persuaded John to change his mind and to stay. Strangford was so angry that he shook the dust of Rio off his shoes and returned to England. John made Brazil a kingdom in 1815 and apparently was ready to end his days there. But in 1820 a rising in Spain started one in Portugal. John's friends in Lisbon sent urgent pleas to him. "If you don't return you will certainly lose Portugal." But could he hold Portugal even if he went back? And if he went, leaving Brazil under the regency of his son, Pedro, could he hold Brazil? John was accustomed to facing such dilemmas, but not to reaching voluntary conclusions. So it was this time; but as he swayed now this way, now that, a combination of Brazilian ministers and the British Ambassador virtually seized him by the scruff of the neck, hustled him aboard a ship, and sent him home in 1821.

Rio thus reverted to its old status of colonial capital. But not quite. The past fourteen years could not be undone. National self-consciousness had grown too strong. Hence when Lisbon tried to deprive Portugal of her status as a co-kingdom and to push her back under parental control, she rebelled. Pedro placed himself at the head of the uprising, and by 1824 was Emperor of an independent Brazil. In 1825 Britain recognized that independence, and other nations followed suit. If Brazil feels grateful to those who contributed to her freedom, she will have to erect many statues. One of them should be of Napoleon, who pushed the royal family out of Lisbon. The other should be of Canning, who pulled it out and landed it on American soil. And there ought to be at least a bust of Strangford.

THE ILLEGAL FUR TRADE OUT OF NEW FRANCE, 1713-60

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The illegal fur trade out of New France may be defined as the export of furs to any destination other than France. In addition, beaver, the most valuable of all, had not merely to be shipped to France, but could be legally exported from Canada only by the French company holding the beaver monopoly.

The contraband trade centred upon Montréal, whence the furs were carried down the Richelieu to Albany.¹ The chief intermediaries between the French merchants at one end, and the English and Dutch at the other, were the converted Iroquois of the Jesuit mission at Caughnawaga, and, to a lesser extent, the Indians of the Saint Sulpice mission which, in 1721, was transferred from Sault-au-Recollet to the Lake of Two Mountains.²

Although the Montreal merchants were the chief offenders, the fur which was smuggled out did not always actually pass through the town, for voyageurs coming down from the up country were sometimes ordered to leave outside the walls a number of packs intended for illegal export. This fur was hidden by being buried, or was concealed in houses on the outskirts of the town, or in the Indian village at Caughnawaga.³ Moreover, savages arriving with furs from their own hunting might be met outside Montreal and relieved of their cargoes, which were sent straight off to the English.⁴ Furs actually in the town were smuggled out to Caughnawaga in the baskets of the squaws,⁵ and, no doubt, by many other means suggested by daring and ingenuity. Probably a good deal of this forbidden trade passed through the hands of the Demoiselles Desautiers, three sisters who, from 1727 to 1752, kept a shop at Caughnawaga, and not only carried on a thriving contraband business of their own, but were said also to have assisted in the smuggling activities of the leading merchants of Montreal, to many of whom they were related.⁶

¹Public Archives of Canada, *Série B*³, vol. 326, ff. 72-72v, Le Peletier (Contrôleur Général des Finances) à Maurepas (Ministre de Marine), Versailles, May 31, 1728; *ibid.*, *Série B*, Ordres et Dépêches du Roi, vol. 66, p. 101, Ministre à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Versailles, April 23, 1738. The "Ministre" is the Ministre de Marine unless otherwise stated.

²E.g., J. R. Brodhead and E. B. O'Callaghan (eds.), *Documents relative to the colonial history of the state of New York* (Albany, 1855), V, 732, Memorial, Colden to Burnet. Nov. 10, 1724 (henceforth *N.Y. Col. Docs.*); Olivier Maurault, "Les vicissitudes d'une mission sauvage" (*Revue trimestrielle canadienne*, XVI, juin, 1930, 3, 7, 26); Public Archives of Canada, *Dépôt des Fortifications*, carton 5, pièce 289, p. 194, Vaudreuil au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 12, 1717; *ibid.*, *Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 48, p. 67, Beauharnois et Dupuy au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 20, 1726; vol. 67, p. 187, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737; vol. 76, pp. 178-9, 183, Mémoire sur le commerce de Canada (1741). The "Conseil" is the Conseil de Marine unless otherwise stated.

³*Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 44, pp. 218-19, De Ramezay au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1722; *Série B*³, vol. 348, ff. 90-3, Mémoire (by the Compagnie des Indes, 1731); Public Archives of Canada, *Ordonnances des Intendants*, XIV, 433, Quebec, Aug. 12, 1738.

⁴*Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 77, pp. 118-20, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 26, 1742; vol. 79, pp. 189-90, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 13, 1743.

⁵*N.Y. Col. Docs.*, IX, 1071, Beauharnois to Minister, Quebec, Sept. 12, 1741.

⁶R. G. Thwaites (ed.), *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin* (Madison, 1908), XVIII, 71-2, La Jonquière to Minister, Quebec, Sept. 29, 1750; *infra*, pp. 129-31.

A particularly interesting source of information, in regard to this illegal trade, is a letter-book kept by Robert Sanders, merchant and some-time mayor of Albany. This letter-book includes copies of letters written by Sanders, in execrable French, to a number of Canadian merchants between the years 1752 and 1755. The letters almost all acknowledge receipt of packs of fur, advise of merchandise sent in return, and state the prices, usually in terms of beaver, at which Sanders offers goods for the Indian trade. Most, if not all, of Sanders's French customers were Montrealers, and some, at least, of the Indian porters were from Caughnawaga.⁷ Two regular and faithful carriers were Indian women, one called Agnese, the other a cross-eyed squaw named Marie Magdelaine.⁸ Their names suggest that they too belonged to one of the French missions.

Perhaps the most illuminating fact which emerges from the letter-book is that the Canadians took most of the risk, for the trade, in this instance at least, seems usually to have been initiated by them, and thus they had to trust both the Indian and the recipient in Albany, against neither of whom was it possible to obtain redress. Furthermore, when Sanders sent merchandise back the risk of loss in transit was again run by the Canadians. It seems curious that large packs of valuable furs and goods should have been entrusted to anyone as notoriously untrustworthy as the Indian, but there was little else that the merchant could do. Moreover, in the legitimate trade very considerable credit was regularly extended by traders to the savages with no really adequate guarantee of repayment. The same Indian names recur constantly in the Sanders correspondence, so, no doubt, the merchants kept employing those savages who had been found to be reasonably faithful, that is to say, those who stole only a percentage of the furs instead of disappearing with the whole lot. Comparatively small losses were fairly constant. According to Sanders, the savages nearly always took out a beaver skin and made up the weight by wetting the furs, or by adding sand to the pack.⁹ To judge from the correspondence itself, the Indians usually arrived with the bulk of the shipment intact, but with five or ten pounds of fur missing, and sometimes the loss was more serious.¹⁰ Moreover, the best-intentioned savage in the world might come to grief, for he might be waylaid by English traders who made him drunk, took his furs, and destroyed the letter which he was carrying from his French employer.¹¹ The practice is clearly analogous to hijacking. The Intendant Hocquart estimated the risk and loss to the Canadian at 10 per cent, in

⁷Public Archives of Canada, *Sanders letter-book*, p. 26, Robert Sanders to Monier, Albany, Oct. 19, 1752; p. 52, R. S. to A., Albany, May 16, 1753; p. 63, R. S. to Meriers, Albany, July 21, 1753; p. 71, R. S. to B., Albany, Aug. 30, 1753; p. 93, R. S. to C., Albany, Nov. 7, 1754; p. 110, R. S. to François De Couagne, Albany, May 22, 1755. The letters A, B, etc., stand for the various signs which Sanders's Canadian correspondents used instead of their names.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 31, R. S. to B., Albany, Oct. 17, 1752; p. 26, R. S. to Monier, Albany, Oct. 19, 1752; p. 51, R. S. to B., Albany, May 16, 1753; p. 62, R. S. to D., Albany, July 6, 1753; p. 62, R. S. to B., Albany, July 12, 1753; p. 82, R. S. to B., Albany (Aug.), 1754.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 64, R. S. to G., Albany, July 24, 1753.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 19, R. S. to D. (Aug. 5, 1752); p. 23, R. S. to B., Albany, Aug. 11, 1752; p. 26, R. S. to Monier, Albany, Oct. 19, 1752; p. 43, R. S. to E., Albany, Jan. 31, 1753; p. 76, R. S. to Madame F., Albany, Sept. 11, 1753.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 44, R. S. to D., Albany, Jan. 31, 1753.

addition to the 10 or 12 per cent paid as wages to the Indian carrier.¹² Moreover, the risk of punishment was run chiefly by the French, for, except for a short time, from 1720 to 1726, this trade was not deemed illegal in the province of New York. To protect themselves, Sanders's Canadian correspondents usually substituted some kind of monogram, or initial, or sign, for their own names. One merchant expresses himself as a smoking pipe, another seems rather like a ladder, and a third appears in the guise of a slightly peevish rooster. Still another carried secrecy to the point where not even Sanders knew his correspondent's real name for at least the best part of a year.¹³

The furs exported to Albany comprised deerskins, some muskrat, and, above all, beaver. During the first half of the period this was chiefly *castor sec*, for the English did not distinguish between different grades, while up to 1738 the French paid sometimes twice as much for *castor gras* as they did for *castor sec*.¹⁴ The returns included all manner of luxury articles obviously destined for the use of the French themselves, such as silver coffee spoons, silver forks, table knives, penknives, pipes, gold buttons, buckles, London-made boots, lace, gloves, mittens, calico, muslin, chintz, fine woollens, chocolate, white sugar, and oysters. More important, however, were goods for the Indian trade, such as wampum, copper kettles, and, especially, strouds, a coarse West of England cloth.¹⁵

There are, of course, certain exceptions to the generalization that the illegal fur trade was carried on between Montreal and Albany, via the Richelieu, by means of the Christian Indians. First, the domiciled Indians occasionally brought English goods on their own initiative, to sell in the colony.¹⁶ Moreover, these savages were not always used as intermediaries, for the French themselves sometimes went to Albany,¹⁷ and merchants from Albany, and even New York, came frequently to Montreal, on pretext of carrying letters, or collecting debts, or looking for runaway slaves, but actually, so the Canadian authorities believed, to exchange English goods

¹²*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 67, pp. 191-2, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737.

¹³*Sanders letter-book*, p. 23, R. S. to B., Albany, Aug. 11, 1752; p. 51, R. S. to B., Albany, May 16, 1753; p. 55, R. S. to B., Albany, June 23, 1753. P.S.; p. 63, R. S. to Meriers, Albany, July 21, 1753; *passim*.

¹⁴*Ordonnances des Intendants*, V, 395-8, Quebec, March 21, 1720; VIII, 207-10, Quebec, July 31, 1724; VIII, 212-5, Quebec, Aug. 14, 1724; VIII, 250-3, Quebec, Oct. 27, 1724; VIII, 369-72, Quebec, July 2, 1725; X, 333-4, Montreal, July 20, 1730. *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 51, pp. 366-7, Réponse de la Compagnie des Indes . . . , Feb. 6, 1729; vol. 67, pp. 88-9, Réponse au mémoire du Roy (1737); vol. 67, pp. 191-3, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737; vol. 97, p. 271, Mémoire sur le commerce des castors de Canada (1748).

¹⁵*Sanders letter-book*, *passim*, *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, p. 8, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 15, 1713; vol. 35, p. 54, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 95, p. 133, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, July 25, 1750; Public Archives of Canada, *Série F³*, Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. IX (2), p. 493, Ordonnance de Bégon, Quebec, April 2, 1716; *Ordonnances des Intendants*, VI, 133-5, Quebec, Oct. 12, 1720; VIII, 207-10, Quebec, July 31, 1724.

¹⁶*Série B*, vol. 35 (3), p. 328, Mémoire du Roy à Vaudreuil et Bégon, June 25, 1713; vol. 59 (1), p. 92, Ministre à Hocquart, Versailles, March 24, 1733.

¹⁷E.g., *Ordonnances des Intendants*, V, 307-8, 308-10; VII, 55-6, 63, 131-5, 135-47, 181-91, 317-8, 341-2; *Série F³*, vol. IX (2), pp. 493-5, Ordonnance de Bégon, Quebec, April 2, 1716; *infra*, p. 128.

for French beaver.¹⁸ In 1728, the Intendant Dupuy declared that the English came by dozens to Montreal and Quebec to set up stores and to establish connections for contraband.¹⁹ Some of them even took up residence in Canada,²⁰ and a few set up in Montreal as hatmakers, as a cover for their smuggling activities.²¹ Occasionally, furs were sent from Montreal to Oswego,²² probably because the route to Lake Ontario was less carefully watched than that to Albany, and, of course, some never reached Montreal at all, but were sent, or taken, directly to Oswego by voyageurs in the up country. A good many furs from Detroit, for instance, found their way to this English post.²³

In addition, there was, no doubt, some inland smuggling between Quebec and Albany,²⁴ but the really extensive illegal export from the capital was by sea, occasionally perhaps to Boston,²⁵ and regularly across the Atlantic, sometimes to France, but chiefly to Holland, where beaver fetched higher prices. The fur was carried not only on merchantmen, but also on the King's ship itself, and was generally trans-shipped in the French ports, although in one instance a shipment was unloaded in Spain, to be taken eventually to the Netherlands.²⁶ The French fishing fleet also car-

¹⁸*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, pp. 435-6, De Ramezay au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 23, 1714; vol. 35, pp. 156-7, De Ramezay au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 28, 1715; vol. 35, pp. 235-6, Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 44, pp. 219-20, De Ramezay au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1722; vol. 47, p. 55, Longueuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 31, 1725; vol. 50, p. 12, Beauharnois et D'Aigremont au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 1, 1728; vol. 55, pp. 144-9, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1731; vol. 59 (1), pp. 159-60, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1733; vol. 71, p. 46, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 4, 1739; vol. 72, p. 39, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Nov. 1, 1739; *Série B*, vol. 53 (3), pp. 440-1, Ministre à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Compiègne, May 2, 1729; *Ordonnances des Intendants*, VII, 161-72, Quebec, July 10, 1722; *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, IX, 957, King to Beauharnois, Versailles, May 7, 1726; IX, 1029-30, Beauharnois and Hocquart to Maurepas, Quebec, Oct. 1, 1731; *Collections of the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society* (Lansing, 1905), XXXIV, 101, Beauharnois and Hocquart to Maurepas, Quebec, Oct. 1, 1732.

¹⁹*Série B³*, vol. 326, ff. 81-81v, Dupuy à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, May 15, 1728.

²⁰*Journal of the General Assembly of New York* (New York, 1764), I, 473, Address to Governor Burnet, June 14, 1722; *Série B*, vol. 52 (1), p. 79, Ministre à Dupuy, Versailles, May 14, 1728.

²¹*Série B*, vol. 49 (2), pp. 413-14, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Dupuy, Versailles, May 14, 1726; vol. 52 (1), p. 122, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Dupuy, Versailles, May 14, 1728; transcript from the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Archives Bastille, carton 11374, pp. 8-9, Mémoire de la Dame de Thiersant au Cardinal de Fleury, June, 1737.

²²*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 55, p. 181, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 18, 1731; vol. 64, p. 72, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct. 25, 1735; vol. 95, p. 133, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, July 25, 1750; *Série B*, vol. 65 (3), p. 701, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Versailles, May 10, 1737.

²³*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 73, pp. 128-9, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Nov. 3, 1740; vol. 93, p. 171, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 22, 1749; *Série F³*, XIV (supplément), 6, Ordonnance de la Jonquière, Montreal, May 29, 1750.

²⁴*Sanders letter-book*, p. 44, R. S. to D., Albany, Jan. 31, 1753.

²⁵*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, pp. 547-8, Précis de . . . mémoire présenté à . . . Pontchartrain . . . par Dauteuil, procureur général du Roi au Conseil Supérieur . . .; vol. 47, pp. 72-7, Vaudreuil au Ministre, Montreal, April 16, 1725.

²⁶Public Archives of Canada, transcript from Archives Rochefort, IE, vol. 85, ff. 665-6, Pontchartrain à Beauharnois, Dec. 5, 1714; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 36, p. 407, Neret et Gayot au Conseil (June 8, 1716); vol. 37, p. 481, Mémoire; vol. 44, p. 140, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 7, 1722; vol. 48, p. 234, Dupuy au Ministre, Oct. 14, 1726; vol. 48, p. 68, Beauharnois et Dupuy au Ministre, Quebec,

ried contraband beaver, bought from Canadian fishermen who had smuggled it out of the colony.²⁷

It is impossible to calculate exactly the extent of the illegal trade. In the early years of the period, some estimates placed the annual illegal export at roughly a half or two-thirds of the total quantity of beaver produced in Canada each year,²⁸ but later the records are silent. There can be no doubt, however, that an extensive contraband trade continued to exist. The most conspicuous reason for its existence was the fact that England produced better and cheaper woollen cloth than France did. The Indian preferred English strouds to French scarlets from all standpoints, quality, colour, style, and price. The Iroquois of Caughnawaga once stated flatly that they would rather be dead than deprived of English goods.²⁹ Throughout the period with which we are concerned, it was asserted again and again that, owing to the Indian preference, English strouds, or their equivalent, were absolutely essential in the fur trade.³⁰ The truth of the assertion is borne out by the periodic, although completely futile, attempts of French manufacturers to imitate English cloth.³¹ Failing to produce an equivalent in

Oct. 20, 1726; vol. 58, p. 69, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 25, 1732; *Série B*, vol. 49 (2), p. 336, Ministre à Dupuy, Versailles, May 7, 1726; *Série B*³, vol. 326, ff. 67-67^v, Le Peletier à Maurepas, Versailles, May 16, 1728.

²⁷*Ordonnances des Intendants*, XIII, 156-8, Quebec, May 6, 1735.

²⁸*Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 39, pp. 61-2, Traité, May 10, 1706; vol. 34, p. 292, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 20, 1714; vol. 35, p. 461, Mémoire, Bégon, Nov. 3, 1715; vol. 39, p. 54, Neret et Gayot au Roy et à Nosseigneurs de son Conseil (1717); vol. 123 (not paged), Sur le mémoire présenté par Sieur Riverin . . . Marginal note, Minute of the Conseil de Marine, April 28, 1716.

²⁹*Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 97, p. 139, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 19, 1751.

³⁰*Ibid.*, vol. 34, pp. 7-8, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 15, 1713; vol. 35, p. 462, Mémoire, Bégon, Quebec, Nov. 3, 1715; vol. 125 (1), pp. 439-40, S. de Lanouillier, Sept. 14, 1715, Conseil, May 12, 1716 (this ellipsis indicates the proceedings of the Conseil on Lanouillier's letter of Sept. 14); vol. 36, pp. 144-5, Réponses aux propositions du député du commerce de Languedoc sur les écarlatines, Bégon, Quebec, Oct. 9, 1716; vol. 38, pp. 119-23, Vaudreuil à Monseigneur, Quebec, Oct. 30, 1717; vol. 43, pp. 256-7, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil, Oct. 8, 1721, Conseil, Dec. 19, 1721; vol. 55, p. 144, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1731; vol. 55, p. 182, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 18, 1731; vol. 67, pp. 188-90, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737; vol. 90-1, pp. 47-8, La Galissonnière et Bigot au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 20, 1748; vol. 103 (2), p. 542, Mémoire, La Compagnie des Indes au Ministre (1758); transcript from Dépôt des Fortifications, Carton 5, pièce 289, p. 194, Vaudreuil, Quebec, Oct. 12, 1717, Conseil, Jan. 5, 1718; Public Archives of Canada, *Série B*¹, vol. 29, p. 169, Charlot, Feb. 19, 1718, Conseil, March 9, 1718; Archives Nationales (Paris), *Série Marine B*³, vol. 532, ff. 71-71^v, Mémoire sur les envois de la Compagnie des Indes dans le Canada (1756); *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, V, 687, Of the trade of New York, Colden (enclosed in, Burnet to the Lords of Trade, June 25, 1723); V, 741, Report of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Albany, Nov. 12, 1724; I. Boislielle (ed.), *Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux*, III, 522, Pontchartrain au Contrôleur Général, Jan. 28, 1714.

³¹Boislielle, *Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux*; *Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 125 (1), pp. 439-40, Lanouillier, Sept. 24, 1715, Conseil, May 12, 1716; vol. 35, p. 52, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 36, p. 144, Réponses . . . Bégon, Quebec, Oct. 9, 1716; *Série B*, vol. 39 (4), p. 948, Conseil à Bégon, Paris, July 7, 1717; *Série B*¹, vol. 29, pp. 23-6, Bégon, Quebec, Nov. 6, 1717, Conseil, Jan. 5, 1718; vol. 29, pp. 200-4, Conseil, March 16, 1718; *Série B*, vol. 89, p. 140, Ministre à La Jonquière et Bigot, Versailles, April 30, 1749; *Série C*¹¹*A*, vol. 93, pp. 3-4, La Jonquière et Bigot au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 1, 1749; vol. 98, pp. 368-9, Martin au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 5, 1752; vol. 103 (2), p. 543, Mémoire, La Compagnie des Indes au Ministre (1758); *Série Marine B*³, vol. 532, ff. 71-71^v, Mémoire sur les envois de la Compagnie des Indes dans le Canada (1756).

any of the desired respects, the French adopted the plan of buying strouds in England for export, via France, to Canada.³² But although by the end of the period the Compagnie des Indes was making large shipments of English cloth, the expedient failed to check smuggling, for, owing presumably to a difference in transportation, and probably in other, costs, strouds brought via Albany could be bought in Montreal more cheaply than strouds sent via France.³³

The belief of the French that strouds were indispensable was shared by many of the colonial authorities in New York.³⁴ For example, the whole policy of Governor Burnet, in regard to Indian trade, was based upon this assumption. Burnet was convinced that, if the supply of strouds sent from Albany to Montreal were cut off, the French trade with the Indians must collapse, and the savages would therefore turn to the English. He anticipated from this policy not only economic gain to the colony of New York, but, more important still, also the political and military advantage of Indian allegiance, which was practically identical with Indian trade. From 1720 to 1726, Burnet did contrive to have the trade in Indian goods to the French prohibited, but the law could not be enforced, and finally, owing chiefly to the machinations of the Albany merchants, the ban was lifted.

✓ The advantage to Albany of trading with Montreal arose, of course, ✓ from the fact that the French had most of the furs. While Canadians penetrated far into the interior, New Yorkers never got past Lake Ontario; while missionary influence and comparatively humane treatment helped to attach the Indians to the French, abusive traders and encroachment on their land tended to estrange them from the English. ✓ The wholesale trade in ✓ strouds to Montreal appealed to the leading merchants of Albany as being easier and safer than trying to tap the fur supply at its source, where the French had already established control. The political wisdom of men like Burnet was lost upon the Albany trader, who was not prepared to interrupt his flow of profits from an established business for the sake of an imperial vision which, he felt, might easily be a mirage. The cautious Dutch merchant was no British Empire builder. He refused, therefore, to gamble immediate gain against the possibly greater, but much less certain, benefits to be derived from an attempt to establish direct relations with the western Indians. He simply turned a deaf Dutch ear and tightened his grasp on

³²*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, p. 322, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 20, 1714; vol. 38, p. 119, Vaudreuil à Monseigneur, Quebec, Oct. 30, 1717; *Série B¹*, vol. 29, p. 169, M. Charlot, La Rochelle, Feb. 19, 1718, Conseil, March 9, 1718; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 44, p. 140, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 17, 1722; vol. 45, p. 25, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1723; vol. 50, p. 224, Requête des marchands (1728); vol. 70, pp. 8-9, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct. 8, 1738; vol. 98, pp. 368-9, Martin au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 5, 1752; vol. 103 (2), p. 543, Mémoire, La Compagnie des Indes au Ministre (1758).

³³*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 35, p. 51, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 44, p. 140, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 17, 1722; vol. 54, pp. 109-10, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 12, 1731; *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, V, 728-30, Memorial, Colden to Burnet, Nov. 10, 1724.

³⁴*N.Y. Col. Docs.*, V, 687. Of the trade of New York, by Colden (enclosed with, Burnet to the Lords of Trade, New York, June 25, 1723); VI, 1010, William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, Lake George, Sept. 24, 1755; VII, 16-7, Peter Wraxall, Some thoughts upon the British Indian interest . . . (enclosed with, Wraxall to Johnson, Jan. 9, 1756).

the bird in his hand, when Burnet, and his like, urged the profits, both political and economic, to be found in the bush.³⁵

While Albany had what it believed to be adequate reasons for trading with Montreal, Montreal had even more compelling motives to trade with Albany. It was profitable to the Canadian merchant not only to buy his cloth, but also to sell his beaver, in Albany. Throughout the period, the English offered higher prices, particularly for *castor sec*, than did the French beaver companies.³⁶ There were, of course, certain charges on the smuggling trade from which the legitimate trade was free, but only once or twice were French and English beaver prices such that these charges loomed so comparatively large as to make the illegal export of beaver unattractive, and even then, the desire to obtain strouds remained.³⁷ Normally, the Canadian got more and better goods for his beaver in Albany than he did anywhere else, he avoided the charge of 5 per cent for good measure collected by the Company, he might avoid payment of certain taxes,³⁸ and, finally, he found in the Albany trade the inestimable advantage of prompt payment. The company holding the beaver monopoly from 1706 to 1717 more than once came very close to defaulting on the payment of its bills of exchange, with consequent alarm and discredit in the colony. At best, its bills were payable, at face value, only after two years, and meanwhile the rate of discount might be as high as 10 per cent.³⁹ When the Compagnie des Indes took over the monopoly it met its drafts promptly, in the spring after the beaver reached France.⁴⁰ This still meant, however, that the Canadian, who had received his beaver in the spring, or early summer, and sold it to the Company in return for bills of exchange, could not expect returns from France at least until the following summer, whereas if

³⁵C. H. McIlwain, Introduction to *An abridgement of the Indian affairs*, by Peter Wraxall (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), pp. lxxv-lxxxix; A. H. Buffinton, "The policy of Albany and English westward expansion" (*Mississippi Valley historical review*, VIII, March, 1922, 327-366, 332-3, 358-63).

³⁶*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, p. 292, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 20, 1714; *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, V, 733, Memorial, Colden to Burnet, Nov. 10, 1724; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 49 (1), p. 44, Merchants of New France to Governor and Intendant (1727); vol. 61, p. 92, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 7, 1734; vol. 67, pp. 88-9, Réponses au mémoire du Roy (1737); vol. 97, p. 271, Mémoire sur le commerce des castors de Canada (1748); vol. 93, pp. 8-10, Observations (1749); *Wisconsin historical collections*, XVIII, 72, 73, La Jonquière to Minister, Quebec, Sept. 29, 1750; *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, VII, 6, Governor Hardy to the Lords of Trade, New York, Jan. 16, 1756.

³⁷*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 44, pp. 202-3, Mémoire, Bégon, Quebec, Oct. 26, 1722; *Sanders letter-book*, p. 31, R. S. to B., Albany, Oct. 17, 1752.

³⁸*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 35, pp. 236-7, Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 97, p. 271, Mémoire (1748).

³⁹*Ibid.*, vol. 39, p. 73, Traité, May 10, 1706; vol. 35, pp. 454-9, Mémoire, Bégon, Quebec, Nov. 3, 1715; vol. 36, pp. 342-50, Protestation du Sieur Lanouillier . . . Oct. 3, 1716; vol. 36, pp. 293-309, Mémoire, Colony of New France to Bégon, Quebec, Oct. 9, 1716; vol. 39, p. 81, Réponses au mémoire des Sieurs Neret et Gayot . . . Quebec, Nov. 6, 1718; transcript from Dépôt des Fortifications, carton 5, pièce 289, p. 194, Vaudreuil, Quebec, Oct. 12, 1717, Conseil, Jan. 5, 1718.

⁴⁰*Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 396, Arrêt, July 11, 1718; I, 505, Arrêt, Versailles, March 30, 1726; *Série B*, vol. 48 (2), p. 56, Ministre à Vaudreuil et (Bégon). Versailles, May 29, 1725; *Série B*, vol. 312, ff. 154-156v, Dodun, Contrôleur Général des Finances, Versailles, March 23, 1726; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 51, pp. 355-6, Réponse de la Compagnie des Indes, Feb. 6, 1729; vol. 93, pp. 17-18, Observations . . . (1749).

✓ he sent his fur off to Albany, he had merchandise back within six weeks.⁴¹ The advantage was obvious.

Moreover, the Albany trade had charms not alone for the profit-seeking fur merchant, but also for the general public. English manufactured goods were much in demand in the colony, especially the finer varieties of cloth which, all legislation to the contrary, Canadians used extensively to ornament both their houses and their persons. Possibly, the appeal lay in a very natural reaction to the coarse woollen cloth, manufactured in Bordeaux, which they usually wore. The export of such goods from Albany was never forbidden by the English, for the ban which they imposed briefly applied only to goods for the Indian trade. Governor Burnet pointed out that all other articles were in the nature of luxuries, and would, therefore, he implies, probably do the French more harm than good.⁴² The fondness of the French for English cloth is illustrated by the case of the tinsmith's wife. The tinsmith's wife owned a short cloak made from printed calico of foreign manufacture, and to this gay garment, with its pattern of red flowers, she was evidently much attached. Wearing it through the streets of Quebec, she was observed one day by two guards employed by the Compagnie des Indes. In reply to the expostulations of the men, she said that she was not aware that the use of such goods was forbidden, that she wanted to wear the cloak, and that they had no right to stop her. Her stubborn refusal to obey any of the guards' commands resulted in a summons to appear before the Intendant. Her protest that her innocence was proved by the fact that she had thrown the cloak into the fire failed to convince Hocquart, but she did plead ignorance and poverty so effectively that he fined her only 100 *livres*, instead of the 500 *livres* required by law.⁴³

✓ Whatever its attractions for Canadians, however, the English trade had no appeal for the authorities in France. Official opinion held it to be harmful to the interests of French manufacturers both of hats and of textiles, and, of course, it interfered with the profits of the beaver company.⁴⁴ It was pointed out that while France bore the cost of maintaining the colony, the English enjoyed the benefits.⁴⁵ Trade with Holland affected the disposal, by the Company, of its surplus beaver which could not be used by the French hatmakers.⁴⁶ Finally, the trade with Albany, in addition to its economic drawbacks, accustomed the dominated Indians to going

⁴¹*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 35, pp. 54-5, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 51, pp. 355-6, Réponse de la Compagnie des Indes, Feb. 6, 1729.

⁴²*Ibid.*, vol. 37, p. 66, Délibération du Conseil sur les écarlatines, Jan., 1717; vol. 48, pp. 70-1, Beauharnois et Dupuy au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 20, 1726; *Wisconsin historical collection*, XVIII, 72, La Jonquière to Minister, Quebec, Sept. 29, 1750; *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, V, 582, Burnet to the Lords of Trade, Dec. 14, 1720.

⁴³*Ordonnances des Intendants*, XIII, 380-4, Quebec, May 19, 1736.

⁴⁴*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 35, p. 55, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 76, pp. 178-9, Mémoire sur le commerce de Canada (1741); vol. 67, pp. 193-4, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737; *Série 3*, vol. 54 (2), p. 351, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Versailles, April 11, 1730; vol. 59 (1), pp. 316-17, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Versailles, May 12, 1733; vol. 49 (2), pp. 318-20, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois, Versailles, May 7, 1726.

⁴⁵*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 40, p. 232, Conseil, May 23, 1719.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, vol. 36, pp. 407-8, Requête présentée au Conseil par Neret et Gayot, June 8, 1716; *Série B*, vol. 89, pp. 142-3, Ministre à La Jonquière et Bigot, Versailles, April 30, 1749.

to the English and attracted the English to Montreal, results which might have dangerous political and military consequences.⁴⁷

The French, therefore, made apparently strenuous efforts to stop the trade. Their periodic endeavours to remove the causes were unsuccessful. This we have already seen in connection with the supplying of cloth, and, similarly, attempts to correct the disparity between the beaver prices failed.⁴⁸ Unable to destroy the trade at its source, the authorities tried to raise barriers against it. Efforts were made to safeguard the passage of the beaver down from the up country to Montreal, by having the cargoes of the canoes checked at each post *en route*,⁴⁹ and voyageurs were ordered to follow a northerly course through Lake Ontario, sedulously avoiding the south shore, lest they hear and hearken to the siren voice of Oswego.⁵⁰ Once the beaver reached the towns the merchants were required to bring it within forty-eight hours to the receiving offices maintained by the Company, and ordinances were issued to prevent its passage from one town to another.⁵¹ The route to Albany was guarded by Fort Chambly and by soldiers on Lake Champlain, whither a detachment was sent each summer from 1717, or earlier, until 1731, when the French fort at Crown Point was built and garrisoned.⁵² Canadians were not only forbidden to take beaver to the English colonies, they might not even go themselves, unless with the Governor's permission viséd by the Intendant.⁵³ To this end, all bark canoes were ordered to be registered, and severe penalties attached to using, selling, or lending them for illegal journeys.⁵⁴ Besides keeping the French in the colony, the English had also to be kept out, but no real efforts were made in this direction until 1725, when it was ruled that Englishmen might remain in Montreal only two days. Letters Patent issued in 1727 for all the colonies, forbade foreigners, even if naturalized, to follow any pursuit

⁴⁷*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, pp. 8-9, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 15, 1713; *Série B*, vol. 49 (2), pp. 318-20, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois, Versailles, May 7, 1726.

⁴⁸*Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 441-2, Arrêt, Paris, Jan. 28, 1722; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 64, pp. 67-9, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct. 25, 1735; vol. 67, pp. 191-3, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737; vol. 81 (1), pp. 52-8, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1744; vol. 93, pp. 8-10, Observations . . . (1749); *Série F³*, XII, 297-8, Ordonnance, Hocquart, Quebec, Dec. 20, 1735; XII, 215-17, Ordonnance, Hocquart, Quebec, July 11, 1738; XIII, 287-91, Ordonnance, Beauharnois et Hocquart, Quebec, June 6, 1746.

⁴⁹Public Archives of Canada, *Série A¹*, Liasse LXIX, pièce 25. Arrêt, Fontainebleau, July 10, 1731; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 75, p. 257, Beauharnois au Ministre, Sept. 22, 1741; *Série F³*, vol. XIV (supplément), p. 6, Ordonnance, La Jonquière, Montreal, May 29, 1750; *Edits et Ordonnances*, II, 375, Ordonnance, Hocquart, Quebec, April 25, 1738.

⁵⁰*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 51, pp. 289-90, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Oct. 12 and 20, 1729.

⁵¹*Ordonnances des Intendants*, IV, 440-1, Quebec, Nov. 14, 1714; V, 32-4, Quebec, May 29, 1715; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 51, pp. 290-1, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Oct. 12 and 20, 1729; *Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 401-3, Arrêt, Paris, June 4, 1719; P. G. Roy (ed.), *Inventaire des Ordonnances des Intendants* (Beauceville, 1919), III, 131, June 16, 1749.

⁵²*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 35, p. 157, De Ramezay au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 28, 1715; vol. 40, p. 238, Conseil, May 23, 1719; *Série B*, vol. 38 (2), p. 378, Conseil à Vaudreuil, Paris, June 15, 1716; vol. 52 (1), p. 92, Ministre à Beauharnois, Versailles, May 14, 1728; vol. 57 (1), pp. 57-8, Ministre à Beauharnois, Versailles, April 1, 1732.

⁵³*Série F³*, IX (2), 493-5, Ordonnance, Bégon, Quebec, April 2, 1716; *Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 489-90, Déclaration du Roi, Versailles, May 22, 1724.

⁵⁴*Ordonnances des Intendants*, VIII, 275-7, Quebec, Dec. 23, 1724.

but farming, but it was not until 1738 that Englishmen were refused admission to the colony on any pretext whatsoever.⁵⁵ Finally, a whole series of ordinances were issued to prevent the import and use of English goods, each new law designed to close some loophole previously overlooked.⁵⁶

✓ Thus the French tried to check the smuggling trade from the moment that the furs were gathered in the wilderness to the time when the returns from Albany were in use in the colony. This "geographical" description of the French efforts is, of course, artificial, for the growth of their policy was purely organic; new regulations were made when and where they occurred to the authorities to be necessary. But while their exertions must have acted as a deterrent, it is certain that smuggling was never suppressed. Occasionally, Canadian officials reported that, as a result of their efforts, the contraband trade had been checked, but usually they had scarcely time to receive congratulations from France before they were forced to admit that smuggling was worse than ever.⁵⁷

✓ It was vain to expect to stop the illegal trade by legislation, for the law either was not, or could not be, enforced. For example, Canadian officials did not insist upon the prompt delivery of beaver to the Company's offices, because they feared to damage business in the colony, where beaver circulated like currency.⁵⁸ Likewise, there are even some tacit admissions that the authorities condoned the import of strouds from Albany, when emergency required.⁵⁹

Moreover, officials in Canada were not always to be trusted. The first Governor Vaudreuil was said to have traded extensively with the English colonies and that in time of war.⁶⁰ Beauharnois apparently saw no reason why Canadians should not be allowed to pay debts to their English neighbours in deerskins. The fact that he wrote the Minister so suggests that the Governor was stupid rather than dishonest.⁶¹ He also believed that English visitors should be freely admitted, and it was solely Hocquart's

⁵⁵*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 47, p. 55, Longueuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 31, 1725; *Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 519, Oct., 1727; II, 374-6, Ordonnance, Hocquart, Quebec, April 25, 1738.

⁵⁶*Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 320-1, Arrêt, July 6, 1709; I, 401-3, Arrêt, Paris, June 4, 1719; *Wisconsin historical collections*, XVII, 214-5, Ordonnance, Beauharnois et Hocquart, Quebec, Aug. 23, 1735; *Série B*, vol. 38 (2), pp. 480-1, Ordonnance du Roy, Paris, May 19, 1716; vol. 49 (2), pp. 492-3, Ordonnance du Roy, Versailles, May 14, 1726; *Ordonnances des Intendants*, X, 259-60, Montreal, July 11, 1730; *Série F³*, XIII, 11-7, Ordonnance, Beauharnois et Hocquart, Quebec, May 12, 1741; XIII, 34-7, Ordonnance, Beauharnois et Hocquart, Quebec, June 16, 1741; XIII, 91-3, Ordonnance, Beauharnois et Hocquart, Quebec, April 24, 1742.

⁵⁷E.g. *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 48, p. 294, Dupuy au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 30, 1726; vol. 49 (1), pp. 139-40, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 25, 1727; *Série B*, vol. 52 (1), p. 120, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Dupuy, Versailles, May 14, 1728; *Série B³*, vol. 326, ff. 81-81v, Dupuy à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, May 15, 1728.

⁵⁸*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 48, pp. 64-6, Beauharnois et Dupuy au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 20, 1726.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 55, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 68, pp. 28-9, Hocquart au Contrôleur Général, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1737; *Série B¹*, vol. 8 (2), pp. 572-3, Observation, Conseil, May 12, 1716.

⁶⁰*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, pp. 547-8, Précis de . . . mémoire présenté à . . . Pontchartrain . . . par Dauteuil.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, vol. 50, pp. 13-14, Beauharnois et D'Aigremont au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 1, 1728.

doing that they were ever excluded.⁶² Prosecutions for smuggling had early to be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Conseil Supérieur to that of the Intendant, because members of the Conseil themselves engaged in business, and their sympathy and interest were so much with the culprits that convictions could not be obtained for the most barefaced contraventions of the law.⁶³ An incident in 1714 illustrates the impunity of the smugglers. An officer of the beaver company discovered, at Cap St. Ignace, thirteen hundred pounds of beaver, evidently part of a much larger collection and obviously destined for illegal export. When the officer reached Quebec with the confiscated beaver, he was met by the owner, sword in hand, and engaged in combat, while the merchant's friends and relatives, who had accompanied him, made off with the fur. The merchant had not troubled to conceal his identity, yet he went unpunished.⁶⁴ Complicity or negligence continued on down the line. The Lieutenant-Governor in Montreal, in his task of checking contraband, received no assistance from the King's Attorney of the Jurisdiction, because that worthy had a business in Quebec and lived there, visiting Montreal seldom and briefly.⁶⁵ The officers of the Montreal garrison were suspected of carrying on, or favouring, foreign trade,⁶⁶ and in 1735 Hocquart had to admit that a law passed four years earlier, to ensure the beaver reaching Montreal, had fallen into disuse, owing to the failure of the commandants of the up country posts to enforce it.⁶⁷ Finally, the illegal trade of the Demoiselles Desautiers was carried on at least with the connivance, and more probably with the full co-operation, of the missionary at Caughnawaga.

Even given conscientious officials, the chances of evading the law were still enormous. A few men, although armed with the right to search any building, could not possibly cope with a community interested almost without exception in the smuggling trade.⁶⁸ So unanimously was the law opposed by public opinion that an attempt to enforce it by offering increasingly attractive rewards to informers was an almost total failure.⁶⁹ Moreover, transgressors, even when caught, still had some hope of avoiding the full impact of the law by pleading ignorance or poverty or both,⁷⁰ and all save the most solidly established citizens might escape punishment by disappearing into the limitless bush, which, throughout the French period, offered friendly sanctuary to the native-born habitant.⁷¹

⁶²*Ibid.*, vol. 70, pp. 6-7, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 8, 1738.

⁶³*Ibid.*, vol. 125 (1), pp. 438-9, Lanouillier, Quebec, Sept. 24, 1715, Conseil, May 12, 1716; vol. 35, pp. 399-401, Neret et Gayot à Pontchartrain, Paris, Feb. 20, 1715; vol. 125 (1), pp. 428-9, Requête de Neret et Gayot, Conseil, May 5, 1716; *Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 347-8, Arrêt, Marly, May 6, 1715; I, 401-3, Arrêt, Paris, June 4, 1719.

⁶⁴*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, pp. 518-25, Procès verbal de Jean Baptiste Le Boeuf, Sieur de Ste. Marie . . . June 4, 5, 6, 1714.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, vol. 53, pp. 15-16, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1730.

⁶⁶*Série B*, vol. 52 (1), p. 195, Ministre à Dupuy, Versailles, May 24, 1728.

⁶⁷*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 64, p. 73, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Québec, Oct. 25, 1735.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 237, Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 49 (2), p. 353, Dupuy au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 20, 1727.

⁶⁹*Edits et Ordonnances*, I, 395-9, July 11, 1718; I, 401-3, Paris, June 4, 1719; I, 404-5, Paris, June 2, 1720; I, 463-4, Paris, May 15, 1722; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 51, p. 288, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Oct. 12 and 20, 1729.

⁷⁰*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 59 (2), p. 472, Mémoire, Hocquart, Quebec, Sept. 1, 1733; e.g. *supra*, p. 124.

⁷¹E.g. *Ordonnances des Intendants*, XII, 283-6, Quebec, April 22, 1734.

Although it was not infrequently pointed out, with a good deal of truth, that smuggling could never be checked in a country the geographical nature of which lent itself so admirably to that pursuit,⁷² the least ineffective of all the measures taken was probably the patrolling of the route to Albany. By about 1740, the Canadian authorities seem to have been satisfied that neither French nor English participated any longer directly in the trade,⁷³ and, if such were the case, the success can be attributed only to the barrier formed by the forts at Chambly and Crown Point.

This simply implied, however, the increased use of the savages as intermediaries, and here emerges probably the greatest single reason for the failure of the French to stop the illegal trade, namely, the fear of offending the domiciled Indians. This fear meant that no really effective methods of coercion could ever be applied to the savages, and beyond a doubt, both the savages and the Canadians knew it.⁷⁴ Attempts were made, of course, to control the mission Indians, but the authorities never dared go so far as absolutely to forbid the savages, as they forbade the French, to trade at Albany. Given so much, any regulation designed to prevent the use of Indian carriers by the French could always be circumvented.

At the beginning of the period, Canadian officials held the defeatist view that no method could be employed with these savages save the practically useless one of suggestion,⁷⁵ and although beaver and foreign goods were sometimes taken from the Indians, these commodities, or their value, seem always to have been returned to them.⁷⁶ After 1719, however, slightly more vigorous action was taken, for Governor Vaudreuil seems to have persuaded the savages to agree to take only their own furs to Albany, and to fetch goods solely for their own use, furthermore to submit to inspection by the commandant at Chambly, and by the officer of the Lake Champlain detachment.⁷⁷ These inspections were probably made, during the first few years, with at least some degree of regularity,⁷⁸ and a few confiscations are recorded,⁷⁹ but the plan seems soon to have fallen into disuse, or at least to

⁷²*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 34, p. 8, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 15, 1713; vol. 51, p. 288, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Oct. 12 and 20, 1729; vol. 73, pp. 129-30, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Nov. 3, 1740; vol. 93, p. 171, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 22, 1749.

⁷³*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 67, p. 85, Réponse au Mémoire du Roy (1737); vol. 74, p. 29, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 6, 1740; vol. 76, pp. 178-9, Mémoire sur le commerce de Canada (1741).

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, vol. 53, pp. 148-9, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 10, 1730.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, vol. 35, pp. 55-6, De Ramezay et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 7, 1715; vol. 36, pp. 87-8, Vaudreuil au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1716.

⁷⁶*Série B*, vol. 37 (3), p. 708, Mémoire du Roy à De Ramezay et Bégon, Marly, July 10, 1715; *Série B¹*, vol. 8 (2), pp. 500-1, Conseil, April 28, 1716.

⁷⁷*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 40, p. 27, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 26, 1719; vol. 42, pp. 21-3, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 26, 1720, Conseil, Dec. 24, 1720.

⁷⁸*N.Y. Col. Docs.*, IX, 908-9, King to Vaudreuil and Bégon, June 8, 1722; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 45, p. 24, Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1723; *Série B*, vol. 49 (2), p. 407, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Dupuy, Versailles, May 14, 1726.

⁷⁹*Ordonnances des Intendants*, V, 395-8, Quebec, March 21, 1720; VII, 249-51, Quebec, Sept. 5, 1722; VIII, 26-7, Quebec, Aug. 16, 1723.

have been enforced seldom and briefly.⁸⁰ Moreover, not only does it appear that no really sustained effort was made to control the domiciled Indians, it is equally evident that the savages were quite capable of coping with such efforts as were made. Sometimes they outwitted the Commandant at Crown Point by passing repeatedly with small quantities at a time,⁸¹ or by sending empty canoes past the fort while the furs were portaged around behind it.⁸² Or, impatient of guile, they might employ force. On one occasion, sixty Indians, meeting the detachment on Lake Champlain, simply grasped their tomahawks and informed the Frenchmen that they were going to Albany and were coming back the same way. There was nothing that the French could do about it.⁸³ Similarly, two hundred domiciled Iroquois with a valuable cargo of beaver, once forestalled interference at Crown Point by first extorting passports from the Governor, under threat of going to settle among their heathen brethren of the Five Nations.⁸⁴

Moreover, the authorities in France to the contrary,⁸⁵ it was quite impossible to discover the French who were using the Indians, for the savages, according to Hocquart, were of a discretion "à toute épreuve" concerning their employers.⁸⁶ Finally, exhortations to the Iroquois at Caughnawaga, especially through their missionary, must have been peculiarly futile during the régime of the Demoiselles Desautiers.

The Demoiselles Desautiers, respectively Marie Magdelaine, Marie Anne, and Marguérite, daughters of a Montreal merchant, set up a store at Caughnawaga in 1727, for the purpose of trading drygoods and provisions to the savages. There they thrived undisturbed until, in 1739, it occurred to the agents of the Compagnie des Indes to wonder why the Demoiselles, who must have received beaver in their trade with the Indians, had never brought any to the Company's office in Montreal. Hocquart admitted that the circumstances were suspicious, but both he and Governor Beauharnois feared lest the suppression of the store, or even an investigation, should antagonize the Indians, and for that reason felt that it would be wiser to tolerate the abuse, if it really existed.⁸⁷ This attitude was approved by the Minister of Marine, who ordered, nevertheless, that the Superior of the Jesuits in Canada be informed that the King's orders must be executed in the mission, and warned that any further complaints

⁸⁰*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 67, pp. 85-7, Réponse au Mémoire du Roy (1737); vol. 67, p. 188, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Quebec, Oct., 1737; vol. 69, pp. 75-7, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1738; vol. 97, pp. 139-40, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 19, 1751.

⁸¹*Série B*, vol. 66, p. 105, Ministre à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Versailles, April 23, 1738; *Série C¹¹A*, vol. 69, pp. 75-7, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 14, 1738.

⁸²*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 125 (2), p. 802, Journal, May-Aug., 1731 (en marge: avec la lettre de M. Daine. 17 octobre, 1731); p. 814, Daine—? Crown Point, Aug. 20, 1731.

⁸³*Ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 221, De Ramezay au Conseil, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1722.

⁸⁴*N.Y. Col. Docs.*, VI, 714, Clinton to the Lords of Trade, New York, July 17, 1751.

⁸⁵*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 69, pp. 27-8, Mémoire du Roy à Beauharnois et Hocquart, May 15, 1738.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, vol. 70, pp. 7-8, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 8, 1738; *Wisconsin historical collections*, XVIII, 73, La Jonquière to Minister, Quebec, Sept. 29, 1750.

⁸⁷*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 72, p. 128, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Nov. 1, 1739; vol. 73, p. 129, Hocquart à la Compagnie des Indes, Nov. 3, 1740; vol. 77, pp. 403-5, Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 29, 1740; vol. 97, p. 277, Demoiselles Desautiers au Ministre, 1751.

would mean the suppression of the store.⁸⁸ When Hocquart carried out these commands, both the Superior at Quebec and the Père Tournois, missionary at Caughnawaga, protested that his insinuations were sheer calumny.⁸⁹ Meanwhile, Beauharnois had returned to the charge with further evidence, with the result that in 1742 the store was ordered closed.⁹⁰ To these orders the Demoiselles, protesting their innocence, apparently acquiesced, but in spite of the fact that they had a fine house in Montreal, where they would have been quite free to carry on a legitimate business, they preferred to go on living, without visible means of support, in an Indian village. At the same time, the savages continued to carry beaver to the English.⁹¹ Two and two make four even without proof, and if the Governor lacked the courage of his convictions, the Minister in France was not so craven. Accordingly, in 1745, the Demoiselles were ordered removed from the mission. But, meanwhile, war had broken out, and the Indians were doing such excellent work against the English that Beauharnois and Hocquart, fearing to discourage their efforts, suspended the execution of the order. The situation was explained to the new Governor coming out in 1747, with instructions to use his own judgment,⁹² but evidently the sisters continued in that state of life to which, no doubt, their sound business instinct had first called them. They could scarcely have been better placed for smuggling, conveniently close to Montreal, the centre of the fur trade, yet sufficiently remote to escape daily observation, and having at hand 250 Indians, not counting the women and children, all of them ready to turn a dishonest penny.⁹³

At last in 1750, Governor La Jonquière was convinced that the Demoiselles were carrying on an extensive contraband trade, with the complicity of the missionary, and probably with the connivance of the Jesuit Superior. Therefore, in May, 1750, he ordered both the sisters and the Père Tournois to Quebec, an order which was executed probably chiefly because he had taken the precaution of sending an officer and eight soldiers to deliver it.⁹⁴ In the autumn of the same year, the Demoiselles, accompanied by the missionary, sailed for France, where both to the Minister of Marine and to the Director of the Compagnie des Indes, they presented petitions, supported by numerous testimonials, which, if anything, suggest the number of their accomplices.⁹⁵ In 1751 the Demoiselles returned alone to Canada and promptly repaired to Montreal, where they occupied themselves inventing reasons for returning to Caughnawaga and being steadily checkmated by La Jonquière, notwithstanding their boasted, if unproducible, permission from the King to re-establish their store.⁹⁶ Then in March, 1752, La Jonquière died, whereupon the sisters prevailed

⁸⁸*Série B*, vol. 72, pp. 79-80, Ministre à Hocquart, Versailles, March 27, 1741.

⁸⁹*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 76, p. 26, Hocquart au Ministre, Oct. 28, 1741.

⁹⁰*N.Y. Col. Docs.*, IX, 1071, Beauharnois to Maurepas, Quebec, Sept. 21, 1741; *Série B*, vol. 74 (2), p. 445, Ministre à Beauharnois et Hocquart, Fontainebleau, April 30, 1742.

⁹¹*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 77, p. 13, Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre, Quebec, Sept. 13, 1742; vol. 79, pp. 189-91, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 13, 1743; vol. 81 (1), pp. 224-7, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 11, 1744.

⁹²*Série C¹¹E*, vol. 16, pp. 486-7, Beauharnois au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 15, 1746; *Série B*, vol. 85, pp. 43-4, Ministre à (La Galissonnière), Versailles, March 6, 1747.

⁹³*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 58, p. 145, Abstract, Hocquart au Ministre, Oct. 10, 1732; De Lotbinière Correspondence, Journal . . . 1749, Aug. 10.

⁹⁴*Série C¹¹A*, vol. 95, pp. 133-44, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, July 25, 1750.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, vol. 97, pp. 277-91.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 191-6, La Jonquière au Ministre, Quebec, Nov. 1, 1751.

upon Longueuil, Governor *pro. tem.*, to allow them to return to the mission for twenty-four hours, to wind up their affairs. Finally, in October, 1752, Duquesne, the new Governor, writes that they so abused this privilege that they would still have been at Caughnawaga had not authority been used to remove them.⁹⁷ Thus, at last, the Demoiselles Desauniers were dislodged, after having conducted a flourishing contraband trade for twenty-five years, during at least half of which time the authorities had been fully cognizant of their activities. One must admit that their behaviour is a sad example of feminine obstinacy, but more pertinently, it is also an excellent illustration, both of the position of Caughnawaga in the contraband trade, and of the protection afforded smugglers by the official fear of offending the savages.

Finally, to what conclusion can one come concerning the effects of the illegal fur trade? It is true that smuggling always encourages contempt for law, but the social consequences of the contraband trade were probably negligible in a colony which was already permeated with the lawlessness of all frontier communities. Again, beaver was, admittedly, the only really valuable return from Canada, and the greater the trade with the English, the less profitable the burdensome colony became to France. The less lucrative to France, the less assistance Canada could expect from the mother country, and without aid the colony must suffer severely, if indeed it could survive. It might even be suggested that the colony's persistence in trading illegally with the English explains its neglect by France during the Seven Years' War. Nevertheless, even before smuggling became extensive, Canada had not been an economic asset. Its value was chiefly political, inasmuch as it contributed to the prestige of France, and provided a base for attack upon the English, and a means to thwart English ambition. The failure to send adequate help in the final struggle is more readily explained by English control of the Atlantic and French entanglement in a continental war, than by any real indifference to the fate of the colony.

Contraband trade was probably harmful to the immediate interests of the Compagnie des Indes which held the beaver monopoly after 1717, for this company seems generally to have been able to find markets for the surplus beaver produced in Canada, and thus to have been free from the problem of overproduction which had bedeviled, and even bankrupted, previous companies. Nevertheless, had the Company received all the beaver exported from Canada, it is by no means certain that the results would have been altogether happy. It could not, probably, have increased its markets extensively, and a reduction of beaver prices in Canada, or a restriction of the quantity of beaver accepted by the Company, would have discouraged both the fur trade and penetration into the interior, with consequent loss of control over the Indians. It is unlikely that the French company could have disposed of its beaver in England, for the English colonies would have turned to the western country for a supply of fur, again with unfortunate results to the French.

The fact that the Compagnie des Indes did have a surplus to be disposed of in Holland, indicates that the illegal export of beaver from Canada did not prevent an adequate supply reaching the French hatmakers, and hence did not damage that industry. Furthermore, while the French luxury grade may have been affected, no harm came to the manufacturers of heavy
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extiles, who, in any case, were unable to produce suitable cloth for the

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, vol. 98, p. 36, Duquesne au Ministre, Quebec, Oct. 28, 1752.

Indian trade. The import of strouds from Albany lessened, not the import of cloth from France, but merely that from England, via France.

✓ With the exception of gunpowder, all English goods for the Indian trade were superior to those of the French.⁹⁸ Had the French used only their own inferior and comparatively expensive merchandise, the Canadian fur trade would have been seriously damaged, notwithstanding the hold of the French over the Indians and over the fur country, a hold which they maintained partly by reason of the very fact that they did use English goods. Moreover, it cannot be asserted that the western Indians would never have known English goods had the French not introduced them among those tribes, for, in any case, strouds and other articles reached the west from Albany through Iroquois middlemen, or were carried thither by English traders, especially those from Pennsylvania, who had made their way into the hinterland.

The plan of having the indispensable English strouds supplied by the *Compagnie des Indes* appealed to the authorities because it meant that, although French manufacturers did not sell their textiles, France at least received the beaver. It was perhaps argued that the difference in price between these strouds and the strouds imported illegally from Albany could be absorbed by the margin of profit between the sale price of beaver in Canada to the French company and the cost price from the Indian, or offset by the superior position of the French in relation to the fur supply. But the economic advantage to France of this arrangement would have been more than offset by the disastrous political consequences to Canada had the Albany trade been completely cut off, consequences infinitely more serious than the results feared by the authorities of accustoming a comparatively few domiciled Indians to going to the English. The interest of Albany in the traffic with Montreal accounts probably more than anything else for the reluctance of the colonists of New York to attack the French, a policy of neutrality which was observed also by Canadians for similar reasons. It was the frontier of New England, not that of New York, that suffered the raids of French Indians in time of war. Thus the contraband trade was at least in part responsible for closing the Richelieu and Lake Champlain to military operations during Queen Anne's War and King George's War, and this probably worked more to the advantage of Canada than to that of New York, although, admittedly, the point is debatable.

There remains, however, one final consideration which far outweighs any disadvantages that smuggling may have had for the French. Had the trade with Montreal been cut off, Albany must have tried much earlier and much more vigorously than it did to establish direct relations with the Indians in the west.⁹⁹ Eventually, it was just such competition in the Ohio Valley between the French and the English, especially those from Virginia and Pennsylvania, that precipitated the war in which Canada was lost to France. By providing the Albany merchants with a supply of beaver and a market for their goods, contraband trade, although by no means the sole reason, was indisputably a factor of enormous influence in hindering the expansion of New York westward into the fur country, and thus, perhaps, helped to postpone the final conflict and the political extinction of New France.

⁹⁸*N.Y. Col. Docs.*, V, 729, Memorial, Colden to Burnet, Nov. 10, 1724.

⁹⁹See in this connection, Buffinton, "The policy of Albany and English westward expansion."

EMPIRE UNITY AND COLONIAL NATIONALISM, 1884-1911

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In considering the relation between the movement for closer Empire unity and the rise of colonial nationalism, the dates which I have suggested, 1884 to 1911, need not be taken too exactly, for Professor Egerton once reminded us that "Where tendencies, not events, are being considered, divisions by time must, in the nature of things, be somewhat rough and arbitrary. No one can say the exact hour when the *zeitgeist* is found pointing in a particular direction."

The mid-Victorian pessimism regarding the colonies, amounting in some cases to anti-imperialism, characteristic of the Manchester school and shared by both political parties and by permanent officials of the Colonial Office, began to give ground in the late sixties and seventies. In 1852 Disraeli was talking of "the wretched colonies" which would "all be independent in a few years, and are a mill-stone round our neck." In 1866 he was still referring to the "colonial deadweights which we do not govern." A few months later Galt was writing to his wife from London: "I am more than ever disappointed at the tone of feeling here as to the colonies. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that they want to get rid of us."¹ Almost immediately after Canadian Confederation, however, a new attitude began to develop.

One of the first signs of reviving interest in the Empire was the foundation, in 1868, of the Royal Colonial Society—later the Royal Colonial Institute—which within a year of its establishment was taking issue with the Colonial Secretary regarding the withdrawal of troops from New Zealand, and beginning its propaganda on behalf of "United Empire." Proposals for closer Empire unity began to appear in the reviews, and Ruskin's inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1870, striking the note of expansion, contained the well-known passage that made such a deep impression on Cecil Rhodes: "This is what England must do or perish. She must found colonies as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men; seizing any piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching her colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea."²

Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech of 1872 has sometimes been regarded as marking the turn of the tide, but more probably it indicates that the tide had already turned, and that the new attitude to colonies had already become sufficiently widespread to warrant the attention of one of the great political parties. It is unlikely, however, that his plea for reconstruction and consolidation was made purely for election purposes. It was also a recognition of changing conditions both within the Empire and in the world. But Disraeli's imperialism was largely an imperialism of prestige. "The issue is not a mean one. It is whether you will be content to be a com-

¹Quoted in C. A. Bodelsen, *Studies in mid-Victorian imperialism* (London, 1924), 45.

²S. G. Millin, *Rhodes* (London, 1933), 29.

fortable England modelled and moulded upon Continental principles and meeting in due course an inevitable fate, or whether you will be a great country, an Imperial country, a country where your sons, when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their countrymen, but command the respect of the world."³

By the eighties statesmen were becoming less concerned about Britain's prestige than about her industrial and commercial condition and prospects. Living by the export of her manufactures and unable to feed herself for long, Britain began to feel the competition of foreign industry and to find herself faced with rising tariff walls. She was also experiencing a depression that continued, with two short recoveries, from 1873 to 1896. The condition of both trade and investment led Britain to a new appreciation of the possibilities of her Empire. In 1884 Lord Randolph Churchill startled the country with his picturesque exaggeration: "Your iron industry is dead, dead as mutton; your coal industries . . . are languishing. Your silk industry is dead, assassinated by the foreigner. Your woollen industry is in *articulo mortis*. Your cotton industry is seriously sick."⁴ But Churchill's Royal Commission on Depression in Trade and Industry confirmed the popular impression that there was a connection between the shrinkage of trade and foreign competition, and strengthened the Fair Trade movement already winning support.

With even Britain's own imports of foreign goods increasing, the question was being asked, "Is it fair" to keep open market for nations that are closing theirs? Two remedies were proposed by the Fair Trade League; first, moderate import duties on foreign manufactures from countries refusing to accept British manufactures on terms of fair exchange; second, a moderate general tax on foreign foods, but free entry for food from the Empire. Here was a foreshadowing of Chamberlain's imperial preference, and a recognition of the value of colonies as sources of raw materials and granaries for industrialized Britain.

At the same time colonies were receiving a greater share of England's foreign investment. As Richard Pares has pointed out: "Foreign railway and government securities must have been sold and the proceeds reinvested in similar securities within the Empire. This process is hard to trace or to explain, but it is there."⁵ It provides an example of "the usefulness of a political Empire as a standby: the investor, like the seeker for a market or the consumer of raw materials, is glad to turn to the Empire when, for one reason or another, the more fully developed independent countries begin to be less attractive than they were." Pares defines imperialism as "a process—and to some degree a policy—which aims at developing complementary relations between high industrial technique in one land and fertile soils in another." This is not only true of tropical imperialism, it also helps to explain the hostility of temperate colonies seeking to develop a balanced economy, to all proposals of Empire free trade.

The imperialist expansion of the European powers in Africa and the Pacific was at its height in the eighties and nineties. The year 1884 has been called Germany's *annus mirabilis*, and the Berlin Conference met a year later. One result of Britain's activity in Africa and the Pacific was

³W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, *The life of Benjamin Disraeli* (London, 1929), II, 536.

⁴W. S. Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill*, I, 291, cited in J. H. Clapham, *An economic history of modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1932), II, 250.

⁵Richard Pares, "The economic factors in the history of the Empire" (*Economic history review*, VII, May, 1937, 140).

the acquisition of 2,600,000 square miles of additional territory. Another was the intensification of rivalry with foreign powers and a further step in the direction of an isolation which Britain found less splendid by the turn of the century.

The new imperialism was not exclusively economic, but combined also political, psychological, and racial factors in a way which gave it a wide appeal. It may be possible to over-emphasize the importance of writers in directing the course of events, but in the last quarter of the nineteenth century they did reflect the prevailing currents of opinion. They combined the two chief aspects of British imperialism, the movement toward expansion and the movement toward closer union, and provided a philosophy which justified both.

If Ruskin had inspired his thousands, Seeley inspired his tens of thousands. To be exact 80,000 copies of *The Expansion of England* were sold in the first two years without benefit of Book Clubs. Although from the point of view of colonial or even Scottish nationalism the title involved a misinterpretation of history, few could fail to be impressed with the sweep of Seeley's ideas, and some probably took to heart his reminder that "Bigness is not necessarily greatness: if by remaining in the second rank of magnitude we can hold the first rank morally and intellectually, let us sacrifice mere material magnitude."

Both W. T. Stead, who became editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1883, and his assistant, Alfred Milner, were admirers of Seeley. "The building up of new Empires beyond the sea," wrote Stead in 1884, "the peopling of waste and savage continents with men of our own speech and lineage, the knitting of the world-sundered members of the English realm into one fraternal union, that is the first great task imposed upon us."⁶ Sir Charles Dilke's two books on Greater Britain enjoyed a deserved success, but probably a wider public was reached by Tennyson and Kipling, the official and unofficial poets laureate.

Mr. Kipling's extraordinary faculties of observation and visualization [says Wingfield-Stratford] were just what was needed to bring home to what he contemptuously characterized as "the poor little street-bred people", their membership of an Empire upon which, as it became fashionable to say, the sun never set. And not only membership but, in some unexplained way, ownership, for the clerk on a pound a week was thrilled with a profound conviction that by the mere fact of his being an Englishman he held the gorgeous East in fee and was among the lords of the Seven Seas. . . . The Golden Gate and the Horn, the Karoo and the great, green, greasy Limpopo became as real and vivid to the city dweller as his own street of desirable residences.⁷

For those who took their imperialism more seriously Mr. Kipling provided the stirring conceptions of the Blood, the Law, the Flag, the Queen, and the White Man's Burden.

Though Tennyson might rejoice at the time of the Golden Jubilee over

Fifty years of ever-broadening Commerce!
Fifty years of ever-brightening Science!
Fifty years of ever-widening Empire!

⁶Cited in J. E. Tyler, *The struggle for imperial unity (1869-1895)* (London, 1938), 67-8.

⁷Esmé Wingfield-Stratford, *The history of British civilization* (London, 1928), II, 1165.

it was consolidation, rather than expansion that he urged in "Hands All Round" (1882) and the lines on "The Opening of the Indian and Colonial Exhibition by the Queen" (1886).

Sons be welded each and all,
Into one Imperial whole,
One with Britain, heart and soul!
One life, one flag, one fleet, one Throne!
Britons, hold your own!

This was also the outlook of the Imperial Federation League, founded in 1884.

The League reflected both a growing interest in the general question of imperial unification, and the fear that if nothing were done to check the centrifugal tendencies resulting from divergent interests and policies in the self-governing colonies, and to consolidate the strength of the Empire in the face of foreign economic and territorial aggression, the result would be disaster. Although the avowed object of the League was "to secure by federation the permanent unity of the Empire," not all members were convinced that political federation was the only alternative to dissolution, and throughout its history the League was characterized by considerable divergence of opinion regarding both objectives and methods. The break-up of the League in 1893 was largely the result of failure to agree whether the major emphasis should be placed on tariff preference or on defence.

Both political parties were represented in its membership, and it had branches carrying on active propaganda in the colonies. In general, however, its appeal was greater in England than in the colonies, despite the able advocacy of Sir George Parkin. It was not that the colonies did not desire the continued power and security of the mother-country and of the Empire. They simply assumed it, and, with the exception of Australia, scarcely felt menaced themselves by foreign imperialism. Canada, feeling secure behind the Monroe Doctrine and already tending to be drawn into the orbit of the United States, suspected that Great Britain had on occasion sacrificed her interests in an endeavour to conciliate the Americans. In so far as the appeal of the League was made on economic grounds it was evident that in the colonies national interests were likely to take precedence over imperial. In so far as the appeal was made on grounds of racial solidarity it had little interest for the French Canadians and Boers or even for Australia's large Irish population. Still the League performed at least two useful services. It focused attention on the really important question of the future relations of Great Britain and her maturing colonies, and in its magazine *Imperial Federation* provided a medium for their discussion, a service taken over later by the *Round Table*. In the second place, it took the initiative in securing the calling of the first Colonial Conference in 1887.

The Colonial and Imperial Conferences have played an important role in the development of Empire relations, both as a forum for discussion of fundamental problems and as a technique, really as an alternative to the imperial Parliament or Council desired by the Federationists. The minutes of their proceedings reveal the variety and frankness of the discussions. The matters that came up with the greatest regularity and that provided the crucial issues on the settlement of which depended the character of imperial relations on the eve of the war, and the course of post-war development,

were political federation, imperial preference, and defence, with which was related foreign policy.

At the first Colonial Conference of 1887, a gathering of colonial personalities in London for the Queen's Jubilee, imperial federation was ruled out as a subject for discussion on the ground that "there had been no expression of colonial opinion in favour of any steps in that direction," and Lord Salisbury had dismissed it as still nebulous, though it might later take solid form. He suggested co-operation in defence as the chief subject for discussion. But the Federation League continued active in its propaganda, and after the break-up of the League the idea survived. At all subsequent Conferences up to the war, in the press and in the British and colonial Parliaments, the matter was thoroughly canvassed.

Twenty-three plans for formal parliamentary federation are analysed in Cheng's *Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire*,⁸ and innumerable proposals for some sort of closer Empire union appeared in the quarterlies and reviews. Federation was advocated for sentimental, logical, economic, idealistic, and realistic reasons, both as the basis for, and as the outcome of, closer economic and defensive co-operation. When, after the South African War, some of the members of Milner's "kindergarten," who had carried through one job of imperial reconstruction, founded the Round Table movement to urge the necessity of another, the case for federation was based on logic, on the postulate that the Dominions would achieve complete autonomy. When that time came the issue of sovereignty would arise. If the Crown were offered contradictory advice by Governments in Great Britain and the Dominions the Empire would face dissolution. But since it was believed the Dominions did not desire separation, some form of federation remained the only means of reconciling the sovereignty of the Crown with the autonomy of the Dominions. It was a restatement of Lord John Russell's dilemma.

Though most of the colonies or Dominions were prepared to admit the first premise, and to say with Deakin of Australia, "We look forward to . . . a gradual assumption of all the responsibilities of maturity," they were not prepared to accept with him the conclusion, that federation was the only alternative to dissolution. Australia, up to 1900, was less interested in federation of the Empire than in federating her own colonies, and when that was achieved she was, as Professor Hancock has said, "prepared to accept the privileges of nationhood but willing to deny herself some heroics—and some responsibilities." New Zealand, "a Dominion in spite of itself," and feeling its isolation, consistently exerted its influence to maintain close imperial ties, and from Ballance and Seddon to Sir Joseph Ward favoured the establishment of some form of federation.

South Africa's relations with the mother country throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century were closer than those of the Pacific colonies, partly because of the strategic importance of the Cape and partly because of the pressure of the Boer Republics and Britain's sense of responsibility for the native peoples. But closer relations were not necessarily better, and even Mr. Rhodes was anxious to "eliminate the imperial factor"⁹ from South African internal affairs, though there was no doubt of his imperialism. The racial appeals of Mr. Chamberlain left the Boers cold. In 1907

⁸Seymour C.-Y. Cheng, *Schemes for the federation of the British Empire* (New York, 1931).

⁹See C. W. De Kiewiet, *The imperial factor in South Africa* (Cambridge, 1937).

General Botha startled the Conference by beginning to speak in Afrikaans, and later switching to English stated his conviction that the proper line to be followed was not centralization but co-operation. In 1911 he helped kill Sir Joseph Ward's scheme for an Imperial Council, saying that if it were given any real authority he felt convinced "that the self-governing powers of the various parts of the Empire must necessarily be encroached upon, and that was a proposition which [he was] certain no Parliament in any part of the Empire [would] entertain for one moment."¹⁰

Canada officially gave the movement no more support than South Africa. Macdonald called federation "an idle dream," and Laurier devoted his best efforts to blocking the movement for centralization in order to keep the way open for complete autonomy for Canada, even if it should lead ultimately to independence. Repeatedly he expressed the conviction that the strength of the Empire lay in local diversity and freedom; that Canada was a nation, loyal to Great Britain but prepared to assume responsibilities only in accordance with her own conception of her interests and duty. He said quite frankly in 1902 that "What Mr. Chamberlain termed the Empire's interest and the Empire's policy were in most cases Great Britain's interest and Great Britain's policy."¹¹ In 1907 Canada rejected Lyttleton's scheme for transforming the Imperial Conference into a Council, and in 1911, in condemning Ward's Imperial Council, Laurier said that foreign policy would have to be decided by a Government responsible to the Parliament of Canada. An interesting comment of Laurier, quoted by Skelton, on the effectiveness of social pressure in the federation campaign, suggests another reason for opposing federation. He says:

Once convinced that the colonies were worth keeping [the Englishman] bent to the work of drawing them closer within the orbit of London with marvellous skill and persistence. In this campaign, which no one could appreciate until he had been in the thick of it, social pressure is the subtlest, and most effective force. In 1897 and 1902 it was Mr. Chamberlain's personal insistence that was strongest, but in 1907 and after, society pressure was the chief force. It is hard to stand up against the flattery of a gracious duchess. Weak men's heads are turned in an evening, and there are few who can resist long. We were wined and dined by royalty, aristocracy and plutocracy, and always the talk was of Empire, Empire, Empire. I said to Deakin in 1907, that this was one reason why we could not have a parliament or council in London. . . .¹²

It is probably true to say that while the federationists had the better of the logical argument they failed to carry the day partly because of their inability to suggest a practical solution of such problems as representation, voting strength, financial contributions, the position of India; partly because of suspicion of Britain's motives and fear of becoming entangled in imperialist wars, since any share in the making of foreign policy would involve responsibility for its execution and results; partly because of the recognition that though Great Britain and the Dominions had certain interests in common, they also had interests peculiar to themselves which they must be free to follow in the international as well as in the domestic

¹⁰*Minutes of proceedings of Imperial Conference* (Ottawa, 1911), 74.

¹¹O. D. Skelton, *Life and letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (London, 1922), II, 298.

¹²*Ibid.*, 299-300, note.

field, and that racial and geographical considerations had to be given due weight in determining national policy. And they failed partly because of growing national sentiment, a growing realization that complete autonomy was implicit in responsible government, and a growing belief that even complete autonomy was consistent with membership in an alliance or league of equal states. When Sir Joseph Ward's resolution was withdrawn in 1911, imperial federation was removed from the realm of practical politics, though it is suggested that the Conference really slew the slain.

To 1846 the British Empire had been considered an economic unit, and its policy, made in Great Britain, was protection. Before the middle of the century that policy became free trade, but after responsible government, Canada, followed by Australia and other colonies, set up protective tariffs against even Great Britain, at first for revenue and later for the benefit of colonial industries. In 1897 Canada offered Great Britain a preference in the Canadian market, and this policy was later followed by other Dominions. It was this development that led Joseph Chamberlain to believe that it was in the field of economic co-operation that the first step could be taken toward his full programme of imperial consolidation. "If we had a commercial union throughout the Empire, of course there would have to be a council of Empire. . . . Even Imperial defence could not be excluded from its deliberations, for Imperial defence is only another name for the protection of Imperial Commerce."¹³

He had other motives for the campaign which he launched in 1903. It is generally asserted that he hoped to divert public attention from the blunders of the South African War and, as H. A. L. Fisher says, "from sordid and trifling squabbles over church schools and public houses and refresh the waning authority of the Unionist party by identifying it with the majestic theme of imperial consolidation."¹⁴ He was probably also convinced that the future lay with great empires, and certainly was alarmed at Britain's isolation in Europe and the hostility to her revealed at the time of the Jameson Raid. Imperial preference, or as Chamberlain would have preferred, imperial free trade, was not only an imperial policy, it was also part of a policy of tariff reform designed to give some advantage in the increasingly stiff competition with Germany and the United States. Chamberlain was prepared to split the Unionist party in advocating a partial abandonment of free trade and the establishment of food taxes on foreign imports in order to give a preference to colonial, and to provide a means of retaliation against foreign rivals. He resigned from the Government to carry "the fiery cross of the new protection" through the country.

In the colonies proposals for straight imperial preference were generally well received, and Chamberlain had found considerable support in the conferences of 1897 and 1902. But an imperial *zollverein* or imperial free trade was another matter. Preference could be given to the mother country by raising the tariff against the foreigner. But Canadian and other colonial industrialists saw that what Chamberlain wanted was the freest possible field for British manufactures, and realized that this would stereotype colonial economic development, and involve a virtual return to the Old Colonial System, Great Britain manufacturing for an Empire producing food and raw materials. Preference the colonies were prepared to give, and more than once offered increased rates in exchange for similar prefer-

¹³C. W. Boyd (ed.), *Mr. Chamberlain's speeches* (Boston, 1914), I, 367-8.

¹⁴H. A. L. Fisher, *A history of Europe* (London, 1935), III, 1079.

ential treatment in the British market. But Britain was not prepared to depart from free trade or increase her manufacturing costs, believing that "markets can be conquered by cheapness." Chamberlain's campaign was defeated partly by the reluctance to abandon free trade, and partly by increasing prosperity. As Clapham has pointed out,¹⁵ by 1903-4 exports of British capital had begun to climb from the low levels of 1901-2, carrying with them the export of goods, and the country was starting on its last and greatest campaign of capital export. And as Chamberlain's critics pointed out, by 1907 Britain was trading more with her rivals than with her Empire, and the growth in the value of foreign trade between 1904 and 1907 was over twice that in the value of imperial trade.

The question in regard to Empire defence was not its desirability, which all colonies were prepared to admit, but the extent and method of contributions and the control of forces raised. The issue can almost be stated in the words of the Social Contract: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."

The British position, stated by the Colonial Secretary supported by the Admiralty and War Office, was that an imperial fleet, to which the colonies would make contributions in money or ships was strategically, as well as politically, the only sound principle. An imperial military force was also proposed but was rejected even by colonies which had sent contingents to the South African War, though subsequently they approved of the creation of an Imperial General Staff and Dominion membership in the Committee of Imperial Defence. Opinion regarding naval defence was more divided, and while New Zealand and South Africa preferred contributions to the British navy, Canada and Australia had decided by 1909 on navies under their own control at least in time of peace.

On the eve of the 1911 Conference Laurier declared: "We are a nation of the Empire and the British Empire today comprises a galaxy of young nations. It is the part of a young and free country such as we are today, nation and free, to provide for its own defence." But he continued: "A school has lately arisen in Great Britain which has quite a number of disciples in this country, the object of which has been to draw the young nations of the empire, Canada in particular, into the armaments of England, into the maelstrom of militarism in which England is engaged as one of the great powers of Europe." He then declared it was the policy of the Government "that under present circumstances it is not advisable for Canada to mix in the armaments of the empire, but that we should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own purposes, and leaving to the Canadian parliament, to the Canadian government and to the Canadian people to take part in these wars in which today they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so."¹⁶

The other Dominions were not prepared to go as far as this, but the comment of the newly-founded *Round Table* was that "It is simply impossible for the Dominions to set up independent foreign policies and

¹⁵J. H. Clapham, *An economic history of modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1938), III, 50-1.

¹⁶Canada, *House of Commons debates*, XCVIII (1911), 449-55. Cf. Mackenzie King, *Canada, House of Commons debates* (unrevised ed.), LXXV, no. 65, 2612-13.

independent defensive systems of their own without destroying the Empire, even if foreign powers refrain from attack.”¹⁷

The British position in face of a deteriorating world situation, and particularly of German trade, colonial and naval rivalry, was that Great Britain could no longer undertake alone the defence of the whole Empire and its trade routes. Colonial contributions were needed. It was admitted that defence requirements were intimately linked with foreign policy, and that if the Dominions contributed their proportionate share to imperial defence they should have a proportionate voice in imperial and foreign policy through a federal council. In the meantime, though contributions were gratefully accepted, it was held that since the British taxpayer was still bearing the bulk of the burden, control of foreign policy could not be shared. And foreign policy increasingly occupied the attention of British and colonial statesmen from 1909 to the war.

In his frank statement on the European situation, in 1911, to the Dominion delegates in the Committee of Imperial Defence, Grey declared, in words that suggest more recent happenings, that what Britain feared was “. . . a Napoleonic policy. That would be a policy on the part of the strongest Power in Europe or of the strongest group of Powers in Europe of first of all separating other Powers outside their own group from each other, taking them in detail, crushing them singly if need be, and forcing each into the orbit of the policy of the strongest Power or of the strongest group of Powers.” If Britain became involved it would become for her a question of sea power.

“So long as the maintenance of sea power and the maintenance of control of sea communications is the underlying motive of our policy in Europe, it is obvious how that is a common interest between us here at home and all the Dominions.”¹⁸ The Dominions were convinced of the seriousness of the world situation, and were prepared to make increased provision for defence each in its own way.

It may not be unduly simplifying a complex situation to say that in the thirty years before the war the mid-Victorian pessimism and separatism had disappeared; an active policy of expansion had added large tropical areas to the colonial Empire; an active campaign to consolidate the Empire and unite the self-governing colonies more closely with Great Britain had failed to produce federation, *zollverein*, or *kriegsverein*. Instead, the Imperial Conference had become an established institution and the chief organ for consultation on imperial affairs. Imperial preference had become part of the tariff policies of the Dominions, and after the war was to involve reciprocal concessions on the part of Great Britain. Co-operation in Empire defence on terms satisfactory to the Dominions, begun before the war, received a striking extension during its course, and contributed to the success of what Dr. Dafoe has called the “flanking operations” which led to the recognition of autonomy in international as in national affairs.

Equality of status has not solved the questions of foreign policy and neutrality which have been canvassed as actively in the present session of the Canadian Parliament as they were before the war, and in much the same terms. But one can say at least, that in so far as the problems of Empire unity and colonial nationalism have been solved, they have been solved in

¹⁷*Round table*, I, 252.

¹⁸H. H. Asquith, *The genesis of the war* (New York, 1923), 124-6.

accordance with the tradition, not of Seeley and Chamberlain, but of Laurier, Botha, and Smuts. "All the Empires we have known in the past," said General Smuts in 1917, "and that exist today are founded on the idea of assimilation, of trying to force human material into one mould. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire; you want to develop them toward greater, fuller nationality. . . . That is the fundamental fact we have to bear in mind—that this British Commonwealth of Nations does not stand for standardization or denationalization, but for the fuller, richer and more various life of all the nations comprised in it."¹⁹

¹⁹J. C. Smuts, *War-time speeches* (New York, 1917), 28.

RECIPROCITY AND THE JOINT HIGH COMMISSION OF 1898-9¹

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Reciprocity between Canada and the United States first became an important issue with the repeal of the Corn Laws by Great Britain, when some other market had to be found for the predominantly agricultural output of the North American colonies. From then on the subject has formed a continuous thread in the international relations of Canada and the United States and also in Canadian political history. In spite of this fact, however, only two treaties have ever been concluded—the Elgin-Marcy Treaty of 1854 to 1866, and that of November, 1935, revised in November 1938.

The tradition has grown up that from the abrogation of the earlier treaty until 1911 it was the United States which was recalcitrant. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that this view needs some revision; that the Canadian attitude on this occasion, as so often in the trade relations of the two countries, was governed by both economic and political considerations; and that Canadian public opinion was already showing many of the signs which were to lead to the “surprising” defeat of reciprocity in 1911.

Before plunging into the story of the Joint High Commission itself, it seems necessary to say a few words about the background. The Liberal party, in power at the time of these negotiations, had fought and been defeated in 1891 on the issue of unrestricted reciprocity—or as the name implies reciprocity in its most extreme form—in an election which, like that of 1911, was distinguished for its screaming appeals to the loyalty of the Canadian people. From 1891 onwards, however, there was a gradual revision in the party's policy, and in the election of 1896, when the Liberals gained office, they were very guarded in their pronouncements. A general policy of tariff for revenue only was, when fiscal matters were discussed, the chief theme of the Liberal leaders,² though freer trade relations on the North American continent did receive some scant attention.³ Laurier also declared his adoption of the plan of an imperial preference which seems to have been introduced by the Conservative leader, Sir Charles Tupper, in an attempt to divert the issue.⁴

After coming into power the Liberal Government did, nevertheless, make tentative overtures to the Republican Government of McKinley which had, in 1897, replaced the Democratic administration of Cleveland.⁵

¹This paper forms part of a thesis entitled “Reciprocity and Canadian politics, 1887-1910,” presented at Bryn Mawr College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy.

²See Laurier at Montreal, Quebec, and Toronto (*Toronto Globe*, April 25, May 7, June 13, 1896); Cartwright to electors of South Oxford and at Streetsville (*ibid.*, Feb. 28, May 30); Mowat's open letter to Laurier (*ibid.*, May 4); Paterson at Brant (*ibid.*, May 14); Fielding at Dartmouth (*Halifax Chronicle*, June 15, 1896).

³See Laurier at Valleyfield (*Montreal Herald*, April 13, 1896); Cartwright to his constituents (*Toronto Globe*, Feb. 28, 1896); and Charlton (*ibid.*, May 9, 1896).

⁴*Toronto Globe*, June 4, 1896; Tupper's manifesto of May 5, 1896, speech at Halifax (*Halifax Herald*, June 4, 1896), at Toronto (*Toronto Mail and Empire*, June 20, 1896); J. S. Willison, *Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party* (Toronto, 1903), II, 287-8.

⁵See *Canada, House of Commons debates*, 1897, 1134, 1253; J. L. Garvin, *Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London, 1932), III, 183-4; O. D. Skelton, *Life and letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (Toronto, 1921, New York, 1922), II, 123-5.

As Fielding, Laurier's Minister of Finance, was later to declare, these "strictly unofficial inquiries . . . were sufficient to satisfy them [i.e. the Canadian Government] that no proposals looking towards a liberal reciprocity treaty between the two countries would be entertained by the United States."⁶ In April, therefore, Fielding introduced the famous tariff which has generally been considered as inaugurating the British preference, and it would seem that reciprocity had been shelved.

Towards the close of the year the question re-appeared anew, however, as the result of negotiations between the two countries on the problem of seal fishing in the Bering Sea. In November, 1897, Laurier and Louis Davies, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, accompanied by some experts, paid a visit to Washington. Here, with a member of the British embassy, they held various conversations with Secretary of State Sherman and John W. Foster of the State Department. At these conferences the Canadians insisted that the seal fishing matter should not be considered alone, but should be one of a number of subjects which, they thought, needed discussion. Among these they included reciprocity. Foster represented that the President felt that the seal fisheries should not be complicated by the inclusion of other subjects; but, "in his earnest desire to promote a more friendly state of relations between the two neighboring countries," he would agree to all inclusive negotiations, if there were some temporary measure of protection for the seals.⁷

In March, the United States again urged an arrangement for the settlement of the seal fisheries and agreed to a preliminary discussion on the organization of a mixed commission for the settlement of all questions. Davies, therefore, went to Washington in May and, with the British Ambassador, had discussions with Foster and Kasson, representing the United States. At these meetings it was decided that it was desirable that "all controversies" between the two countries should be settled by means of reference to a Joint High Commission, which should have five members from each side—later increased to six on the admission of a member from Newfoundland—and that it should meet at Quebec. The bases to be presented for the consideration of the Commission were also agreed upon. The question of reciprocity formed the subject of the eighth point of reference, where "such readjustments and concessions as may be deemed mutually advantageous, of customs duties applicable in each country to the products of the soil or the industry of the other, upon the basis of reciprocal equivalents," was stated to be one of the matters to be discussed by the Commission. The other points of reference included seal fishing in the Bering Sea, the Atlantic and Pacific fisheries, the Alaska boundary, and some other minor matters.⁸ On May 31 public announcement was made of the forthcoming meeting of a commission.

In August the Governments exchanged protocols giving their views on

⁶*Fielding papers*, Letter-book, Oct. 13-Nov. 10, 1909, 619-34, Memorandum of the Canadian Minister of Finance for the information of His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, Dec. 1. I am indebted to the trustees of the *Fielding papers*, the Hon. Norman McL. Rogers, the Hon. Mr. Justice A. K. MacLean, and Mr. Alexander Johnston for access to the letter-books from 1908-10 and also to a miscellaneous collection, relating especially to reciprocity.

⁷*Foreign relations of the United States*, 1897, 320-4; Public Archives of Canada, *Laurier papers*.

⁸*Laurier papers*; W. M. Malloy, *Treaties and conventions between the United States and other powers* (Washington, 1910), I, 770-3.

the different subjects of the terms of reference. The British communication was based on a Canadian Privy Council Minute, prepared in response to a wire from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In its completed form the paragraph dealing with reciprocity read as follows:

It has always been the opinion of the party now in power in Canada that the geographical position of the United States and Canada makes a large measure of free trade between them most desirable. The fact, however, that each country has a high customs tariff, which is practically protective, renders mutual concessions somewhat difficult. Moreover, the fact should not be overlooked that Canada, while fully appreciating the advantage of the American markets, has in recent years, by the judicious subsidizing of freight steam-ships and the introduction of the cold storage system, succeeded in finding a profitable market for a large portion of her surplus natural products in Great Britain; that this market is capable of indefinite expansion, and that in consequence the desirability of obtaining access to the markets of the United States has been appreciably diminished. Notwithstanding this fact, it is considered that negotiations for a free interchange of a wide list of natural products,⁹—is still desirable and feasible, though it would, of course, be impossible for Canada to grant to the United States tariff concessions without extending them also to such countries as are entitled by Treaty to most-favoured nation treatment in Canada, and it is essential also that the Dominion should maintain unimpaired its right to grant preferential treatment to the mother country and other parts of the Empire of which it is a member.¹⁰

The American comment on the same article was much simpler. "The Government of the United States," it states, "is heartily committed to the policy of commercial reciprocity, and trusts that the labors of the commission will result in some such arrangement with Canada on the basis indicated in this paragraph of the Protocol."¹¹

The Commission met in Quebec from August 23 to October 10, 1898, with a short adjournment in September, and from November 10, 1898, to February 20, 1899, in Washington. The American members were Senators Fairbanks and Gray, Congressman Dingley, and Foster, Kasson and T. J. Coolidge of the State Department. Great Britain was represented by Lord Herschell, Lord Chancellor, who was made chairman of this section, Laurier, Cartwright, Charlton, and Davies from Canada, and Winter of Newfoundland. The three Canadians who accompanied the Prime Minister, it should be noted, had all been prominent in the Liberal agitation for reciprocity in the eighties and early nineties. Both before and during the meeting of the Commission both sides received many communications and these, with the newspaper editorials, give some idea of the state of public opinion.

On the general question of reciprocity the tone of both Laurier's correspondents and of the Liberal press was inclined to be cautious rather

⁹An earlier draft, corrected by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, added here "and a carefully selected list of manufactured products" (*Laurier papers*).

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹Eleanor Poland, "Reciprocity negotiations between Canada and the United States, 1866-1911," 283, quoting *Kasson papers*, U.S. memorandum of views on subjects in protocol of May 30, 1898. I am indebted to the author and the authorities of Radcliffe College for access to this unpublished thesis.

than enthusiastic. As one letter received from a prominent supporter said, "Better no treaty at all than one that will meet with determined opposition;" and another repeated these views, declaring that any reciprocity agreement must be capable of being "reasonably defended, and very well and strongly defended at that, as being a treaty which is not one-sided in the way of too many concessions by Canada without fully corresponding concessions by the United States." Another correspondent said, "The feeling here is very strongly in favor of no reciprocity arrangements with the United States unless with regard to some natural products and raw materials." Clifford Sifton, now Laurier's Minister of the Interior and destined to leave the party in 1911 on the issue of reciprocity, expressed these same views to both Davies and Laurier. Two correspondents of Laurier prophesied that even reciprocity in natural products would result in defeat at the polls, and another, to quote himself, "a life-long Liberal," declared, "More people and cheap transport will be of greater benefit to Canadian agriculture than would any reciprocity treaty that can be framed."¹² Of course there were some enthusiasts, one correspondent even urging that an effort to secure unrestricted reciprocity be made; this, however, only offset the extremists in the other direction. The generally prevalent tone was that of care and caution.

The attitude of the Liberal press was similar. The *Halifax Chronicle* admitted that the two subjects in which the Maritime Provinces were interested were the Atlantic fisheries and reciprocity, but it saw considerable difficulty in the way of achieving any progress in the latter. The *Montreal Herald* considered reciprocity "on a basis which Sir Wilfrid Laurier will approve" a good thing, and, no doubt, beneficial to some industries. On the other hand, however, "Let Canada be made a cheap country to live in, and a cheap country to produce in, and these industries will work out their own salvation just as the agricultural industry did when it was quite as seriously threatened. . . . If Sir Wilfrid brings back a treaty it will be well; if not, it will still be well." The *Manitoba Free Press* was most non-committal in its attitude; and the *Victoria Daily Times*, while more enthusiastic than any other paper in its praise of the benefits of reciprocity, still, possibly influenced by geographical considerations, thought the Alaska boundary question "by far the most important question" with which the Commission had to deal. Both Conservative and Liberal papers warned the Government not to "jeopardize or sacrifice any great Canadian industry," for stable conditions must be maintained and there was no assurance of permanency in any arrangement with the United States, as past experience had all too clearly shown. Even for the farmer the best possibility of expansion lay in the British market, and Canadian opinion in general was opposed to any sacrifice of the preferential clause to gain American reciprocity.¹³

¹²*Laurier papers*; John W. Dafoe, *Clifford Sifton, in relation to his times* (Toronto, 1931), 191-2; A Canadian Liberal, "The Anglo-American Joint High Commission" (*North American review*, CLXVII, July, 1898, 165-75); *Toronto Globe*, Aug. 27, 1898.

¹³*Halifax Chronicle*, Aug. 17, 24, 25, Sept. 3, 6, 27, 1898; *Halifax Herald*, Aug. 23, 26, 1898; *Montreal Herald*, Aug. 22, 26, Sept. 12, Nov. 21, Dec. 10, 1898; *Montreal Gazette*, Aug. 11, 30, Sept. 6, Nov. 29, 1898; *Toronto Globe*, Aug. 19, 23, 25, Nov. 9, Dec. 10, 1898; *Toronto Mail and Empire*, Aug. 19, 20, 24, 26, 31, Nov. 21, 1898, Jan. 26, 1899; *Manitoba Free Press*, Aug. 23, 1898; *Victoria Daily Times*, Sept. 9,

Aside from the general question of the desirability of a treaty there was, of course, as in all tariff negotiations, a considerable amount of correspondence and expression of opinion on the specific articles which should be included. "The subject of woods generally," wrote Laurier, "whether in log or in any way prepared for consumption, is one of the most difficult questions with which we have to deal." It certainly called forth the largest amount of correspondence and was complicated by the regulations of the province of Ontario requiring manufacture of lumber before its export. The lumbermen presented a memorial to the Commission protesting against the removal of these regulations, except in return for the free admission of Canadian lumber, and this was repeated in several letters to Laurier, including one from the Premier of Ontario, who also visited Quebec to impress the Commission with his views.¹⁴ Some of Laurier's correspondents, including a member of his Cabinet, did not, however, think that this was an adequate return, pointing out that if the Ontario law was retained the duty on lumber must soon be withdrawn by the United States.¹⁵ Others asked for an import duty on American lumber, laths, and shingles, equal to that imposed on Canadian products by the United States.¹⁶

There was also considerable demand for the remission of duty on minerals,—iron, nickel, silver, lead, phosphorus, gypsum, and mica all being brought forward by those interested.¹⁷ Some were careful to add, however, that ores should not be admitted free, unless the same concession was made to bullion, as this would destroy the smelting industry in Canada;¹⁸ and there was protest against a proposal, favoured by Fielding, to place pig-iron on the free list.¹⁹ Others suggested that an export duty should be placed on nickel ore and matte, or other provision made for its compulsory manufacture in Canada.²⁰

A number of letters asked for the free admission of barley and corn-meal into the United States, and the Minister of Customs suggested that binder twine and fencing should be placed on the American free list.²¹

There was quite a brisk demand from Ontario for admission of coal into Canada free of duty, but this was opposed by the Nova Scotia interests, whose views were pressed by Fielding in the Cabinet. Laurier, in a letter to the latter, confessed that he found the question "full of difficulties. . . .

28, 1898; Robert McConnell, editor of the *Halifax Chronicle*, "Commercial relations between Canada and the United States" (*Canadian magazine*, XII, Jan., 1899, 198-201).

¹⁴*Laurier papers*, Gillies and Co. to Laurier, Resolution of Penetanguishene Town Council, A. S. Hardy to Laurier; *Toronto Globe*, Sept. 20, 1898; *Montreal Herald*, Sept. 12, 1898.

¹⁵*Laurier papers*, Orillia and Owen Sound Boards of Trade, L. P. Graves, J. E. Murphy, Thomas Conlon, E. W. Rathbunn, R. W. Scott to Laurier.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Boards of Trade of Orillia and District of Rainy River, Lumber and Shingle Manufacturers of British Columbia, C. Beck to Laurier.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, T. D. Ledyard, T. P. Brazill, W. Gibbs, W. A. Williams to Laurier; W. J. McAndy to Fielding.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, H. W. Bostock, Kaslo Board of Trade to Laurier.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, E. W. Rathbunn, Clifford Sifton and Fielding to Laurier.

²⁰*Ibid.*, Municipal Council of Drury, Dennison and Graham, Sault Ste. Marie Board of Trade and John Patterson to Laurier.

²¹*Ibid.*, Petitions from some inhabitants of Nova Scotia, Whitby, and Chatham Boards of Trade, Wm. Betcher, J. Penfound, W. Paterson to Laurier.

There are some important sections of the country which expected it and which will be grievously disappointed if we refuse it."²²

The manufacturers were, of course, busy urging that there should be no concessions on their products. Manufacturers of different implements and machines—axes, scythes, forks, sewing-machines, typewriters, and type-setting machines—all sent memorials to this effect.²³ They were joined by the bicycle and furniture manufacturers, and representations came also from soap manufacturers, leather and boot and shoe manufacturers.²⁴ The Dominion Cotton Company and a wholesale dry goods firm in Montreal protested against the inclusion of cotton goods in a reciprocity agreement declaring that the New England market was glutted and, therefore, the advantage would all be on the side of the Americans.²⁵

The Dominion Millers' Association presented a memorial against the removal of the duty on flour and this protest was repeated by several interested private individuals, though there seems to have been some division of opinion among those engaged in the business.²⁶

It would, of course, be unwise to build too much of an argument on these representations. In all tariff negotiations and revisions those who claim that their interests will be hurt by any reduction seem always to be more vocal. As a report of the *Montreal Gazette* said, "The advocates of restricted—not unrestricted trade—were thick on the ground here today in the proportion of three to every one who is anxious to see the tariff barriers between the United States and Canada reduced."²⁷ It can at least be said, however, that they bear out the impression, gathered from more general letters and newspaper editorials, that the interest in and desire for a reciprocity treaty had waned considerably now that it had become evident that Canada was once more enjoying prosperity.

No official minutes of the meetings of the Commission or its committees were kept, and therefore no account of its progress, except a report of the last meeting, appears in any official publication, either of Canada or of the United States. Thus it is necessary to piece the story together from newspaper reports, which, except for the delegations appearing before the Commission, must be considered as unreliable, for its secrets were well kept. The personal relations of the commissioners seem on the whole to have been harmonious. Laurier commented on the "new and general goodwill observable here," though he complained of the influence of local interests on the American members, so that "the Commission is bounded on the east by Gloucester cod and on the west by Indiana lambs, no, sometimes on the west by Seattle lions." The American Secretary of State made the same complaint about the Canadians, whose minds, he said, were "com-

²²*Ibid.*, Hamilton, Chatham, and Kingston Boards of Trade, Petitions from the towns of Trenton, Belleville, Tweed, Napanee, Deseronto, Farnworth, Francis Frost (M.P. for Grenville), Elias Rogers (President Toronto Board of Trade), H. A. Calvin (M.P.), Walter Macdonald, R. J. Hopper to Laurier, Laurier to Fielding.

²³*Ibid.*, Bedford Manufacturing Company, Williams Manufacturing Company, Canadian Typograph Company, Manager of the Massey-Harris Company to Laurier.

²⁴*Ibid.*, Memorials from the Canadian Bicycle Manufacturers, Furniture Manufacturers of Ontario, Leather Manufacturers, Boot and Shoe Manufacturers, J. Humphrey Parker, and R. H. Hudson to Laurier.

²⁵*Ibid.*, C. R. Whitehead of the Dominion Cotton Mills Co., J. N. Greenshields, and A. F. Gault to Laurier.

²⁶*Ibid.*, John Mather, Robert Meighen, Archibald Campbell (with enclosures) to Laurier.

²⁷*Montreal Gazette*, Sept. 2, 1898.

pletely occupied with their own party and factional disputes. . . . Sir Wilfrid Laurier is far more afraid of Sir Charles Tupper than he is of Lord Salisbury and President McKinley combined." The Americans also complained of the contentiousness of Lord Herschell who, they said, was "more cantankerous than any of the Canadians. . . . In fact he is the principal obstacle to a favorable arrangement." The American Ambassador in Great Britain was asked to hint this to the British Government, which countered, however, by an attack on Foster, the Canadian dislike of whom had already been conveyed in a roundabout way to the American Government and resulted in the substitution of Kasson wherever possible.²⁸

The Canadian newspapers reported that reciprocity was the most difficult problem before the Commission and despaired of any agreement,²⁹ but as a matter of fact substantial progress seems to have been made and the press even contained some hints of the possibility of an agreement.³⁰ Laurier wrote later :

We struggled to obtain reciprocity in lumber, because the condition of things in so far as lumber is concerned is acute and may become worse. I may say, however, that in this we made no progress whatever. We also endeavoured to obtain a fair measure of reciprocity in minerals, in which we were altogether successful; in quarry products, in which we were also quite successful; and in a few agricultural products in which we had some partial success. On the whole, with reference to the reciprocity question, I am quite satisfied with the progress which we made, barring the sole article of lumber, and we can at any moment make a very fair treaty.

Our chief efforts, however, were directed to these subjects: the Atlantic fisheries, the Pacific seal fisheries and the Alaska boundary.

Charlton also said, with reference to the reciprocity agreement, "We came very near getting a good treaty," but "a little trouble intervened between the trade treaty and something else." Senator Fairbanks, in summing up the results of the Commission, said that "a tentative agreement" was reached on the question of trade relations, "though satisfactory conclusion not probable on many articles chiefly lumber and farm products, on which Canadians urged very considerable concessions." Foster alone maintained that "little progress" had been made on reciprocity.³¹

Most important in this connection are the various memoranda drawn up by Kasson. He reported that the Canadians had demanded concessions on natural products—"products of the mines, forest and farm"—and that the Americans had offered to admit mineral products free, to increase the free list of forest products, to reduce the duty on sawed lumber, to put on the free list "two of the important products of the farm which they demanded," to reduce the duty on the remaining three, and, finally, "a

²⁸Allan Nevins, *Henry White* (Boston and New York, 1930), 134, 187-8; Wm. Roscoe Thayer, *Life of John Hay* (Boston and New York, 1915), II, 204-5; Skelton, *Laurier*, II, 127-9.

²⁹Halifax *Herald*, Oct. 14, Dec. 3, 1898; Montreal *Gazette*, Nov. 19, 1898; Toronto *Globe*, Sept. 28, Oct. 7, Nov. 12, Dec. 8, 1898.

³⁰Montreal *Gazette*, Oct. 11, 1898, Interview with Clarke Wallace; *ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1898.

³¹Canada, *House of Commons debates*, 1902, 1539; 1903, 1651, 1663; Skelton, *Laurier*, II, 131-3; John W. Foster, *Diplomatic memoirs* (Boston and New York, 1909), 188.

general reduction of existing duties." A suggested draft for a reciprocity treaty with several rough lists of articles which might be reciprocally admitted free and at specified reduced duties also appears among the Kasson papers.

The commodities mentioned on these lists show an effort on the part of the commissioners to conform to the requests made in both the American and Canadian representations. The free admission of natural ores is mentioned in three lists, coal appears on two, gypsum on three. Of farm products barley, butter and cheese, wheat and wheat flour appear on two lists, live animals on one, canned meat and vegetables on two. Some vegetables, fruit and berries, seed of various sorts, and nursery stock also receive mention. Manufactured articles appear very sparsely; furniture, agricultural machinery, locomotives and their parts, are each on one list, mining tools and machinery on two. There is some effort to meet the Canadian demand with regard to lumber and wood products in lists specifying the qualities and articles which might be admitted free. On the whole the lists cannot be said to be very comprehensive, but they might, as was evidently expected, have formed a basis for further discussion and agreement.³²

The Commission, however, broke up on February 20, because of the failure to reach an agreement on the Alaska boundary or the conditions on which it should be submitted to arbitration. The American commissioners proposed that attention should be turned to the determination of the other subjects "several" of which "were so far advanced as to assure the possibility of a settlement"; but the Canadians refused, stating as their reason that "the manner in which they would be prepared to adjust some of the other important matters under consideration, must depend, in their view, upon whether it is possible to arrive at a settlement of all questions which might at any time occasion acute controversy or even conflict."³³ In this attitude they received the support of the Conservatives.³⁴

Technically the Commission only adjourned till the second of August and some of the Liberal papers, therefore, refused to believe that it had failed.³⁵ It did not meet on the date set, however, and in fact never met again, though various approaches were made with a view to its re-opening. In March, 1900, Laurier said in the House of Commons that he did not consider the negotiations were at an end, though he was unable to say when they would be re-opened.³⁶ In his budget speech of 1903 Fielding announced that there had been some correspondence between Laurier and Fairbanks on the subject. The American chairman, in a letter written on February 13, 1903, had suggested that since the question of the Alaska boundary had by then been transferred to a special tribunal, the Joint High Commission should re-convene. The Canadian Government, however, would only agree to another session if an informal preliminary meeting should give "reasonable hope" of a successful outcome.³⁷ Laurier, in a confidential letter to the secretary of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association written

³²Poland, *Reciprocity negotiations*, 291-6 and Appendix a.

³³*Canada, Sessional papers*, 1899, no. 99; Laurier in the House of Commons (*Canada, House of Commons debates*, 1899, 3341, 3668).

³⁴*Ibid.*, 3780, 4266.

³⁵*Halifax Chronicle*, Feb. 24, 1899; *Montreal Herald*, Feb. 21, 1899.

³⁶*Canada, House of Commons debates*, 1900, 2147.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 1903, 1407-8.

on May 29 of the same year, said that he expected that the Joint High Commission would re-assemble before long.³⁸ Nothing came of the suggestion however. On October 20, the decision of the Alaska boundary tribunal was announced and this so enraged Canadian public opinion that any effort to reach an agreement with the United States at that time, on any subject whatever, would have almost certainly proved abortive. In the parliamentary session of 1904 Laurier definitely stated that the American Government would have to take the initiative for further negotiations; and though the American press of November 22 contained an announcement of an informal meeting of the commissioners in New York, nothing further resulted. Apparently this ended all efforts to revive the ill-starred Commission.³⁹

All sides explained the failure of the Joint High Commission in accordance with their own views. The Americans blamed the Canadian negotiators, who, they considered, were governed more by the exigencies of national politics than by the desire to make a settlement. "The Canadian matter in a nutshell is this," wrote Secretary of State Hay, "Laurier preferred to pose before his Parliament as a stout defender of Canadian rights and interests against Yankee selfishness, rather than have the trouble to defend himself against the attacks of the Opposition for having made a just and reasonable treaty—which was within his reach."⁴⁰ Kasson also was of the same opinion and declared that the American commissioners "were more surprised by this sudden termination of our negotiations because they [i.e. the Canadians] had previously indicated to us that the question of reciprocity in trade relations was the hinge upon which success or failure of negotiations would turn."⁴¹ Foster went so far as to compare the abortive efforts of this Commission with the success of that of 1871 and pointed out that the latter contained one Canadian and four English statesmen, while in 1898 there were three Canadians and only one Englishman.⁴²

The Conservatives blamed the "bungling incapacity" of the Canadian negotiators, of whom only Charlton had shown any ability. Their previous record and policies made it vain to hope that they would get any favourable consideration from the United States. Not only had they been the proponents of unrestricted reciprocity and on most of the disputed points taken the side of the United States, but in the last two tariffs they had discriminated against the United States.⁴³

The Liberal explanation, that reciprocity had been refused by the United States, was that which was to become traditional. "There was found no disposition on the part of the representatives of the United States," said J. W. Longley, a prominent Nova Scotia Liberal, speaking at a meeting of the Canadian Club of Boston three years later, "to even discuss the question of reciprocity upon any basis upon which it could be honorably considered by the Canadian delegates." Fielding was even to declare in an official document, "Again a failure to come to an agreement was due to

³⁸Laurier papers.

³⁹Canada, *House of Commons debates*, 1904, 75; *Montreal Gazette*, Nov. 30, 1904, Jan. 13, 1905.

⁴⁰Nevins, *Henry White*, 191.

⁴¹Poland, *Reciprocity negotiations*, 296.

⁴²Foster, *Diplomatic memoirs*, II, 189.

⁴³Comment of Sir Charles Tupper, *Conservative press*, Feb. 21, 1899; *Toronto Mail and Empire*, Feb. 20, 21, 22, 1899.

the manifest unwillingness of the United States authorities to make any substantial concessions in favour of imports from Canada."⁴⁴ This interpretation should, however, be challenged. As has been seen, it was the Canadians who insisted that, on the failure to reach an agreement on the Alaska boundary, the Commission should adjourn, although a tentative treaty had been drawn up and Laurier himself had declared, "We can at any moment make a very fair treaty." A further quotation from this letter strengthens this point. "There has been a great deal of misconception as to the character of the negotiations at Washington," he wrote. "The impression was that we were struggling with might and main to obtain a wide measure of reciprocity. The reverse is the truth."⁴⁵ The Liberal defence of their position in the parliamentary session of 1899 is also far more consistent with this view. Here Laurier explained the attitude of the Canadian negotiators as follows:

Now, Sir, the hon. gentleman [Tupper] assumes that in all these negotiations we have been begging for reciprocity; he assumes that in all these negotiations that took place at Quebec and in Washington we were not dealing with the Bering Sea question, that we were not dealing with the Atlantic fisheries but that we were seeking to modify [*sic*] the American commissioners in order to obtain some trade concessions. Let me tell the hon. gentleman that in this matter, as in all others, and especially in this one he is mistaken. I have no right to speak of what took place in the commission, but I have a right to refer to what is now in the minds of the Canadian people; and if we know the hearts and minds of our people at present, I think I am not making too wide a statement when I say that the general feeling in Canada to-day is not in favour of reciprocity. There was a time when Canadians, beginning with the hon. gentleman himself, would have given many things to obtain the American market; there was a time not long ago when the market of the great cities of the union was the only market we had for any of our products. But, thank heaven! These days are past and over now.⁴⁶

There was very little disappointment expressed in Canada over the failure of the negotiations. The Hamilton *Spectator* spoke of the country having escaped the "calamity" of a reciprocity treaty,⁴⁷ and the Montreal *Gazette* declared: "There was really less risk of Canada losing from the commission's failure to come to an understanding than from its reaching one. Nobody expected a reciprocity arrangement that would be fair to Canada from the high tariff men who presently control the United States affairs."⁴⁸ Even the Toronto *Globe* said: "It was important to have trade relations liberalized: it was of far greater importance to have the boundary

⁴⁴Halifax *Chronicle*, April 9, 1902. See also Longley's article, "Reciprocity between the United States and Canada" (*North American review*, CLXXVI, March, 1903, 407; reprinted *National reciprocity*, March, 1903, I, 23); Memorandum by the Canadian Minister of Finance for the information of His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, Dec. 1, 1909, 620-1; Victoria *Daily Times*, Feb. 17, 1899; Toronto *Globe*, Feb. 21, 1899.

⁴⁵Skelton, *Laurier*, II, 131.

⁴⁶Canada, *House of Commons debates*, 1899, 10, 102, 157.

⁴⁷Quoted by the Halifax *Herald*, Feb. 25, 1899.

⁴⁸Jan. 26, 1899; see also Feb. 22, 1899. Sifton's views were apparently similar to those expressed here; see Dafoe, *Sifton*, 193.

question, a possible source of serious international complications, removed from the field of disputed issues."⁴⁹

Both before the Commission met and during its sessions, it had been stated that Canada would make this one effort to secure reciprocity with the United States, but if this were unsuccessful, "the idea of better trade relations with the United States will be abandoned by our people one and all," and the Government, backed by a united nation, would be free to take "the measures which shall then be deemed necessary." Charlton was more explicit as to what these "measures" were to be.

We will seek in every possible way to develop and extend our export trade with England, and we will be impelled by every consideration of fair play and filial feeling to arrange a tariff that will permit the imports from England to wipe out to the greatest practical extent, the balance of trade that we now score up against her. We shall look with more favour upon schemes for the consolidation of a world-wide empire, and will be ready and anxious to meet any discrimination that England may be induced to make in favour of colonial products by discriminations as generous in favour of British imports. The parting of the way is just before us; we have a preference as to which road we shall take; but if access is denied us, we will enter upon the other with high resolve to make it the road to victory over all the obstacles that may confront us.

The note of national growth and self-reliance was struck by the *Toronto Globe*, which said: "Each country [i.e. Canada and the United States] has its own business to do and its own destiny to fulfil, and in our case there is every reason to believe that the path of independence and of an intelligent care of our own interests will also be the path of friendship."⁵⁰

Thus after the failure of the Joint High Commission, at the turn of the century, Canadian public opinion resembles that of a decade later far more than it does that of the eighties and early nineties, when the Conservative Premier, Sir John Macdonald, had felt it necessary to make concessions to the prevailing advocacy of a large measure of reciprocity with the United States. Indeed the speeches made and articles written at this time express the essence of the principal emotions which were to defeat the reciprocity agreement when presented in 1911 by the United States and point clearly to the fact that the reciprocity of the eighties and nineties was dictated in large measure by the poor economic conditions of those years. It was the reviving spirit of national independence and prosperity and of imperial attachment which in 1899 prevented any keen disappointment at the failure of the Joint High Commission to produce any results. Thus from this episode emerge the two salient features of the discussion of reciprocity in Canada—first that it has been regarded as a depression measure, and second that it is inseparably linked with the position of Canada as a part of the British Empire.

⁴⁹Feb. 21, 1899. See also *Victoria Daily Times*, Feb. 17, 1899.

⁵⁰*Toronto Globe*, Feb. 16 and May 25, 1899; Charlton in *Canada: an encyclopaedia*, I, 378; A. H. U. Colquhoun, "Reciprocity trips to Washington" (*Canadian magazine*, VIII, March, 1897, 423).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Martin discussed the position of John Charlton as an important factor in the attitude of the Liberal party to reciprocity. Charlton had been a completely consistent supporter of the freest commercial relations between Canada and the United States; he had, with some reluctance, abandoned commercial union in favour, first of unrestricted, and then of restricted, reciprocity. His convictions, Mr. Martin believed, did not change after 1896; but the imposition of the Dingley Tariff drove him to the conclusion that nothing was to be hoped for from the Americans, and, in disillusionment, he turned to a policy of reprisals.

Miss Foster agreed with Mr. Martin as to Charlton's sincerity and the consistency of his views. She drew attention, however, to the lumber interests which Charlton represented, and to the importance of lumber as a factor in reciprocity negotiations.

CANADA'S REJECTION OF RECIPROCITY IN 1911

By L. ETHAN ELLIS

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The 1911 reciprocity episode presents, *inter alia*, an interesting study of propaganda enlisted in the aid of protection both above and below the Canadian-American frontier. The United States had been aggressively protectionist since the Civil War; Canada, rebuffed in repeated efforts to secure reciprocity with the United States, had at length turned to a retaliatory protectionism of her own.¹ The years 1909-10 produced factors which led responsible leaders in each country to seek in reciprocity a solution of vexing domestic problems.

On both sides of the border political parties old in power viewed the future in the light of alarming symptoms. In Canada, French-Canadian Nationalism took from the Government, on the naval issue, a by-election in a district strongly Liberal since 1887.² This boded ill for a Government soon bound to face a general election. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, touring the prairies the previous summer, had been made unpleasantly aware that the farmers wanted, among other things, a renewal of reciprocity.³ Clearly, storm warnings were up.

In Washington, too, the barometer was sinking. The Republican party, prey to internal bickerings,⁴ had failed to implement its own promises of tariff reform when the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 left rates high and disappointed reformers in the party. Particularly disappointed too, and particularly vocal, were the newspaper publishers, since the Act failed to grant them a much desired reduction in the duty on Canadian newsprint. These made life miserable for the good-natured William Howard Taft, in office for a year without affirmative accomplishment, and unpleasantly aware of a mid-term Congressional election which would bring him to book in November, 1910.⁵ Reciprocity with Canada seemed, in the spring of that year, to offer Taft at once an opportunity for accomplishment and a chance to quiet the angry publishers. He made the proposal at a meeting with William H. Fielding, Laurier's Minister of Finance, at Albany, New York, April 20, and the two parted committed to the idea.⁶ That Laurier

¹Tariff tendencies are conveniently accessible in Edward Porritt, *Sixty Years of protection in Canada, 1846-1907: Where industry leans on the politicians* (London, 1908), and F. W. Taussig, *Tariff history of the United States* (ed. 8, New York, 1931).

²J. Castell Hopkins (comp.), *The Canadian annual review of public affairs, 1910* (Toronto, 1911), 139-211; *Toronto News*, Oct. 24, 28, Nov. 3, 4, 1910.

³Hopkins, *Canadian annual review, 1910*, 265-80. The *Grain growers' guide* (Winnipeg), and *Toronto Globe*, for July, August, and September, 1910, cover this story.

⁴Two of these were the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy and the unhorsing of Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, described briefly in L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, *The United States since 1865* (New York, 1932), 392-3, 410-12.

⁵*Bulletins of the American newspaper publishers' association*, no. 2037, "B" Special (New York), Aug. 3, 1909, 545.

⁶*Canadian tariff negotiations* (n.p., n.d.), 1-19, covers this episode. This pamphlet, in *The Philander C. Knox papers* in the Library of Congress, was evidently compiled for the American Secretary of State by Charles M. Pepper, who was prominent in the American side of the negotiations. It gives in printed form many documents preserved in manuscript in the Department of State and is the most important source for the American side of the negotiation of reciprocity through

was also minded to seek surcease from domestic difficulties in foreign negotiations is evidenced by the promptitude with which Fielding presently accepted Taft's invitation to further discussions.

These found the United States anxious and Canada somewhat coy, since the Government felt the pressure of Canadian business interests exerted against concessions to the southern neighbour. Considerable jockeying, carried through a meeting at Ottawa in November and another at Washington in January, 1911, produced an agreement. The main point of difference concerned the degree of reciprocity in manufactures. The Canadians desired to secure a market for their natural products but, mindful of their comfortable alliance with protected interests at home, were very loath to leave the way open for any trickle through the dike of protection. A formula was suggested by the United States in November which guided the later negotiations: "in taking up the manufacturing schedules in detail the effort on our part would be as much as possible to differentiate and segregate those articles affecting the smaller industries on both sides of the water [*sic*], so that they might compete on equal terms and leave the rates on the industries of the great combinations unchanged where they involved Canadian objection."⁷ The ultimate agreement, announced in January, 1911, attempted faithfully to mirror the desires of both parties: many agricultural products were allowed to enter the United States duty free; in return American agricultural implements entered Canada at reduced rates, and identical rates were levied upon the exchange of a list of manufactures numerically imposing but economically unimportant. Thus did Fielding and Laurier attempt to benefit Canada's farmers without injuring her industries.

Meantime the mere prospect of reciprocity activated a number of Canadian elements into hostility. The manufacturers, represented as being "very nervous" during the March parleys, discussed in September the desirability of a nation-wide propaganda campaign to enlighten the people on the benefits of protection. The Conservative leader, Mr. Robert L. Borden, voiced doubts of Canada's position in an imperial trade federation if she fettered her fiscal freedom "by embarrassing commercial treaties and understandings . . ." with foreign countries.⁸ By the early autumn the newspaper clans began to gather for the fray and marshalled arguments favourable to protection in general. Thus the lines were being drawn even before the agreement was formulated.

The announcement of the agreement on January 26, 1911, undoubtedly took the opposition between wind and water. Fielding's stout apology stressed the concessions made by the United States to Canadian raw materials and the lowered duties on imports of agricultural implements, and insisted upon the safe position of Canadian manufacturers. It was particularly disconcerting to western Conservatives, who had seen reciprocity as a move toward tariff reform. Borden, replying, dutifully strove

November 18, 1910. See also *Tariff relations between the United States and the Dominion of Canada: Correspondence concerning negotiations, 1910* (Ottawa, 1910), and the *Toronto Globe* for March, 1910. The *Globe's* editor, Dr. James A. Macdonald, played an important part in arranging the Taft-Fielding meeting.

⁷*Canadian tariff negotiations*, 25-89.

⁸*Industrial Canada* (Toronto), XI, 251-333; *Toronto News*, June 25, 1910. The files of the *Toronto News*, the *Toronto World*, and *Montreal Gazette* support the Conservative-protectionist point of view, while the *Toronto Globe* took the other side.

to put the Government in the wrong, but his somewhat tentative remarks emphasized the dangers of the agreement to imperial relations almost as much as its distinctively Canadian aspects.⁹ Out-of-doors various interests began to express themselves. Railway officials, manufacturers of agricultural implements, boards of trade, and fruit-growers were heard early, on a prevailing note of hostility; there were, however, audible minorities in several instances.¹⁰ The press generally followed party lines, with an occasional Conservative journal deserting the ranks to support the agreement for a time, and others delaying definite commitments until the party's course in Parliament had been clarified. Press opinion was predominantly hostile in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia; the Maritimes and the prairies were favourable.¹¹ Arguments combined economics with the agreement's dangers to national and particularly to imperial welfare. The imperial factor was useful in placing the matter upon a patriotic level and above mere partisan contention. Even so early, Conservative journals introduced matters external to the economics of reciprocity, but later to be of considerable value to its political opponents: appeals were made to the racial feelings of the French and aspersions were cast upon the purity of the Government's administrative record.¹² Liberal journals faced a problem which was always serious and ultimately insoluble: they must convince the Canadian public that reciprocity was economically good and politically safe, and they must overcome opposition attacks on both these counts. Early discussion made it clear that the Liberal papers needed to spend almost as much time saying "No" to Conservative arguments as to singing reciprocity's praises.

With the agreement thus before Parliament and country, the problem involved in its rejection may now be stated, preliminary to an examination of the forces causing its failure. Why did an arrangement deliberately directed toward giving the products of an agricultural country a new outlet, representing the achievement of an end vainly sought for years by bi-partisan efforts, and sponsored by a party long ensconced in power and led by the brilliant Laurier, go down to one of the most spectacular defeats in the history of the Dominion? The following pages attempt to trace the roles played by economic factors, by imperial relationships, by the United States, and by time itself in contributing to the mounting tide of loyalty to country and to Empire, and of accentuated fear of the neighbour to the south, under which reciprocity was buried.

It is obvious that Canadian beneficiaries of protection, Canadian rail-rovers managing lines built to defy natural trade routes by virtue of government subsidies, and bankers attuned to the interests of these powerful clients, would alike distrust any proposal which would lower tariff barriers or allow commerce to seek its natural level. These interests were geographically concentrated and numerically insignificant. Their influence,

⁹*Canada, House of Commons debates, 3rd sess., 11th Parliament* (5 vol., Ottawa, 1910-11), II, 2440-78, 2497-502. Cited subsequently as *Hansard*.

¹⁰*Grain growers' guide*, Feb. 8, summarizes the attitudes of railroad leaders. Other interests are noted in *Edmonton Daily Bulletin*, Jan. 30; *Toronto Globe*, Jan. 31; *Montreal Daily Star*, Feb. 1, 1911.

¹¹The discussion of early press opinion is based upon examination of ten files from Ontario, five from Quebec, six from the Maritimes, six from the Prairie Provinces, and one from British Columbia. Obviously, individual citation is impossible; an effort has been made to reflect the tenor of press opinion.

¹²*Montreal Star*, Jan. 31; *Halifax Herald*, Jan. 30, Feb. 1, 1911.

which it is here suggested was dominant in defeating the Taft-Fielding agreement, had therefore to be exerted so as to move popular majorities to hostility or to fear. Both time and circumstance aided these interests in the unfolding of a gradually-developing plan which used Conservative press and party as a vehicle of reciprocity's destruction. A number of factors forwarded this plan. The agreement involved the United States, and pious platitudes about an undefended frontier had not yet sufficed to make all Canadians love their neighbours. Again, the alleged danger of a weakened imperial tie made a waving Union Jack an imposing weapon in the opponents' arsenal. An early parliamentary verdict (which contemporaries well-nigh unanimously agreed would have been a favourable one) was prevented by lack of closure and desire to move slowly lest the United States might act unfavourably. Congress failing to act in regular course, the necessity of a special session gave time for Canadian opposition to harden into obstruction, until Laurier had to leave to assist in the crowning of a King. When he returned the initiative had passed to his opponents, now in an excellent tactical position to force an election which could be fought on the positive side by appealing to national and imperial patriotism and on the negative side by saying "No" to the Government's programme without having to advance constructive measures of their own.

The first organized opposition after the agreement was announced capitalized upon the defection from their party of eighteen Toronto Liberals. The group, probably organized by Z. A. Lash, represented the Board of Trade, five banks, two railroads, three manufacturers, two life insurance companies, and other interests employing a total of 110,000 men. Its Manifesto of February 20 denounced reciprocity as an enemy of Canadian nationality and the British connection. Its main contribution was the launching, at a mass-meeting in Massey Hall, March 9, of the Canadian National League.¹³ The League, headed by Lash with Arthur Hawkes as secretary and Clifford Sifton (whose defection Laurier later said cost the Liberals their continuance in power¹⁴) as *sub rosa* adviser, played an exceedingly important role in the ensuing battle.¹⁵

Hawkes states that a meeting at Montreal attended by Lash, Sifton, Sir Hugh Graham of the Montreal *Daily Star*, and himself, launched a far-flung propaganda campaign under League auspices, the expenses of which were met by Lash personally from funds presumably collected from the Eighteen. It included publication of a number of pamphlets, among which were *The road to Washington*, exposing the intention of the United States to accomplish the economic and political absorption of the Dominion; *Home market and farm*, directed to the identity of agricultural and industrial interest in the maintenance of protection; and *Reciprocity with the United States—Canadian nationality, British connection and fiscal independence*. A press campaign, opened even before the formation of the League, offered to buy space in newspapers of both parties for material

¹³Toronto *Globe*, March 10, 1911, describes the meeting, which was addressed by Sir Mortimer Clark.

¹⁴John W. Dafoe, *Clifford Sifton in relation to his times* (Toronto, 1931), 377; Winnipeg *Free Press*, Sept. 21, 1929.

¹⁵Hawkes's article in the Winnipeg *Free Press*, cited above, tells of his own relations with Sifton and with the campaign. Lash presented a collection of pamphlets to the Public Archives of Canada telling the story of the League's propaganda activities: *Canadian National League campaign of 1911 against reciprocity with the United States of America*, (n.p., n.d.), no. 3849.

originally appearing in the *Star* and the *Canadian Century*. A Montreal advertising firm pushed this so energetically that it was asserted late in April that the *Canadian Century* articles were appearing in four hundred rural weeklies. The influence of the *Star* upon the opposition press emerged as one of the most powerful factors in the whole situation.¹⁶ Other propaganda moves of some moment were conducted by the Anti-Reciprocity League, functioning from Montreal by circulating petitions, and the "Appeal to the British born," launched by Hawkes upon advice of Sifton, through a pamphlet of the same title. This was an effort to appeal to the racial instincts of an estimated quarter million old-countrymen, half of whom had migrated to Canada since the 1908 election and presumably were keenly desirous of preserving the British connection.¹⁷

While these engines of propaganda were in the making, parliamentary discussion opened February 9, two days before congressional oratory commenced. By this time Conservative spines, particularly from Ontario, had been stiffened by contact with their constituents. This enabled the party to unite upon a programme of opposition, after nearly a week of stormy caucuses which opened in an atmosphere of uncertainty and divided sentiment.¹⁸ Thus was launched a struggle covering twenty-five legislative days during February, March, April, and early May. This debate, carried on against a background of events in the United States, and of growing hostility in Canada, marked important developments in reciprocity's progress to oblivion. By the time Parliament adjourned to allow Laurier to attend the Coronation and the Imperial Conference, the Liberals had lost their advantage of surprise, had been forced on the defensive, and faced the likelihood of an appeal to the country.

At this point a brief recapitulation of events below the border may illuminate Canadian developments. President Taft's failure to secure passage of his agreement at the regular session of Congress has been noted. He was therefore forced to call a special session which assembled April 4. Here the House acted promptly (April 21), but Senate hearings lasted until early May and the bill was not passed until July 22. This delay, particularly failure to act at the short session, strengthened the position of the Canadian opposition—if the United States did not act, why should Canada hurry to bind herself? Again, the lengthy congressional debate furnished much ammunition for the Canadian discussion, particularly for the opposition, for every favourable argument below the border could be adapted into an unfavourable one above. Finally, American leaders themselves contributed a series of almost unbelievably inept statements which no Liberal glosses could free from damaging implications.

Taft's anxiety to place the agreement in a good light before the American public made him the chief offender. He said in his message of transmittal that the Canadian people were "coming to the parting of the ways."¹⁹ On April 27, speaking before the American Newspaper Pub-

¹⁶Edmonton *Bulletin*, Feb. 17; Saint John *Daily Telegraph and the Sun*, April 26; *Grain growers' guide*, March 15, May 3, 1911. It should be noted that the author has found no evidence explicitly connecting this press campaign with the League. Hawkes placed Lash's expenditures at \$26,400.

¹⁷Toronto *Daily Star*, March 6; Toronto *Globe*, June 7, 1911; Dafoe, *Sifton*, 371.

¹⁸Henry Borden (ed.), *Robert Laird Borden: His memoirs* (New York, 1938), I, 303-4; Montreal *Star*, Feb. 1-7, 1911.

¹⁹*Congressional record* (Washington, 1874 ff.), 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1515.

lishers' Association, he asserted that: "The forces which are at work in England and in Canada to separate her by a Chinese wall from the United States and to make her part of an imperial commercial band reaching from England around the world to England again by a system of preferential tariffs, will derive an impetus from the rejection of this treaty, and if we would have reciprocity with all the advantages that I have described and that I earnestly and sincerely believe will follow upon its adoption, we must take it now or give it up forever."²⁰ In the same speech he said: "The government is one controlled entirely by the people, and the bond uniting the dominion to the mother country is light and almost imperceptible." In their context these remarks are obviously directed to trade matters; they were unfortunately susceptible of being lifted from their context and twisted to convey political threats to national integrity and imperial solidarity. A more obvious and even more maladroit threat to the British connection was uttered by Champ Clark, Democratic Speaker-designate, during the first House debate, in which he advocated annexation of Canada "because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British-North American possessions clear to the North Pole. . . ."²¹ This statement, despite prompt presidential repudiation and repeated official and press denials, furnished Canadian opposition one of its most potent weapons. Together, Taft and Clark did much to defeat the agreement that meant so much to each.

The parliamentary debates were significant along two lines: they served as a vehicle for the presentation of arguments on both sides, and they foreshadowed opposition strategy. All the important arguments went into the record in February, when debate reached the high-water mark of parliamentary discussion. The national, imperial, and economic consequences of the agreement were canvassed thoroughly. Many followed Borden's lead and asked, in effect, "Why not let well enough alone?"²² Others argued that the ministry had no popular mandate for the proposed action.²³ Others were alarmed at the uncertain duration of the agreement.²⁴ On the national-imperial front concern was voiced lest reciprocity destroy Canada's fiscal freedom and endanger the tariff preference to Britain.²⁵ The danger of annexation, prominent in the later discussion, was less noticed at this stage.²⁶

Among economic arguments, fear was expressed lest the most-favoured-nation clauses extend favours granted the United States to all of Britain's possessions and to many foreign countries.²⁷ The imminent danger to Canada's far-flung east-west transportation lanes was noted.²⁸ The whole Conservative argument echoed the refrain that the producer, in whose interest the Government had professedly made the arrangement, would be grievously injured by the competition which reciprocity would make possible.²⁹ Thus reciprocity's opponents, in Canada as well as in the United States, made their chief plea to the producing interests; the farmer, rather than the manufacturer, was pushed to the fore as the

²⁰New York *Tribune*, April 28, 1911. ²¹*Record*, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 2520.

²²*Hansard*, II, 3284-324, 3685, 3750; III, 4003.

²³*Ibid.*, II, 3581, 3738; III, 4072, 4085, 4389.

²⁴*Ibid.*, II, 3582, 3754.

²⁵*Ibid.*, II, 3742, 3744; III, 4064, 4089, 4091.

²⁶*Ibid.*, II, 3586, 3742-3; III, 4069-70.

²⁷*Ibid.*, III, 4096-7.

²⁸*Ibid.*, II, 3693; III, 3991.

²⁹*Ibid.*, II, 3586 ff., 3741; III, 4094-5, 4172, 4182, 4394, 4401-2.

principal sufferer. By the same token, Liberals emphasized the larger market which reciprocity would provide, while reciprocity's friends south of the border insisted that it would not harm the United States farmer.³⁰ Liberal debaters spent most of their time refuting Conservative contentions, which exceeded their own both in number and variety.³¹ This first period of discussion launched the principal arguments on both sides, preserved a fairly high level of courtesy and urbanity, and stuck fairly closely to the point at issue.

This courtesy and urbanity may have had something to do with a revolt against Borden's leadership of the party in late March, seemingly led by Montreal and Quebec capitalist elements in disagreement with his too-gentlemanly conduct of the campaign.³² He survived the challenge to lead a further fight emerging in April as an evident effort to make Parliament a sounding-board to magnify the volume of hostility being stirred up in the country. Another note appeared in May—Why not wait until the United States acts by herself? This developed from the evident intention of the Democrats in the new Congress to attempt general tariff revision as well as adopt reciprocity. By late April the Liberals had passed definitely to the defensive and devoted most of their time to refuting the ever-louder Conservative assertions; furthermore, time was passing rapidly. The season for the Coronation and ensuing Imperial Conference approached, and presently a Conservative caucus decided to carry reciprocity to a bitter-end fight.³³ With this Conservative strategy began to be apparent—they would postpone decision until after the Coronation, and would then try to force the issue to the country. The parliamentary recess could be used to good advantage in fanning the flames of hostility already burning.

Away from Ottawa the propaganda mills had been turning apace. The February memorial of the Manufacturers' Association to the Prime Minister exhibited a tenderness for the farmer's welfare, allegedly endangered by reciprocity, matched only by American manufacturers' solicitude for the American farmer, also alleged to be facing ruin. This pushing forward of the farmer as the stalking horse of the protected interests was an outstanding as well as an adroit part of the campaign on both sides of the border. In neither case were manufacturers anxious to admit their own interest in preserving the tariff wall intact, though the files of *Industrial Canada* contain many articles openly deprecating any breach in the barrier. Boards of trade generally followed the lead of the manufacturers, though frequently adverse resolutions were adopted only after bitter internal struggles. Expressed sentiment of railroad leaders varied from Sir Donald Mann's belief that "no harm can come to our Canadian railways . . ." from reciprocity, to Sir William Van Horne's emergence from retirement in an effort "to bust the damned thing."³⁴ The evidence indicates that strong adverse railroad influence was brought to bear behind the scenes.

February and March saw the press campaign gather headway, mirror-

³⁰*Ibid.*, II, 3566, 3578, 3648; III, 4020, 4185, 4432.

³¹*Ibid.*, II, 3574-5, 3712-13, 3719; III, 3965-6, 3977, 4193.

³²*Montreal Daily Witness*, March 28, 31; *Toronto Globe*, March 28; *Halifax Chronicle*, March 28-30; *Toronto Daily Star*, March 28, 29, 1911.

³³*Toronto Globe*, *Montreal Star*, April 27, 1911.

³⁴Mann quoted in *Edmonton Bulletin*, Feb. 9, 1911; Van Horne in Dafoe, *Sifton*, 364.

ing the parliamentary arguments. Hereafter the newspapers settled down for a time to reiteration, with Conservative organs occasionally discovering a new tack, which defenders veered to meet. As in Parliament, the Conservatives had the initiative, with Quebec and Ontario journals, particularly the *Montreal Star* and the *Toronto News* furnishing most of the ammunition; the stoutest pro-reciprocity fighter was the *Toronto Star*; the *Globe*, while active, was at first disinclined to a shirt-sleeves campaign. Declining during the Coronation season, the press drive revived rapidly during July to reach a crescendo in August and September. Opposition arguments first centred principally around the danger to national unity implicit in a reciprocity which would destroy the transportation bridge north of Lake Superior by turning western trade south to Chicago and the Twin Cities; stressed also were the threat to the imperial connection and the danger of annexation. In March the *Star* inaugurated a determined effort to prove reciprocity bad for the farmer; a widely-copied series of articles described, in words and pictures, the deserted farms of New England; Canadians were pointedly asked if these farmers, so close to a supposedly hungry market, could not meet the competition of the American West, how could Canadians overcome a still greater transportation obstacle?³⁵ Again the *Star* launched (March 11) an argument designed to show how reciprocity would expose Canada to the hard times and unemployment said to be rampant in the United States. Two days later the *News* added a fear that the agreement would let the American trusts into Canada.

Liberal journals played up the argument that the agreement opened to Canadian producers a "Ninety Million Market."³⁶ The next most important supporting claim was that reciprocity would benefit both producer and consumer, an unfortunate effort which subjected Liberals to no little ridicule in the controversy's later stages.³⁷ Beyond these points, Liberal energies were mainly directed to refuting opposition sallies; this, in fact, became more and more the burden of the Liberal plea.

April saw a recurring appeal to annexation and the farm interest; Taft's unfortunate utterance of April 27 gave rise to a flurry of charge and counter-charge on annexation and the Empire. About this time, too, Conservatives began to emphasize a series of alleged scandals in the Liberal administrative record.³⁸ By the adjournment of Parliament the main outlines of the press campaign were evident—aside from the farmer's plight, matters of economic concern were to be soft-pedalled, it being the aim of opposition strategy to direct attention to more easily capitalized national, imperial, and political aspects. This strategy was possible because the opposition press seized and maintained the initiative, forcing reciprocity's defenders into a heart-breaking effort to overtake a strong front runner.

Laurier's decision to adjourn Parliament and go to London marked a turning point. Taken upon the advice of his Cabinet and against his own judgment that he should remain in Canada and fight reciprocity to a

³⁵March 14, 22, 25, 1911.

³⁶*Toronto Star*, Feb. 27; *Saint John Telegraph-Sun*, Feb. 24, 1911.

³⁷*Toronto Star*, Feb. 10, 27, 1911.

³⁸*Toronto News*, May 4, 18, 26; *Montreal Gazette*, April 19, 27, 29, May 3, 5, 6; *Edmonton Bulletin*, May 2; *Victoria Daily Colonist*, May 11, 1911.

conclusion, whether before Parliament or country,³⁹ the recess finally overcame the last vestiges of Liberal advantage so evident in January—surprise, prospective economic benefit, and entrenched power. The uncertain opposition, so hesitant in January, had been strengthened from powerful quarters, had profited by delay in the United States, and, after the recess took the offensive in Parliament and country to the point where it could enforce its demands for a popular verdict with the odds heavily in its favour.

His departure for London gave the Premier no respite from attack. The hostile press saw in adjournment evidence that the Prime Minister did not trust Fielding to manage debate on his own measure, and a quarrel between the two was intimated. Laurier's choice of an autonomist policy at the Imperial Conference allowed Conservative and Protestant to charge that he was trying to destroy the Empire at the behest of Quebec separatism.⁴⁰ Meantime Borden, on a western tour, was facing the Grain Growers, who pressed him hard on reciprocity, and were satisfied neither with his stout refusal to co-operate in this direction nor his equally stout promises along other lines.⁴¹ The tour, however, gave him a chance to preach the national and imperial aspects of reciprocity and to de-emphasize its economic side. Though it made him little political capital, it showed the West and, more important, the East, what to expect from him, and gave him good experience in trying out his arguments before a hostile audience.

When Parliament reassembled on July 18, the Conservative strategy of obstruction was given full play until suddenly, on July 29, the Government stilled the repetition of old arguments by announcing an immediate dissolution with an election on September 21. The key to the bitter fight which followed is to be found in the Liberals' vain efforts to push reciprocity to the fore and in their opponents' more successful efforts (aided by left-handed allies in the French Nationalists), to drown it in a clamour of national and imperial interests allegedly more important. Both parties used the Eastern Provinces as sounding-boards for the leaders' oratory, leaving local campaigns in the hands of lieutenants. Laurier at first asserted valiantly that reciprocity was the sole issue, but ere long he abandoned this contention and introduced other matters into his addresses, particularly trying to lay the annexation spectre and to expose the "Unholy Alliance" between Borden and the French Nationalists. Toward the close of his tour he pointedly noted that the agreement treated the manufacturers kindly, and stressed again its great advantages to the farmer. Despite his stout front, he was obviously on the defensive, and privately began to have his doubts about the result as early as three weeks before the election.⁴²

³⁹This statement of Laurier's feelings about the Coronation trip was made to the writer by two members of his Government, George P. Graham and W. L. Mackenzie King.

⁴⁰*Victoria Colonist*, May 5; *Montreal Gazette*, May 10, 11, 13; *Toronto News*, June 3, 8, 9, 10, 19; *Toronto Saturday Night*, June 17; *Sentinel*, June 15, July 27, 1911.

⁴¹The *Grain growers' guide* and the *Winnipeg Free Press* for June and July tell the story of Borden's travels.

⁴²This brief summary of the Laurier campaign is based upon careful reading of his speeches as reported in the *Toronto Globe* and the account in *Canadian annual review*, 1911, 161-9. His misgivings about the ultimate result were based, he later told Arthur Hawkes, on the reports of his private barometer, commercial travellers (*Winnipeg Free Press*, Sept. 21, 1929).

Borden spent over a third of his speaking time in the superlatively important Ontario. Like Laurier, he devoted considerable attention to the agreement's economic aspects, but generally connected these with its national consequences in an effort to show that reciprocity would endanger Canadian commercial, fiscal, or political independence. Using the unfortunate parting-of-the-ways remark in almost every speech, Borden made Taft his lay-figure, to be stood up and knocked down for the benefit of Canadian audiences. These, along with a plea to preserve the Empire, some attention to alleged Liberal extravagance and corruption, and the necessary promises of the out-of-office, comprised the burden of his argument.⁴³ Next to the two leaders the most important speaker on either side was Clifford Sifton, whose trenchant criticisms of the agreement in many eastern industrial centres added to the influence he had already wielded as adviser to the opposition forces.⁴⁴

The position of the Quebec Nationalists, led by Henri Bourassa and the fiery *Le Devoir*, was a matter of moment to both sides. Bourassa at first favoured the Laurier reciprocity.⁴⁵ The looming of a Dominion election complicated the Nationalist position. Quebec Conservatism, led by F. D. Monk, opposed Laurier and his reciprocity. Quebec Nationalism opposed Laurier's navy but not his reciprocity. To prevent this situation from creating three-cornered provincial contests which might result in the victory of Laurier men, a Monk-Bourassa arrangement produced Conservative candidates generally acceptable to the Nationalists.⁴⁶

This working agreement gave the Liberals an opportunity to assert that Borden himself was allied with Bourassa, an accusation which he never formally denied. Solution of this problem lies beyond the scope of the present study; the possibility of the alliance alarmed much of the Liberal press to the point of hysteria and caused the Premier to spend over half of his campaigning time in Quebec; it injected the race and naval questions into the Quebec battle to such an extent that reciprocity became distinctly a minor issue there; it gave the Liberals a chance to assert that the Ontario Conservatives were financing the Quebec Nationalists and that while Borden was mouthing protestations of loyalty to the Empire in Ontario his Quebec allies were, in the *Toronto Globe's* words, "doing their treasonable utmost to inflame the minds of the French-Canadians against that very Imperial idea which Mr. Borden extols."⁴⁷

The reader of the Canadian press is struck by the bewildering reiteration of old arguments and the paucity of new approaches to what was now definitely a political problem. One is almost tempted to agree with *The Sentinel's* (Toronto) editorial writer who greeted election day with this effusion:

A careful reading of the party papers leads to the conclusion that Mr. Borden will be returned to power with a majority of thirty for Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Nationalists holding the balance of power. This, of course, involves the defeat of the reciprocity pact, which will

⁴³*Canadian annual review*, 1911, 169-79, covers his tour.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 196-9.

⁴⁵He edited a series of articles from *Le Devoir* under dates Jan. 31-Feb. 7, 1911, under the title *The reciprocity agreement and its consequences from the Nationalist standpoint* (Montreal, 1911).

⁴⁶Henri Bourassa, *The story of the Nationalist-Conservative alliance told by Henri Bourassa, the Nationalist leader* (Ottawa, 1914), 2-6.

⁴⁷Aug. 19, 1911.

be put into effect as soon as Parliament meets, the United States already having adopted it.

This paradoxical situation will make Canada an ideal place to live, as the producer will get higher prices than before, while the consumer will get his goods for less money. Seeing that almost everybody in Canada is a producer of something, and seeing, too, that they are all consumers, it follows that everything a man has to sell will be higher and everything he has to buy will be cheaper.

The national song will be "Yankee Doodle's Maple Leaf," to be sung as a solo by your Uncle Samuel and Brittania [*sic*], who rules the waves.

Reiterated argument and phrase were dressed out in a tremendous variety of typographical pyrotechnics. Red ink, streamer headlines, cartoons, pictures of prominent deserters from each party on the reciprocity question, were all shaded by the Union Jack on front pages whence world news and the economic phases of reciprocity were pushed far into the background.

Liberal journals again had to devote much time to refutation; the principal positive arguments being their offer of the larger market to the producing classes, and the alleged Borden-Bourassa alliance.⁴⁸ When, toward the end of the campaign, it became evident that the single appeal to the farmer would not win the day, attention was turned to reassuring industry and labour. At the last minute a prominent United States argument that reciprocity would lower food costs to labour was pressed into service. Finally, it was urged that the agreement should have a trial before it was condemned—an argument seized upon by the opposition as a counsel of despair. The last few days found the Liberal press striving valiantly to keep to the main issue, but being forced more and more into channels fashioned by the other side.

Conservative press strategy, as earlier, was to obscure the reciprocity issue by appeal to indirect and largely irrelevant matters, many imported from the United States for the occasion. Imperial loyalty, Liberal scandals, and annexation, the manna called down from Heaven by Champ Clark, the Missouri Moses, were much to the fore. The producer, as in the United States, was warned of dire disaster to follow in reciprocity's wake. The Canadian worker was proffered American hard times—duty free; at the same time charges were bandied that American money was pouring in to influence the Canadian issue. In the last days the worker was told that his job was not safe, as alleged by the Liberals, but in grave jeopardy unless reciprocity were defeated. Another American import was publicized: William Randolph Hearst, who in May and June had turned all the pressure of his powerful influence behind Taft in the United States, was charged with insinuating himself into the Canadian election. September 18, too late for successful contradiction, widely scattered journals announced a Taft-Hearst scheme to deliver Canada to the United States.⁴⁹

⁴⁸This survey of press opinion is based upon reading of four files from Ontario, three from Quebec, and two each from Manitoba, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia. The Ottawa libraries had available but one file each (all pro-reciprocity) from Alberta, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick. Space considerations preclude specific citations.

⁴⁹"Was it for this," asked the *Toronto News*, "that the illustrious heroes of our British history fought their age-long battles, and freely gave their lives? Was the soil of England empurpled by a hundred wars to vouchsafe to succeeding generations

Thus Conservative initiative led Liberals off the point of reciprocity despite valiant efforts, dissipated their energies, and forced them to reply in kind to Conservative appeals to race and to emotion. The result was a campaign which in intensity and picturesqueness has had few rivals in North America.

The end result of the forces surveyed above was recorded in the astonishing overturn of September 21. The first opportunity for this overturn came when the matter was opened to political discussion. This gave, on both sides of the border, a chance for protected interests to influence political events for private ends. In Canada, United States delay, Liberal unwillingness to force the issue to a vote, American indiscretions, and the passage of time conspired to raise opposition hopes and depress defenders' chances. The contest found one party on the way up and the other on the way down, and accelerated a change in the nature of things inevitable, but made more quickly possible when the 1911 campaign on the reciprocity issue alienated important interests which in 1908 had supported the Prime Minister. Having forced matters to an election, opposition chances improved rapidly, since the political arena was large enough to introduce extraneous issues more likely to appeal to patriotism or to fear; thus an economic programme of some intrinsic merit became the football of a political campaign in which the opposition won by an essentially simple tactic—of saying "No" to reciprocity and "Yes" to the British connection. Out of the whole episode Canada approached nationhood, under the British flag, and launched upon a period of high protection. This last result was the end sought by those whose agents filled the Dominion from ocean to ocean with propaganda.

Farmer, loyalty, imperialism, all meant one thing to the groups which used all these pleas to avert a danger which knows no national boundaries—the danger to a self-interest well-developed and long-entrenched. Any analysis of the reciprocity episode which stops with the explanation that the American farmer opposed reciprocity, and that it was defeated in Canada because of the annexation-loyalty cries, misses the fundamental factor involved; the farmer may have been opposed, and the average Canadian may have feared the United States, but this opposition and these fears were assiduously cultivated, if not implanted, by interests motivated by a common fear of the consequences of lower tariffs.⁵⁰

DISCUSSION

Mr. Creighton suggested that the propaganda of vested interests was not entirely responsible for the rejection of reciprocity. Canada had, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, achieved a measure of economic integration which was new in her history. This integration was based upon the large-scale production of wheat in Western Canada and its

the right of the subject to the untrammelled ballot, only to have this priceless heritage torn from our grasp by the greedy magnates and the designing demagogues of the United States?"

⁵⁰Manuscript of author's *Reciprocity, 1911: A study in Canadian-American relations*, now in press.

export, via the east-west transport system, to Great Britain. Successful Canadian economic nationalism was thus linked with Empire trade; and this helps to explain the association of nationalist and imperialist cries in the reciprocity campaign.

Mr. Landon recalled some of his impressions as a parliamentary correspondent in the last years of the Laurier ministry. It appeared clear at that time that, while the Liberals were declining in vigorous leadership and party spirit, the Conservatives were gaining energetic adherents and acquiring a large measure of confidence. Mr. Landon thought that these personal and party elements should not be forgotten in any analysis of the defeat of 1911.

Mr. Kyte recalled the attitude of the British press and people to the reciprocity campaign. Reciprocity had been at first regarded in Great Britain as a purely domestic Canadian issue; and the country was surprised and gratified at the amount of imperial sentiment which was revealed in Canada during the campaign.

Mr. Innis suggested that any relationship between Canada and the United States, into which dangerous political implications could be read, was certain of an unfavourable reception in the Dominion; and he cited the C.I.O. controversy as another illustration of the forces at work in the reciprocity campaign. He thought that the position of Canadian lumber and the changing commercial strategy of Canadian lumbermen were partly responsible for the reversal of opinion in respect of reciprocity.

Miss Foster emphasized again the importance of the east-west transport system in determining the attitude of Canadians to the reciprocity agreement. She pointed out that a number of the confidential letters on the subject of reciprocity, which were sent by the Liberal M.P.'s to Mr. Fielding during the summer of 1910, had stressed the necessity of protecting the interests of the Canadian transcontinental railway system. She suggested also that the memorials presented by the farmers to Sir Wilfrid Laurier during his western tour in 1910 did not appear to indicate that reciprocity was the all-important issue for the West. In reality, the farmers appeared more interested in various extensions of public ownership; but Sir Wilfrid, opposed in principle to public ownership, probably hoped that reciprocity alone would be sufficient to conciliate them.

SIR FRANCIS HINCKS, FINANCE MINISTER OF CANADA
1869-73

By R. S. LONGLEY
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On June 30, 1864, three Reformers, George Brown, Oliver Mowat, and William McDougall, ended a deadlock in the Canadian Assembly and inaugurated a period of political co-operation by uniting with the Conservatives to form a coalition Ministry. During the next two years Mowat and Brown withdrew from the Government, but their places were taken by Reformers. The co-operation between the two parties, which was extended to the Maritime Provinces, made possible the federal union known as the Dominion of Canada.

With the wish, rather than the conviction, that former party issues were dead, the first Prime Minister of the Dominion, Sir John Macdonald, formed his Government on the "old coalition principle."¹ By an agreement among the political leaders five of the thirteen Ministers were chosen from Ontario; three of these, William McDougall, W. P. Howland, and A. J. Fergusson Blair, were Liberals.

The elections of 1867 proving favourable to the Government, Macdonald's personal followers took advantage of Fergusson Blair's death in December, 1867, to request that his successor be appointed from the Conservatives. Faced with this demand and yet unwilling to offend the Reformers, the Prime Minister offered to make Howland Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, with the understanding that in the future there should be three rather than two Conservative Ministers from the province. The name of Alexander Morris was suggested as agreeable to both parties; Howland was to be succeeded by a Liberal, Senator James C. Aikins.

On McDougall's advice Aikins refused to accept office under the proposed terms.² The following year, however, when the Minister of Public Works had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Territories, he asked Aikins to join the Cabinet; Aikins agreed to do so if an influential Reformer could be found to succeed McDougall.³ At first this seemed an impossible task for no Liberal with any following would risk the wrath of George Brown and his *Toronto Globe* by supporting the Government. A fortunate circumstance, however, gave Macdonald his man.

At the close of the parliamentary session of 1869 the Minister of Finance, John Rose, informed the Prime Minister that it was his intention soon to retire from Canadian public life to accept a business position in England. Almost coincident with this announcement, Macdonald learned that a former Canadian statesman, Sir Francis Hincks, was on his way to his former home for a brief visit. The Prime Minister saw in Hincks a possible solution for his problem. Sir Francis must be persuaded to succeed John Rose as Minister of Finance and to assume the leadership of the coalition Liberals of Ontario. Thus it was that soon after Hincks landed at Montreal Macdonald arrived to seek his advice.

¹Sir Joseph Pope, *Memoirs of Sir John Macdonald* (Toronto, 1930), 306-7, Macdonald to Tupper, May 30, 1867.

²*Parliamentary debates*, 1870, 67-9, Aikins to McDougall, July 24, Nov. 3, 1868; McDougall to Macdonald, Nov. 19, 1868.

³Statement of J. C. Aikins in the Canadian Senate, Feb., 1870.

After having served for a number of years as Inspector-General and Prime Minister of the province of Canada, Hincks had left British North America in 1855 to become Governor of Barbados and the Windward Islands. Seven years later he was promoted to the governorship of British Guiana, a position he filled with ability until January, 1869. Unfortunately for his future preferment, his residence at Georgetown was disturbed by a long and acrimonious quarrel with the Chief Justice, William Beaumont, over the relations between the Executive and Judiciary which quite exhausted the patience of the Colonial Office.⁴ At the close of his term of office, Lord Granville commended him for his indefatigable activity in advancing the social and economic welfare of the colony and informed him that Her Majesty had been pleased to honour him with a knighthood.⁵ But, being relieved of the Hincks-Beaumont controversy, neither Granville nor his assistant was anxious to find Sir Francis a speedy appointment.⁶ It was rumoured that he might be sent to the East as Comptroller of India or as Governor of Cape Colony or Mauritius, but no definite offer was made. In the interim he resolved to visit Canada. He was therefore in a position to listen to Sir John Macdonald's proposal with an open mind.

After learning something of Ontario politics Hincks accompanied the Prime Minister to Ottawa. Here Macdonald introduced his guest to Parliament Hill by means of a public meeting. In responding to an address of welcome Sir Francis traced the history of coalition Governments both in Great Britain and Canada, and reached the conclusion that they had been the result of a political deadlock or a national crisis. He justified his support of the Morin-MacNab Administration in 1854 as necessary to preserve the stability of Canadian institutions. Without the union of the Liberals and Conservatives in 1864 there could have been no Dominion of Canada. George Brown, Alexander Mackenzie, and other opponents of the Government, were seeking to destroy political co-operation, but as long as there was national danger from Fenians and Annexationists, the coalition should be maintained. The content of this speech was published in pamphlet form and sent to the leading Liberals of Ontario.

From Ottawa Hincks made a tour of the province, stopping at Toronto, Woodstock, London, Ingersoll, and other towns for conferences with political and financial leaders. His interviews with McDougall, Howland, and Aikins proving satisfactory, he returned to the Dominion capital to inform Macdonald he would enter the Cabinet as a coalition Liberal.⁷ Since the two preceding Ministers of Finance had represented Quebec, Hincks offered to take one of the lesser portfolios if Sir Alexander Galt would resume charge of the Treasury. When Galt refused to serve again under Macdonald, the way was open for Sir Francis to become Minister of Finance. He assumed office on October 9, 1869.

Sir Francis Hincks returned to Canadian public life under unfavourable circumstances. An ardent imperialist and leader of pre-Confederation Canada, he found it difficult to understand the political aspirations and sectional jealousies of the new Dominion. As a coalition Liberal he pleased neither his opponents nor his colleagues. The *Globe* was "perfectly frantic"

⁴*Public Record Office, C.O., 111 and 112.*

⁵*Ibid., C.O. 112, vol. 40, Granville to Hincks, Jan. 1, 1869.*

⁶*Ibid., C.O. 111, vol. 367, note.*

⁷The *Toronto Globe*, Aug. 12 to 30, describes Hincks's peregrinations through Ontario.

that the Prime Minister had been able to patch up a superficial and dying coalition by means of a "resuscitated mummy" who had been awakened from a tropical sleep of fifteen years to oppose the wishes of the people.⁸ The Conservative Belleville *Intelligencer*, inspired by discontented Conservatives such as Richard Cartwright, called the appointment a fatal political blunder since it informed Macdonald's followers that they were not capable of filling the office.⁹ Cartwright, encouraged by Galt, wrote the Prime Minister that if his decision had not been "absolutely and irrevocably made," he should give it more serious consideration.¹⁰ When his advice was not followed, Cartwright announced that he could have no confidence in any Ministry of which Sir Francis Hincks was a member.¹¹ At the next session of Parliament he joined Galt as a member of the opposition.¹²

Macdonald's first task was to find his new Minister a seat in the House of Commons. No Liberal would retire in his favour, but the Conservative member for North Renfrew, Rankin, was finally persuaded to resign after an interview with the Prime Minister and a pledge of future preferment. The Conservatives, at Macdonald's urgent request, supported Hincks, but the Liberals, urged to action by the *Globe*, nominated James Findley to contest the seat. Brown reminded the electors that Sir Francis had introduced jobbery and corruption into Canadian politics by his manipulation of Grand Trunk stock twenty years before, and prophesied that if he won the election there would be further scandals following which the Minister of Finance would depart for India or Cape Colony with a full purse.¹³ Many of the journals throughout Canada re-echoed these sentiments, the Montreal *Witness* going so far as to say that there was as much chance of Hincks administering the finances of the Dominion as there was that Santa Anna would be restored to power in Mexico. So bitter did the opposition become that Sir Francis considered finding himself a seat in the Senate.¹⁴ He finally won the election by a majority of forty-nine.¹⁵

During his first meetings with the Cabinet Hincks found his colleagues almost as unfriendly as his enemies. Many of them resented Macdonald's decision to place a man of sixty-two who was unacquainted with Dominion politics in the most important office of the Government. Quebec and Montreal wished the appointment to go to Cartier or Galt. The Maritime members considered Sir Francis an apostle of imperialism and colonial inferiority who would sell the North Atlantic fisheries for a "mess of pottage." Mitchell even went so far as to ask Rankin not to resign his seat. Even Tilley and Tupper would have preferred another man as Minister of Finance had not the political situation in Ontario been so serious. The imperialism of the ex-Governor especially annoyed Macdonald's unwilling colleague, Joseph Howe, who had recently lost his struggle to take Nova Scotia out of the union. The long smouldering antagonism between the two Ministers came to an open quarrel when during a lecture at the Y.M.C.A. in Ottawa on February 27, 1872, Howe

⁸Toronto *Globe*, Sept. 21 and 30, Oct. 16 and 28, 1869.

⁹Quoted in the Toronto *Globe*, Sept. 23, 1869.

¹⁰Public Archives of Canada, *Macdonald letter-books*, Cartwright to Macdonald, Sept. 23, 1869.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1869.

¹²Pope, *Memoirs*, 428.

¹³Toronto *Globe*, Sept. 30, 1869.

¹⁴*Macdonald letter-books* (Hincks), Hincks to Macdonald, Nov. 8, 1869.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Hincks, 489, Findley, 440.

made a violent attack upon the British Government for withdrawing her troops from Canada and otherwise neglecting Canadian interests.¹⁶ After reading this speech Hincks threatened to resign from the Government. Later he asked Macdonald to disavow the political contents of the speech and to suppress its publication.¹⁷ Since the Prime Minister wished to avoid all further trouble with Nova Scotia, he separated his two "old men" by sending Howe to Halifax as Lieutenant-Governor. By this time the financial ability of Sir Francis had made him more acceptable to his colleagues and to the country.

II

Although his return to Canada was a political failure, Sir Francis Hincks was as suggestive and brilliant in financial matters as he had been in the days of Sir Charles Bagot and Lord Elgin.¹⁸ Macdonald declared that in most respects Sir Francis was a man of ordinary ability, but in finance he had an aptitude which amounted almost to genius.¹⁹ Goldwin Smith, who opposed him politically, called him Canada's greatest economist and financier.²⁰ Two former Ministers of Finance, Holton and Galt, listened to him with respect, and even Cartwright gave him the credit of being the only man in the Government who understood the financial business of the country.²¹

As the Minister in charge of the Canadian Exchequer from 1869 to 1873, Hincks played a part in three important affairs: the establishment of a Dominion system of banking and currency, the background of the Canadian claims at the Conference in Washington, and the preliminary negotiation for the construction of a railway to the Pacific. His relations with the first two were a credit to himself and of financial value to the Dominion; the third was not so fortunate and led to his retirement from public life.

Prior to 1867 each province of British North America had charge of its own currency and banking. In the Maritime Provinces, where the capital investment was usually less than \$100,000, the banks were permitted to issue notes equal in amount to from two to three times their capital.²² The Canadian banks, usually with larger assets, were limited to an issue equal in amount to their capital plus the specie and provincial securities held.²³ Under the authority of the Bank Act of 1866 the Canadian Government was able to issue provincial notes to the amount of \$8,000,000, provided the first \$5,000,000 was secured by a reserve of 20 per cent, and the remaining \$3,000,000 by 25 per cent. The chartered banks were still permitted to issue their own notes, but every encouragement was given

¹⁶Pope, *Memoirs*, appendix xxiv.

¹⁷Macdonald letter-books, Hincks to Macdonald, March 2, 1872.

¹⁸Pope, *Memoirs*, 512, Macdonald to Rose, Jan. 19, 1872.

¹⁹*Memoirs*, 148.

²⁰Goldwin Smith, *Reminiscences* (New York, 1911), 437.

²¹Sir Richard Cartwright, *Reminiscences* (Toronto, 1912), 69, 106.

²²Nova Scotia permitted a note issue equal in amount to three times the capital of the banks, but the Government had control of all currency in denominations below £5. In New Brunswick the banks were permitted to issue notes equal in amount to twice their capital.

²³Some of the banks of Ontario and Quebec particularly the Bank of Montreal and the Bank of British North America had considerable capital. The Bank of British North America held an imperial charter.

them to secure the provincial currency.²⁴ The Bank of Montreal, under the aggressive leadership of E. H. King, had an agreement with the Government whereby the bank received a commission of one per cent for the issue and redemption of provincial notes and a sum of at least \$400,000 was kept on deposit without interest. With securities of more than \$2,000,000 in its vaults the bank was in a position to secure Government notes. As most of the small banks were unable to do so, the Bank of Montreal was considered the financial dictator of the Dominion, especially in Ontario, where since 1862 King had withdrawn credit to invest funds in stock and bonds.

In 1867 currency and banking came under the control of the federal Government. During the first session of the Dominion Parliament the desirability of having an assimilated currency and a national Bank Act were considered but no definite action was taken. The Senate Committee on Banking favoured leaving the note issue to the banks, but added that if a controlled currency seemed necessary in the interests of the national revenue, Government notes might be issued in exchange for Dominion securities.²⁵ In 1868 the Canadian currency then in circulation was made legal tender throughout the Dominion under the conditions provided by the Act of 1866. The Bank of Montreal retained its agreement for the issue and redemption of Dominion notes.

Hincks's immediate predecessor, John Rose, asked the House of Commons to appoint a Committee on Currency and Banking with himself as chairman. The Committee sent out a series of questions to bankers and boards of trade in an endeavour to discover the financial needs of the Dominion. Of the nineteen individuals and three boards of trade who replied, almost all declared against any form of controlled currency. In the face of such declarations of public opinion and in spite of protests from more than seventy banks and boards of trade, Rose asked the House to pass a series of resolutions which would require all banks to recall their own notes at the rate of 20 per cent annually, beginning in July, 1871, and to replace them with Dominion currency.²⁶ The resolutions met with strong opposition, especially from the members representing Ontario and the Maritime Provinces.²⁷ Finally, Rose withdrew the resolutions and contented himself with extending the charters of twelve banks until the end of the session of 1870. He then retired from office and left the banking question as a legacy for his successor.

Bankers and commercial interests from all parts of the Dominion awaited with anxiety to hear a pronouncement of policy from the new Minister. Sir Francis Hincks was known to have favoured a bank of issue in 1841 and it was assumed that he had not changed his views since that time. The Conservative Toronto *Leader* sought to allay uneasiness in Ontario by affirming that Hincks would legislate fairly for all parts of Canada. The *Globe* ridiculed such an idea. "Pitch over poor Rose, worry King, cast derision on all of their supporters who stuck to them last session? Out with such base insinuation. John A. might lend himself to such a trick, but Cartier never."²⁸

²⁴Chiefly by remitting the tax of one per cent on the currency.

²⁵*Journal of the Senate of Canada*, appendix I, 1867-8.

²⁶*Journal of the House of Commons*, appendix I, 1867-8.

²⁷*Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association*, II, 350 ff.

²⁸Toronto *Globe*, Sept. 21, 1869.

Brown's suspicions seemed confirmed when Hincks visited Montreal for a conference with Rose and King. Rose went over the national accounts with his successor and considered him fully competent to administer Dominion finances provided he avoided innovations.²⁹ Some of the Tories of Montreal registered their disapproval of Sir Francis, but Rose got the *Daily News* and the *Gazette* to support him and King invited him to dine. Soon the chief objectors were silenced.

Fearing to be too friendly with the bankers of Lower Canada, Hincks declined to attend Rose's farewell banquet, making the excuse that he had been called to New York on private business.³⁰ The *Globe* discovered that King was also in New York and at once informed its readers that if Sir Francis became Minister of Finance, he and King would have "What the Yankees call a *good time* together."³¹

Before he assumed office Hincks wrote the Prime Minister that he could modify Rose's resolutions sufficiently to satisfy the bankers of Toronto.³² Macdonald gladly informed his followers of this fact. "Hincks has always been and is now quite unconnected with any Montreal interests. I feel confident the result of his action on this question will be to secure the support of the western banking institutions, and indeed the eastern ones as well, who object to the enormous power of the Montreal Bank."³³ The speech from the Throne confirmed the Prime Minister's statement by promising to secure the safety of the community without interfering with the legitimate operations of the banks.³⁴

On March 1, 1870, the Minister of Finance revealed his bank policy to an expectant House. He stated quite frankly that he favoured a bank of issue whereby the profits obtained from a Dominion currency should accrue to the Government, but that he had determined to follow public opinion. The Bank Act of 1870 required every chartered bank to have a capital of at least \$500,000 of which 20 per cent was to be fully paid up.³⁵ All banks must hold from one-third to one-half of their reserve in Dominion securities, the note issue being restricted to an amount equal to the capital plus the specie and securities held. All issue of notes in denominations less than four dollars was reserved to the Government. Stockholders were limited to one vote for each share held, and were called upon to resume double liability. Directors must hold not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent of the stock; certified lists of stockholders were to be available for the inspection of the Minister of Finance.³⁶

The Bank Act was received with general favour throughout the country. The following year its provisions were consolidated and extended into a general Banking Act.³⁷ In 1870 the Government was authorized to increase its note issue from \$8,000,000 to \$9,000,000 provided there was a reserve of at least \$2,000,000; all issue over \$9,000,000 was to be entirely covered by gold. Two years later Parliament permitted an un-

²⁹*Macdonald letter-books*, Rose to Macdonald, Sept. 24, 1869.

³⁰*Ibid.*, Hincks to Macdonald, Sept. 20, 1869.

³¹*Toronto Globe*, Sept. 30, 1869.

³²*Macdonald letter-books*, Hincks to Macdonald, Sept. 20, 1869.

³³*Ibid.*, Macdonald to Cartwright, Nov. 17, 1869.

³⁴*Canada, House of Commons debates*, 1870, 27.

³⁵Hincks first asked that the minimum capital be fixed at \$1,000,000. Strong interests were at work in Ottawa to secure a Bank Act more favourable to the smaller institutions and Hincks finally yielded.

³⁶33 Vict., c. 3, May 12, 1870.

³⁷34 Vict., c. 10, 1871.

limited issue of Government notes provided there was a reserve of at least 35 per cent for all in excess of \$9,000,000. The *Globe* denounced this extension of power as the natural fruition of the Act of 1870, which had been in reality a concealed attempt to control the currency of the Dominion. There were then over \$11,000,000 of Canadian notes in circulation, which Brown called a monopoly.³⁸ Hincks admitted that his policy constituted a limited inflation, but denied the monopoly. He was quite willing, however, to educate the people in that direction.

The Bank Acts of 1870 and 1871 provided the Dominion of Canada with the "most elaborate and detailed Banking system in the British Empire."³⁹ By it the nation committed itself to a system of branch banking and asset-secured bank notes which stood the strain of prosperity and adversity for more than sixty years. While introducing no great changes in the existing methods of banking, Hincks took what was acceptable to the people and made it safe. In recent times his dream of a Bank of Canada has been realized.

After assimilating the paper currency of the Dominion, Hincks turned his attention to the specie. When he assumed office the country was flooded with depreciated United States silver. By an Act of the American Congress in 1853, United States silver, which had been previously selling at a small premium, was devaluated by 7 per cent. On the suspension of specie payments during the Civil War a large supply of the depreciated silver coins flowed into the provinces of British America. Early in 1870 Hincks issued a circular announcing that in the future these coins would be legal tender in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec only to the amount of ten dollars and at a discount of 20 per cent. Later, with the assistance of the banks and boards of trade, he purchased and exported \$3,000,000 worth of the depreciated coins.⁴⁰ During the next three years he ordered Canadian coins to the value of \$1,100,000 from the British mint.⁴¹ While these were being prepared he placed in circulation an additional number of fifty and twenty-five cent scripts.

As a part of his financial policy Hincks cancelled the special agreement between the Government and the Bank of Montreal. Rose was much disturbed by this news and wrote from London to warn the Prime Minister against allowing his Liberal Minister of Finance to upset the financial stability of the country for personal or political reasons.⁴² Macdonald declined to interfere with a Minister who was obviously making a success of his department and Rose was soon compelled to admit that giving all the banks an opportunity to compete for Government business had not destroyed national prosperity.

Sir Francis Hincks was fortunate in holding office during that period

³⁸Toronto *Globe*, April 29, 1872. By the Currency Act all issue of Dominion notes up to \$9,000,000 required a reserve of \$1,800,000 in gold and \$720,000 in Government securities. All issue over \$9,000,000 was to be entirely covered by gold.

³⁹B. H. Beckhart, *The banking system of Canada* (New York, 1929), 301.

⁴⁰*Public Record Office, C.O. 42*, vol. 684, 1870. These coins were being purchased by employers at a discount and paid to employees at par. Hincks offered the banks a commission of 5 per cent for the first million dollars worth of coins they collected for export and 5½ per cent for the remaining two million.

⁴¹During 1870 and 1871 the Minister of Finance ordered from the British mint 500,000 half dollars, 1,300,000 quarter dollars, 2,400,000 ten cent pieces, and 1,050,000 five cent pieces.

⁴²*Macdonald letter-books*, Rose to Macdonald, Jan. 6, 1870.

of economic prosperity which preceded the depression of 1873. From 1867 to 1872 Canada rose from eleventh to eighth place in the competitive markets of Great Britain, while her total trade increased from \$129,000,000 to \$146,000,000. The first year after the union the national income was only \$15,000,000; five years later it had grown to \$19,000,000. As the expenditures for 1872 were hardly in excess of \$17,000,000, the Treasury was able to report a substantial surplus. By 1873 the national debt amounted to \$80,000,000 or \$20 per head of population. This was an increase of less than \$2,000,000 since the union. The increase was due to the construction of public works on which an additional \$6,000,000 had been spent from current account.⁴³ Hincks was not the creator of the prosperity, but his ingenuity and efficiency in making economies in administration, in increasing the national income, and in procuring funds for public works, were largely responsible for a balanced budget and an annual surplus.

The Finance Minister obtained most of his income from customs and excise, the issue of Dominion currency, and from saving banks and insurance companies. In his budget of 1870 he asked Parliament to place a duty on wheat, flour, coal, hops, animals, fruits, and roots, which had been on the free list. He wished this change partly because he expected to add \$200,000 to the budget, and partly to persuade the United States to consider a new reciprocal trade agreement. He denied that his tariff was in any sense retaliatory, but he repeated the words of his predecessor in the House of Commons the previous year that sooner or later Canada would be compelled to adopt a "national policy." The duties found the majority of the members in the Commons unprepared for a protective tariff. The following year the new duties were repealed in spite of the fact that the Prime Minister was then in Washington as a member of the Joint High Commission seeking to exchange the North Atlantic fisheries for a reciprocity treaty.⁴⁴

By asserting Canada's independence from the control of the British Lords of the Treasury Hincks added nearly £60,000 to the Dominion income. Some years previously the British Government had agreed to guarantee a loan of £3,000,000 for the construction of an intercolonial railway. Two million pounds of the loan had been completed and was on deposit with the Canadian agents in London where it drew only nominal interest. Since it was impossible for the Canadian Government to expend the entire sum in one year, Rose used £1,500,000 of the fund to redeem certain outstanding debts and securities on which there was an interest charge of from 5 to 6 per cent.⁴⁵ The Lords of the Treasury at once informed the Colonial Office that no further sums would be given to the Dominion until the "whole amount already paid had been spent in the construction of the railway or placed in good securities ready for such

⁴³*Canada, House of Commons debates*, 1871 and 1872, March 10, 1871, April 30, 1872.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 1871, 598.

⁴⁵The £1,500,000 was used as follows:—

Extinction of the debt on the military canals.....	\$ 681,333
Repayments to Canadian agents in London.....	\$ 983,562
Payment due Bank of Montreal.....	\$2,500,000
Payment due the province of Ontario.....	\$ 500,000
Redemption of colonial debentures.....	\$ 873,098

expenditure.”⁴⁶ Lord Granville called this statement “strong meat for Canadian consumption,” but Hincks argued that the regulations of the Treasury were unreasonable. The Canadian Government held itself responsible for the redemption of the loan and ought to be permitted to use the funds to the best possible advantage. He therefore informed the House of Commons that no change would be made in Rose’s policy. Granville wired to know the meaning of the implied disobedience, but the Minister of Finance remained firm and was finally given his own way.⁴⁷ When the negotiations for a loan of £300,000 with which to purchase the territories of the Hudson’s Bay Company were undertaken, the Lords of the Treasury wished to place the money under the control of four trustees.⁴⁸ Since Granville would not assent to the plan it was soon dropped.⁴⁹ When the purchase was completed in 1870 Hincks instructed Rose to pay the £300,000 from the Intercolonial fund, with the understanding that it would be repaid from an additional loan. When the remaining £1,000,000 of the Intercolonial loan was negotiated, Hincks insisted that it be undertaken by the Canadian agents in London rather than by the Bank of England. He further shocked the orthodox British Treasury by requesting that Canadian funds waiting for investment should be used for the purchase of Dominion securities. By selling India Consols at 112 and purchasing Canada debentures at 97 the Finance Minister made a profit of £20,000.⁵⁰ Politically a strong supporter of closer imperial ties, Sir Francis Hincks believed that these ties could be best maintained by giving each Dominion control of its own local affairs. Such self-government had been implied when the North American provinces had been granted responsible government. His bold assertion of Canadian rights brought the Dominion nearer to fiscal autonomy.

Perhaps the most interesting of the financial accomplishments of Sir Francis Hincks was his use of the Washington Conference to obtain a guaranteed loan for the construction of a railway to the Pacific. As soon as Gladstone and Granville decided to “sweeten the Alabama question for the United States by bringing in Canada,” Hincks decided that the negotiations would be a game of “hag,” and that by “hagging high” Canada must win adequate compensation for her fisheries. Assuming that the United States would not reject a second effort to settle the *Alabama* claims, and that Great Britain was equally anxious to settle, he believed that Britain would compensate the Dominion for any losses she might sustain. The compensation Canada needed was a three and one-half per cent guaranteed loan for the construction of a railway to the Pacific, and necessary repairs to the canals. He asked Sir John Macdonald, as Canada’s representative at the Conference to obtain a loan of not less than \$5,000,000. If the United States should be willing to grant reciprocity on anything like the

⁴⁶C.O. 42, vol. 682, the Lords of the Treasury to Sir Frederick Rogers, June 23, 1869.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, Granville to Sir John Young, April 18, 1870; Young to Granville, April 21, 1870.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, the Lords of the Treasury to Sir Frederick Rogers, July 5, 1869.

⁴⁹The Colonial Office informed the Treasury on July 12 that the payment or non-payment of the £300,000 was a matter between the Dominion and the Hudson’s Bay Company, and that it was useless to place in the agreement any clause which would cause Canada to reject it.

⁵⁰C.O. 42, vol. 689, 1870, Hincks to Lisgar, Nov. 25, 1870; Lisgar to Kimberley, Nov. 28, 1870.

old terms in exchange for the fisheries, the loan might be given as a compensation for the loss of the fisheries. If the United States fishermen should be permitted to fish in Canadian waters in order to settle the *Alabama* question, the loan might be secured on condition Canada did not press the Fenian claims which were otherwise "of no real importance."⁵¹

Hincks's plan, while ingenious, was not without difficulties. The guardian of the North American fisheries, Peter Mitchell, was determined to make a success of his department at the expense of his old enemies, the American fishermen.⁵² Assisted by Howe, Tupper, and other Maritime members of the Commons, Mitchell opposed any Canadian participation in the Washington Conference.

When Granville and Kimberley first discussed the appointment of a Canadian on the Commission, Kimberley proposed Lord Lisgar. Rose considered Lisgar too Canadian in his views. Kimberley then asked Lisgar if Sir John Macdonald would serve or if Sir John Rose would sufficiently represent Canada.⁵³ Due to the opposition of the Maritime members Macdonald decided he could not accept the appointment, although he hesitated to let Canada's claims go by default.⁵⁴ But Hincks learned that Rose, who would probably represent Canada if Macdonald refused to serve, was negotiating a loan in London for the Government of the United States.⁵⁵ Hence, when Rose reached Ottawa early in February, 1871, after conducting the preliminary negotiations for the Conference at Washington, he found the Canadian Ministers suspicious of his designs and willing for Macdonald to accept the appointment.⁵⁶

Macdonald left for Washington with many misgivings. "If anything goes wrong," he wrote Rose, "I shall be made the scapegoat."⁵⁷ To Hincks, however, it was Canada's opportunity. Throughout the negotiations he moderated the demands of the Maritime members and encouraged the Prime Minister. During the Conference he kept in mind the needed loan and urged Macdonald to propose it. When the proposal was accepted he advised the Prime Minister to sign the treaty and helped to secure its adoption by the Canadian Parliament.

As early as October, 1870, Gladstone had expressed a willingness to compensate Canada for her sacrifices to British interests.⁵⁸ Later, after Hincks had suggested it to Macdonald, the British Prime Minister wrote that the time had come for smoothing over the Canadian difficulties "by some undertaking on account of the expense of the Fenian raids."⁵⁹ The British Government did not wish to press Macdonald too far lest he "break like a rusty screw-driver in their hands."⁶⁰ Hence it was agreed that, when the Canadian Parliament accepted the Washington Treaty, the British Government would guarantee a loan.

The Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, on November 23, 1871, expressed the hope that some measure might be found to enable the treaty to pass the Canadian Parliament. Hincks replied for the Council suggest-

⁵¹*Macdonald letter-books*, Hincks to Macdonald, Feb. 15, 1871.

⁵²Colonial Office note.

⁵³Kimberley to Lisgar, Feb. 1, 1871.

⁵⁴*Macdonald letter-books*, "Washington Treaty," Macdonald to Lisgar, Feb. 4, 1871.

⁵⁵*Public Record Office*, F.O. 5, volume 1298, Lisgar to Kimberley, Feb. 18 and 23, 1871.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, Rose to Granville, Feb. 9, 1871.

⁵⁷*Macdonald letter-books*, Macdonald to Rose, Feb. 22, 1871.

⁵⁸Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's imperial policy* (New York, 1927), 122.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 122-3, Gladstone to Granville, Feb. 20, 1871.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 125.

ing a guarantee for £4,000,000 for the construction of a railway to the Pacific which he estimated could cost £8,000,000.⁶¹ In reply the British Government agreed to guarantee £2,500,000 when the Washington Treaty had become effective.⁶² Later this amount was increased by £1,300,000 which was originally guaranteed for the construction of Canadian fortifications.⁶³

Hincks's last year in office was one of disappointment. In the autumn of 1871, without authority of the Canadian Government, he gave Sir Hugh Allan of Montreal the names of certain United States capitalists with whom he might co-operate in the construction of a company to build the Pacific railway. Later he tried to undo what he had done by suggesting that Allan confine his company to Canadians, and obtain funds through loans at New York. The situation became complicated when the Prime Minister, in order not to lose support in Ontario, persuaded David L. MacPherson to form an all-Canadian company. When the two Companies refused to unite, Macdonald, through the influence of Cartier, was led to pledge the support of the Government to secure Sir Hugh Allan the presidency of whatever company was finally chosen to build the railway.⁶⁴ Hincks was constantly in touch with Sir Hugh and was accused of having asked Allan for a gift as well as a position for one of his sons.⁶⁵

Due to the Prime Minister's failure to obtain reciprocal trade in natural products with the United States, to have the Fenian claims considered at the Washington Conference, and to punish Louis Riel for the murder of the Orangeman Thomas Scott, the Government faced the electors of Ontario in 1872 with pronounced misgivings. Hincks insisted upon representing one of the western constituencies, and finally won the nomination in South Brant where his opponent was a strong Liberal, William Patterson. Fearing defeat the Finance Minister asked Macdonald for aid. "The party ought to have a campaign fund," he declared. "If they don't, rely on it many counties will be lost."⁶⁶ Five days later Cartier informed Sir Hugh Allan that the friends of the Government would be expecting financial assistance in the pending elections.⁶⁷ Hincks received about \$1,000 from the fund, but it was not sufficient to give him the seat.⁶⁸

Sir Francis was greatly disappointed at his failure to retain the support of his adopted province. Macdonald quickly found him a seat in British Columbia, but Hincks resented Brown's triumphant remark that no place could be found in Ontario or Quebec for the "heaven-born Minister."⁶⁹ He became apprehensive concerning the relations of the Government to Sir Hugh Allan and finally decided to resign his portfolio in order to avoid possible political entanglements.⁷⁰ "As for myself," he wrote bitterly to the Prime Minister, "Nothing would ever tempt me again to be a candidate for the House of Commons. The people are utterly

⁶¹*C.O.* 42, vol. 705, 1872, Lisgar to Kimberley, Jan. 22, 1872.

⁶²*Ibid.*, Kimberley to Lisgar, March 18, 1872.

⁶³*Ibid.*, vol. 706, Dufferin to Kimberley, Sept. 20, 1872; Kimberley to Dufferin, Dec. 5, 1872.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, Macdonald to Cartier, July 26, 1872; Cartier to Allan, July 30, 1872.

⁶⁵Hincks denied the accusation in a letter to the *Montreal Gazette*, July 19, 1873.

⁶⁶*Macdonald letter-books*, Hincks to Macdonald, July 25, 1872.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, Cartier to Allan, July 30, 1872; Cartier to J. J. C. Abbott, Aug. 24, 1872.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, Hincks to Macdonald, Aug. 7, 1872.

⁶⁹*Toronto Globe*, Sept. 2, 1872.

⁷⁰*Macdonald letter-books*, Hincks to Macdonald, Sept. 23, 1872.

demoralized. Could I have believed three years ago what experience has taught me, nothing would have induced me to re-enter public life."⁷¹

Knowing that a new appointment would cause jealousy in the Cabinet, Macdonald urged Sir Francis to remain in office, but the Finance Minister repeated his determination not to meet the House again as a member of the Government.⁷² Early in 1873 he was ill and unable to attend to his duties. Finally, on February 10 he submitted his resignation.⁷³ He retired from active politics in January, 1874.

When his retirement was announced both friends and opponents united to pay tribute to his excellent administration of the Canadian Exchequer. History has confirmed this judgment, but his long residence outside of Canada, his rashness which increased with the years, and the bitter political antagonisms which existed in Ontario due to Macdonald's coalition, prevented Sir Francis from regaining his former position as a popular leader.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Landon inquired whether Hincks's previous railway connections were to be looked upon as the explanation of the suspicion with which he was regarded during his new term of office.

Mr. Longley agreed that the *Globe*, the old enemy of the Grand Trunk Railway, was from the first suspicious of Hincks. The past career of the Finance Minister made his connection with the Pacific Railway charter all the more open to scrutiny and suspicion. The railway affair ruined Hincks's second venture into Canadian politics and he was immediately conscious of the fact.

Mr. Lockhart asked how the appointment of Hincks as Finance Minister was to be explained.

Mr. Longley replied that Macdonald was responsible for the appointment. The other Ministers were opposed; but Macdonald decided that, in view of the difficult political situation in Ontario, this was the only means by which the coalition could be kept going.

Mr. Trotter asked whether any other person could have been considered for the office, and Mr. Longley replied that Cartwright, the future Finance Minister of the Liberal Administration, was a possibility.

Mr. Martin suggested that the animosity of the Ontario Liberals for Hincks dated back to the transition from the Hincks-Morin to the Liberal-Conservative Ministry. The Clear Grits suspected at that time that Hincks had given his approval to the Liberal-Conservative coalition; and their resentment against him survived intact down into the post-Confederation years.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1872.

⁷²*Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1872.

⁷³*Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1873.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF MACDONALD CONSERVATISM TO NATIONAL UNITY, 1854-78

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The purpose of this paper is to survey—at least in some of its aspects—the usefulness of Macdonald Conservatism to national unity, from 1854 to 1878. In party history, the period covers the change from “fossil” Toryism to National Policy. In the affairs of Canada, it takes in the quarter-century when sectional discord almost destroyed the union, to be followed by the achievement of Federation, and then, the wide perspective of creating a united people.

Old Toryism, as it existed in the early 1850's, had little to commend it. Rated from the viewpoint of unity, its contribution was negative—as in 1849, when it pyramided such errors as abuse of the French race, denunciation of the constitution, and a peevish movement towards annexation. MacNab Toryism was a lingering player on the political scene, fanning the air on issues already decided. “The party nowhere—,” exclaimed young John A. Macdonald in 1854, “damned—everlastingly damned.”¹

That the party had to re-orientate was only slowly realized. Under the new order of things, it was a case of “stand up and fight” on equal terms, and the index of a party was its ability to secure a broad basis in popular support. The coalition of September, 1854, which gave birth to the Liberal Conservative party, appears in retrospect as an event of some significance. Contemporaries did not think so. Friendly newspapers said it was “astonishing” and “not likely to last.” The Rouge and the Grit press less charitably spoke of “unholy alliances,” “crass political immorality,” and the “wrigglings of apostates.”²

In point of fact, the coalition had a worthy and thoughtful parentage. Among its sponsors were Lord Elgin, John A. Macdonald, Hincks, Baldwin, and Cauchon, all of them convinced enemies of sectionalism. The Elgin-Grey correspondence, so far back as 1850, has many references like the following: “It is more than probable that ere long the French and the Conservatives of Upper Canada will come together to resist the radicals. . . . No doubt the French are essentially conservative and their alliance with a destructive party is unnatural.”³ “That they will fall, sooner or later, into a political alliance with any section of the British which prefers British to United States institutions is my conviction. . . . It is of the utmost importance that any such British party should stand on a pretty wide basis in Upper Canada.”⁴ Excerpts of this kind clearly foreshadow the three-way character of the 1854 combination; and they help to explain why the appearance of the coalition was assailed as “the governor's *coup d'état*.”

For the Conservatives, John A. Macdonald had gradually assumed the position of party tactician. His colleagues in the House were already

¹Public Archives of Canada, *Macdonald papers*, A. Campbell to John A. Macdonald, March 8, 1855.

²Quoted in the *North American*, Sept. 20, 1854.

³Public Archives of Canada, *Elgin-Grey correspondence*, Elgin to Grey, Nov. 22, 1850.

⁴*Ibid.*, Elgin to Grey, June 14, 1851.

commenting on his genius as a "manager of men" and as a conciliator⁵—that tendency which Principal Grant described as an inclination "to build bridges, rather than dig ditches, between himself and those who differed from him." It is possible to discern the evolution in Macdonald's attitude towards the Lower Canadians. In 1849, he regarded "no domination by the French" as the chief reason for the founding of the British American League.⁶ In the following year, he became conspicuous in the House for his good personal relations with the French. Just prior to the election of 1854, he wrote to a political friend: "I believe that there must be a change of ministry after the next election, and from my friendly relations with the French, I am inclined to think my assistance will be sought. Our aim should be to enlarge the bounds of our party so as to embrace every person desirous of being counted as a 'progressive Conservative'."⁷ Two years after the anticipated "broadening out" had occurred, Macdonald ousted "fossil" Toryism in the person of Sir Allan McNab. The change in leadership had the full co-operation of the French. That the "wheel had gone full circle" is shown in a letter from Macdonald to Chamberlin of the *Montreal Gazette*: "The truth is you British Canadians never can forget that you were once supreme. . . . No man in his senses can suppose that the country can for a century to come be governed by a totally unfrenchified government. If a British Canadian desires to conquer, he must "stoop to conquer." He must make friends of the French without sacrificing the status of his race or his religion. He must respect their nationality. Treat them as a nation and they will act as a free people generally do—call them a faction and they become factious."⁸

Another aspect of the coalition which laid its foundations on a sound basis was the inclusion of the Baldwin Reformers. At once, the Liberal Conservatives became heirs of those ideas of government to which Baldwin had devoted himself. Responsible government and a faith in the continuity of political development were legacies of great value. They served to root Macdonald Conservatism in the best traditions of the past, and at the same time, gave the assurance that "the great measures" of the future would be handled with due regard to historic spontaneity.

The decade from 1854 to 1864 has properly been labelled "stalemate." The period was a heyday of close political manoeuvring, petty treacheries, and spasmodic, half-honest efforts "to find a way out." At least on one issue the battleline was clearly drawn, namely—the demand of Upper Canada for organic change. The Clear Grits existed to champion the Upper Canadian case. That they did so with a convincing weight of argument is not disputed. From another viewpoint, however, the movement was a threat to the well-being of the country and a misdirection in the main current of Canadian development. "The Western peninsula must not get control of the ship," wrote Macdonald in 1856. "It is occupied by Yankees and Covenanters—in fact, the most yeasty and unsafe of populations."⁹ Throughout the ten-year period, the Liberal Conservatives put up inflexible resistance. Having regard to the preservation of the union, their stand

⁵*Macdonald papers*, A. Campbell to J. A. M., March 8, 1855.

⁶Ontario Archives, *Stevenson papers*, J. A. M. to Stevenson, July 5, 1849.

⁷*Macdonald papers*, J. A. M. to Captain Strachan, Feb. 9, 1854.

⁸Public Archives of Canada, *Chamberlin papers*, J. A. M. to Chamberlin, June 21, 1856.

⁹*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to Chamberlin, June 21, 1856.

was well taken. In the first place, Clear Gritism was intensely sectional. Lower Canada was attacked with shrieking malice. By 1864, the crusading zeal of George Brown had stirred up so much animosity that even his supporters in the House were hopeful that he would quit public life.¹⁰

Another major count on which the Liberal Conservatives indicted the Grits was on their disavowal of responsible government. There is much evidence to show that the famous Reform Convention of 1859 was adroitly "steered" into the semblance of moderation,¹¹ yet it produced officially such vagrant notions as "a written constitution," "a people's convention to determine organic change," "a system of checks and balances," and "ministers who are heads of departments—no more and no less." The *Globe* summed up: "The system of government we desire to see adopted [in Canada] resembles most closely that in force in those states formed out of what was the North-West Territory. We suggest Ohio or Illinois."¹² The ridicule which proposals of this kind drew from the Liberal Conservative party was timely; and it was a fortunate happening that public opinion—both Conservative and old-time Reform—prevented digressions towards the "American System." Federation was already casting its shadow. One wonders how the great project would have fared at the hands of "people's conventions" and without the lubricating influence of a British technique.

The Intercolonial Railway was another matter on which Macdonald Conservatism took up cudgels on behalf of the wider view. The hostility of the Clear Grits and of the Rouges to the project was bitter and consistent. In both cases, the objections sprang from sectionalism—the Grits objected to the expense and the Rouges to the political implications. That Federation was a corollary of the I.C.R. was seen by everyone. When George Brown in 1863 blasted the negotiations, sentiment in the Maritimes was outraged at what was termed "the bad faith" of "political outlaws."¹³ The *Globe* in retort, declared that if £50,000, spent in the East, was the price of Confederation, "the union must be postponed for an indefinite period."¹⁴

In contrast, the Toronto *Leader* expressed the typical view of the Liberal Conservative party and its press: "A patriotic legislature will not stop to enquire which one section of the country may possibly reap the larger share of the benefit. We have always protested against treating the I.C.R. upon such narrow grounds and when it is a question of pushing improvements with the North-West, we would not alter our policy. . . . At present the various parts of British North America are isolated and distinct with only a feeble and doubtful tendency towards union. . . . A fine opportunity has been thrown away."¹⁵ Conservative support of the Intercolonial, it may be said, was not exclusively based on these high grounds. Cartier's association with the Grand Trunk and Macdonald's intimacy with Brydges and D. L. McPherson played a part. Yet if the latter could write to Macdonald about "advantages to you, both political and material"—"We owe you \$5,000; also we will return your draft on us for \$11,000"¹⁶—it is also a fact that the "railroad friends" sometimes did their lobbying in quarters where the national interest was benefited. A

¹⁰Ontario Archives, *Charles Clarke papers*, Dr. Parker to Clarke, April 10, 1864.

¹¹*Ibid.*, George Sheppard to Chas. Clarke, July 5, 1859.

¹²*The Globe*, June 1, 1859.

¹³*Morning Telegraph*, cited by the Toronto *Leader*, Oct. 29, 1863.

¹⁴*The Globe*, Nov. 4, 1863.

¹⁵Toronto *Leader*, June 23, 1863.

¹⁶Macdonald *papers*, D. L. Macpherson to J. A. M., June 17, 1863.

good instance of this is revealed in a letter from Brydges to Macdonald, four months before "the great events": "I told you I had seen Brown. . . . I offered him the chair of the Canada Board of Hudson's Bay at which, I think, he was a good deal impressed, but would not say 'yes' positively. I showed him that nothing could be done about the North-West without the Intercolonial. On the latter part, he seems much mollified. . . . He does not object, I think, to the *marrying* of the North-West and the Intercolonial, but wants the number of items enlarged. . . . You can judge from this if it is desirable for me to press him further."¹⁷

The great coalition came in June of 1864. It is not possible here to trace the relationship of the Liberal Conservatives to the Confederation idea, or to assess the value of the propaganda carried on by the party press during the period of so-called "hibernation." In common with men like D'Arcy McGee and Dr. Tupper, the Conservative newspapers played up the arguments of "national destiny" and "a new nationality," while they scouted the notion that union was justified simply as an escape from the sectional difficulties of the Canadas.¹⁸

When the federation compromise arrived, it embodied both concepts—"the Larger Scheme" and "the Lesser Scheme." In view of its ideology, the Conservative party adjusted itself naturally to the promotion of the "Larger Scheme." It was otherwise with the Clear Grits. The wide vision which characterized Mr. Brown's speech in the *Confederation Debates* seemed short-lived. Though the bargain of 1864 was faithfully adhered to, sectionalism died hard, and the Clear Grits continued to regard the great project and all its works through Upper Canadian spectacles. Thus in 1865, Brown wrote to Alexander Mackenzie: "Whatever happens now . . . my fifteen years' labour is amply recompensed by the consent, recorded beyond recall . . . in favour of representation by population. I feel now quite relieved of all uneasiness as to what may hereafter happen."¹⁹

In the crucial years between 1864 and the defeat of the repeal movement, the services of the Liberal Conservative party were invaluable. Upper Canada presented no difficulty, unless it was public apathy—a complaint to be found many times in the letters of party workers. In Lower Canada, on the other hand, there were memories of 1840. Federation could not have won except for the confidence with which Cartier was regarded by the people and by the church, and it was no small achievement that in ten years the coalition of 1854 had prepared the ground for so fruitful a partnership of the two races.

Tested by "great events," Macdonald rose to a level of dynamic statesmanship which dwarfed that of his colleagues. Intuitively he saw the project in its right perspective. "An event which will make us historical," he told Lord Monck, "—not with my will, would another person take my position in completing the scheme for which I have worked so earnestly."²⁰ His letters for the period show a serenity that is extraordinary. Faced with a series of reverses, he countered the despair of his supporters with the phrase, "Stick with the ship until she rights."²¹ In August of 1866,

¹⁷*Ibid.*, C. J. Brydges to J. A. M., Feb. 24, 1864.

¹⁸Toronto *Leader*, Nov. 30, 1863.

¹⁹Alexander Mackenzie, *The life and speeches of the Hon. George Brown* (Toronto, 1882), 232.

²⁰Macdonald papers, J. A. M. to Viscount Monck, June 26, 1866.

²¹*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to J. H. Gray, March 27, 1865.

even Galt, whose early record for Confederation was more consistent than that of any other man, wavered. Galt wrote: "I do not care now much as regards Nova Scotia" ". . . indeed, I should not grieve greatly if that province were not to come in now . . . as you then could have a legislative union with New Brunswick and save all the trouble about local governments and guarantees."²²

Macdonald's handling of the difficulties in the Maritimes shows not only the expert tactician, but the conciliator. In regard to New Brunswick, Lord Monck suggested coercive methods,²³ but Macdonald opposed "brow-beating." Howe's Repeal Movement in Nova Scotia was more serious. Macdonald thought Tupper "had zeal without discretion." "The bulk of the people are sincere in their desire for repeal," he wrote to Archibald, "but the leaders, I think, are not sincere."²⁴ "The anti-feeling can be worn out, not snuffed out." The tactics used by Macdonald were calculated to leave the least possible scar.

On the Federation settlement, itself, Macdonald left an imprint that has been enduring. In a hypothetical state of affairs—such as did not exist—his own inclination would have been for a legislative union. This was due partly to his observation of the American scene, and partly, no doubt, to the innate conservative spirit which puts unity before local interests and specialities. In any case, his preference was shared by others—for instance, Lord Elgin, Sir Edmund Head, Lord Monck, E. W. Archibald, John Rose, and Sandfield Macdonald.

Macdonald was too intimately associated with Cartier to confuse what was "desirable" with what was "possible." At Quebec, the Clear Grit idea for "co-ordinate—not subordinate"²⁵ local governments was defeated. The Federation plan, as it came into effect in 1867, was substantially pleasing to the national party. Macdonald made the prediction that "within the ordinary age of man," the general Government would swallow the provincial ones. Like several of his long-range prophecies, this one was unfulfilled. Within two years, Brown had established the *Globe* as the guardian of provincial autonomy, and was engaged in berating Sandfield Macdonald for his submissiveness to the Government at Ottawa. John A. wrote to the editor of the *Gazette*: "I fully concur with you as to apprehension ere long of conflict between the Dominion and the states' rights people. We must meet it, however, as best we may. . . . My own opinion is that the general government should pay no more regard to the status or position of the local governments than they would to the ruling party in a corporation like Quebec or Ontario."²⁶

With the appearance in 1871 of Oliver Mowat as Liberal Prime Minister of Ontario, the provincial rights movement acquired an aggressive champion. Hostilities were delayed by the change in Government at Ottawa, but for the battle which was to come, Macdonald Conservatism was already equipped with the conviction that narrow, provincial loyalties must give way to national sentiment and attachment to the interests of the Dominion. The conviction, indeed, has remained a permanent one; and, looking to the constitutional issues of the present day, it may be assumed

²²*Ibid.*, Alexander Galt to J. A. M., Aug. 31, 1866.

²³*Ibid.*, Viscount Monck to J. A. M., April 17, 1866.

²⁴*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to E. W. Archibald, July 4, 1868.

²⁵C. R. Biggar, *Sir Oliver Mowat* (Toronto, 1905), I, 132.

²⁶*Macdonald papers*, J. A. M. to Chamberlin, Dec. 22, 1868.

that Conservatives—whether federal or provincial—would re-assert the historic position of the party.

The physical extension of the Dominion to take in the North-west and British Columbia was a spur to the development of national unity. It stirred "the feeling for greatness"—a feeling which Lord Hugh Cecil lists as one of the ingredients in all Conservatism.

As regards the North-west, Macdonald's attitude in 1865 was summed up in a letter to Watkin. "The opening of the prairie lands would drain away our youth and strength. I am perfectly willing personally to leave the whole country a wilderness for the next half century, but I fear if the English do not go in, the Yankees will, and with that apprehension, I would gladly see a crown colony established there."²⁷ A distrust of the United States and a dislike for things American was a part of Macdonald's Canadianism. It was an impelling motive in the latter part of 1867 and caused him to swing over to Macdougall's demand for immediate action on Rupert's Land. The plan was carried in the Cabinet against the lukewarmness—if not, the opposition—of the French, headed by Cartier and aided by Alexander Campbell.²⁸ It was this display of sectionalism which caused Macdonald to comment to Sir John Young. "The natural tendency of public men is in that direction. Each member of your government holds his position from his supposed influence in his own province. . . . We are all yet mere provincial politicians—Bye and bye, it is hoped that some of us may rise to the level of National Statesmen."²⁹

The inclusion of British Columbia followed quickly after the North-west. The promise of a Pacific railroad, viewed by the opposition as the price paid for the province, was not so regarded by Macdonald. A railroad was needed, in any case, as a check against the dangers of American penetration. Macdonald had a sincere apprehension at this time that deliberate acts might be expected from Washington.³⁰ It is not surprising, therefore, the initiative for railroad construction came from the Government, and not—as in the case of the Intercolonial—from outside interests.

In his efforts to round out Confederation as a physical unity, Macdonald was obstructed by the heterogeneous Liberal groups. Both as regards "better terms" for the Lower Provinces and the Pacific railroad, sectionalism of this sort was a hampering influence. For narrow self-interests, the best antidote was that supplied by Macdonald. The national domain opened up a wide and safe field for enterprise, and, at the same time, created a popular pride in the young Dominion.

The political task of governing the country was another matter which was interwoven with the growth of co-operation and national unity. A date, possibly as late as 1896, should be fixed for the complete application of the two party system on national lines.³¹ This fact, however, does not detract from the work of Macdonald Conservatism during the first fifteen years of Confederation in extending party contacts to the new provinces. In 1867, an idealistic impulse in some quarters was to denounce parties as

²⁷*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to E. W. Watkin, March 26, 1865.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Alexander Campbell to J. A. M., Feb. 12, 1868.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Letter-book, no. 12, 443-7.

³⁰*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to John Rose, June 28, 1870.

³¹Escott Reid, "The rise of national parties in Canada" (*Proceedings of Canadian Political Science Association*, 1932).

a mode of government.³² Being himself the chief contributor to "the spirit of the times," Macdonald agreed to latitudinarian principles. "I believe that a great party is arising of moderate men. There are many men who think alike about the future of British America who have been hitherto divided by their political antecedents. All this ought to be forgotten now, and I hope that men, whatever their antecedents, who think alike, will act together. This is the true and only principle of party."³³ The first Dominion Cabinet set something of a standard in combining the diverse regional, racial, and religious elements in the country. In the Ontario section, the coalition principle held; and this fact, together with the looseness of the relationship with the Maritimers, gave the administration a group, rather than a party, aspect.

In carrying on the work of government, the Cabinet was soon racked by internal dissensions. Sectional feuds on such questions as the Inter-colonial, the North-west, banking policy, and immigration distressed Macdonald. He wrote to Chamberlin, "The difficulty is that there is no great party interested in fighting the battle of the Dominion."³⁴ Convinced that there was need of a well-knit party in which Conservative principles should predominate, he worked to that end, as changes in the personnel of the Cabinet showed. Macdougall went off to the North-west, disgruntled at being sacrificed, as he said "to create a new political party."³⁵

In the Maritimes, conditions were unfavourable to the extension of party sovereignty. This was due to a variety of causes—among them, the aversion with which the Brownite Liberals were regarded as "the selfish Ontario party." Among the provincial Reformers, there was resentment that Brown had broken the historic Liberal front by his failure to consult them in the coalition of 1864.³⁶ Since public men—anti-unionists as well as unionists—were disinclined to work with Dominion opposition—a division on national party lines was ruled out and the tendency was to give an independent support to Macdonald. This kind of relationship was hardly conducive to thinking in terms of national unity. Against it, is to be set the nucleus of key men—such as, Tupper, Tilley, Archibald, McCully, Mitchell, and Bishop Connelly—who were true friends of the national viewpoint. Newspapers like the *British Colonist* and the *Saint John Daily News* aided in the work of identifying Maritime interests with those of the Dominion. Possibly by 1872 a fair degree of integration in party affairs had been reached, since in the election of that year, thirty-four of the thirty-seven members had been expressly "pledged" to support of the Macdonald Government.³⁷ On the other hand, there were later events which suggest that the sovereignty for the national parties was not fully attained until 1878.

In the case of British Columbia, the Conservatives did a similar work in pioneering for political contacts, although here again a two-party division was retarded by the failure of the opposition to nationalize their influence. Only a small "Grit element" was to be found in the province, and this was

³²E.g. Egerton Ryerson, *The New Canadian Dominion* (Toronto, 1867).

³³*Macdonald papers*, J. A. M. to Alexander MacClenaghan, Nov. 8, 1866.

³⁴*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to Chamberlin, Dec. 26, 1868.

³⁵*Ibid.*, William Macdougall to J. A. M., June 16, 1869.

³⁶Sir Francis Hincks, Pembroke Speech, Oct. 27, 1870 (pamphlet in Public Archives of Canada).

³⁷*Macdonald papers*, J. A. M. to Lord Lisgar, Sept. 2, 1872.

made up of transplanted Canadians whose political faith was kept nourished by the *Globe*.³⁸ Indeed, until 1903 non-party government prevailed in the local Legislature.

The circumstances under which British Columbia entered Confederation, gave Macdonald a strong personal hold on her public leaders. The beginnings of responsible government had been interlinked with the movement for union, and for both, Macdonald had been the champion who won victory over the Governor Seymour's official clique. As a consequence his reputation stood high. "No one," wrote Joseph Trutch in 1872, "unless pledged to support your government consistently could have been elected, and therefore, turning on personal considerations of a trivial character, the elections were without excitement."³⁹

During the Mackenzie administration, the attitude of the Government towards the railway promise confirmed the province in its attachment to Macdonald. Most of her public men—including the Lieutenant-Governor—continued to carry on an intimate political correspondence with the Leader of the Dominion opposition—a fact that gives additional point to Richard Cartwright's remark about living "in a glass hive." It was in line with Macdonald's fidelity to a united Canada that he advised against agitation.⁴⁰

A small minority party, favourable to compromise with Mackenzie, made its appearance, and this provided at least the beginnings of national party lines in 1878. G. A. Walkem sums up in a letter to Macdonald. "You may remember me telling you back in 1874 that we knew nothing, comparatively speaking, of your Canadian party lines. Our M. P.'s were a doleful B.C. chorus—neglecting all questions which did not directly affect their own home. . . . A great change has been brought about by Mackenzie's conduct. Party lines have been drawn some time back and have gradually been defined by Richards, Dupont and Robson on behalf of Mackenzie until the clearness of the lines has become unmistakable—and the province with the exception of New Westminster has become thoroughly Conservative."⁴¹

The coping stone which rounded off the services of Macdonald Conservatism to unity was its enunciation in 1878 of National Policy. Much has been said and written on the "insincerity" of Macdonald in advocating protection, while, on the other hand, an attenuated case can be made out for consistency. Possibly Macdonald's pragmatic attitude is best revealed in a letter written to D. L. MacPherson in 1872—the election year in which some of the constituencies were given a mild review of N.P. "Mackenzie, Brown and Co. are thoroughly committed to free trade. Now you are, I know, a hot free-trader, so am I; but I quite agree with Patterson [of the *Toronto Mail*] that our game is to coquet with the protectionists. The word 'protection' itself must be taboo, but we can ring the changes on National Policy, paying U.S. in their own coin, etc."⁴²

A study of the origins of National Policy—as it appeared, full-dress, in 1878—reveals that the Conservative leaders were not so much the spon-

³⁸*Ibid.*, G. A. Walkem to J. A. M., April 17, 1873.

³⁹*Ibid.*, Joseph Trutch to J. A. M., Sept. 10, 1872.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Joseph Trutch to J. A. M., June 20, 1876.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, G. A. Walkem to J. A. M., Sept. 28, 1878.

⁴²*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to D. L. MacPherson, Feb. 20, 1872.

sors, as the recipients of it. Hundreds of letters and press articles testify to this fact. Goldwin Smith remarked that national sentiment was ripe for protection and to refuse it was "to slam the door in the people's faces."⁴³ Macdonald was amazed at the popularity of the demand, and proceeded hastily to educate himself in the finer points of "industrial politics." E. W. Mackintosh, Isaac Buchanan, Adam Brown, and R. W. Phipps were among his informants. Macdonald's own contribution to National Policy was to put behind it the vehicle of party and to present the case to the electors. It was significant that for the first time, a Dominion leader—backed by a united party—stumped not only Central Canada, but the Maritimes as well.⁴⁴

National Policy was in substance economic nationalism. As such, it tested the aspirations of Canadians and the degree to which the forces of cohesion had done their work. The acceptance of the policy in every province, except New Brunswick, marked a determinant achievement in national unity.

⁴³*Ibid.*, Goldwin Smith to J. A. M., Oct. 4, 1878.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, J. A. M. to H. R. Macdonald, Aug. 12, 1872.

EDWARD BLAKE, THE LIBERAL PARTY, AND UNRESTRICTED RECIPROCITY¹

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In a country so complex as Canada political parties, as distinguished from political groups, are never very clear-cut in their advocacy of any principle or policy. But during the first generation after Confederation there is one continuous and persistent difference between the two major parties which comes out in all their debates and election campaigns. This is the difference in their attitude towards the United States. The new nationality which was brought into being by Confederation resulted primarily from the ambitions of great business interests to preserve the northern half of North America from American encroachment. The Conservative party which expressed their point of view in politics tended to be hostile to the United States, suspicious of too close commercial relations, truculent in its attitude on such questions as fisheries and canals, and, because the connection with Great Britain seemed to furnish the one abiding guarantee against American absorption, vociferously demonstrative in its imperial loyalty. The Liberals, on the other hand, mostly looked forward to a future of political independence for Canada in her relations with Great Britain and emphasized her present economic dependence upon the free entry of Canadian goods into the American market. "The Liberals," said Goldwin Smith in 1890,² "are the continental, their opponents the anti-continental party."

It is only on reading the newspapers and periodicals and party pamphlets of the 1870's and 1880's that one gets an adequate conception of this importance of the American market in Canadian thinking and of the persistent vitality of the idea of reciprocity. Later, with the growth of the West after 1890 and the concurrent growth of Canadian exports to Great Britain, a great east-west traffic developed and there emerged for the first time a genuine national economic structure. Then at last this question whether closer relations with the United States meant a threat or a promise to the future of Canada ceased to plague Canadian statesmen. But for twenty years or more the same issues are threshed over and over again. And the same uncertainty overhangs the discussion, not merely before but also after the adoption of the National Policy and the building of the C.P.R., as to the ultimate destiny of the new Canadian nationality. In the 1870 session of Parliament, L. S. Huntingdon's motion for independent treaty-making powers and for a customs union with the United States brought forth all the arguments on both sides which were to do duty until after the 1891 election—and also most of the slogans, including the sacred phrase "A National Policy," but not including John A. Macdonald's "A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die," which apparently he did not use till the middle 1870's.

I have no space in the present paper to deal with all the aspects of this continuous national debate during these years. My attention will be

¹In this paper quotations from, or references to, private letters which passed between Blake and his friends are based upon the original documents in the *Edward Blake papers* in the Library of the University of Toronto.

²In the *Bystander*, May, 1890.

confined to Edward Blake's part in it during the eighties and early nineties.

Blake became leader of the Liberal party in 1880 just after the adoption of the National Policy. He had no liking for the crudely selfish ambitions of the business groups who were proceeding to exploit national sentiment in their own interests; and he could and did inveigh as heartily as any free trader against the cost of artificial industries "tariff-born, tariff-bred and tariff-fed" and against red parlour methods of tariff manipulation. But Blake also soon came to feel that it was dishonest to pretend that there could be a wide difference in practice between the actual National Policy tariff and any tariff which a Liberal Government would be compelled to impose. The greatly increased expenditure of the national Government was an inescapable fact; a certain part of it was due to extravagance and corruption, but it all left growing debt burdens which must be met. In the 1882 session of Parliament, Blake moved for treaty-making powers for Canada in commercial matters and supported his motion by the usual Liberal constitutional arguments. But in the election campaign of this year he began to modify his party's policy in the direction of a closer approximation to the National Policy. His election address declared that "free trade is for us impossible"; and he advocated an adjustment of the National Policy so as to put fuel and breadstuffs on the free list and to lower the duties on sugar, on the cheaper grades of cottons and woollens, and on raw materials used by Canadian manufacturers.

In the next general election, in 1887, Blake went further. His famous Malvern speech (Jan. 22) is devoted to driving home the points that the difference between the parties is not that of free trade versus protection, that a Liberal Government cannot now go as far in the direction of tariff revision as he had wished to go in 1882, and that the manufacturers as a whole have nothing to fear from a Liberal victory. The Malvern speech mentions reciprocity only in passing, though the passing reference, according to the printed Liberal campaign pamphlet, is received with "great applause." As long as he was leader Blake refused to push reciprocity forward as the chief plank of the Liberals to the exclusion of many other topics which he thought worth discussion.

This painfully honest recognition that the tariff was here to stay, and that the possibilities of reciprocal trade concessions between two high-tariff countries such as Canada and the United States were limited, was not to the liking of many of Blake's followers. Conservative commentators pointed out how markedly the emphasis in Blake's speeches differed from that in those of Cartwright and Charlton. Behind the scenes in Liberal party circles there must have been a good deal of pressure to revise the party policy, to drop Blake's careful compromise, and to take up commercial union with the United States. In the *Blake papers* there are letters from L. S. Huntingdon in 1881 and 1882 proposing to start a campaign in Quebec Province for commercial union, and offering to do it in an independent role in order to ascertain the public reaction if Blake doesn't see fit to commit the whole party. In 1886 there is correspondence between Blake and J. W. Longley of Nova Scotia on the same subject; and one of Blake's private letters to Longley anticipates all the criticisms of commercial union which he was later to elaborate in the public West Durham letter of 1891. This latter document itself refers to some of the discussions that took place during these years. "Long ago, while leader of the Liberal party, it became my duty to examine into a similar design,

submitted by a political architect of some reputation. I thought the foundations insecure, the lines defective, and the estimates of cost inadequate." John Charlton in his autobiography tells us that he was the political architect to whom this passage refers.³

Blake retired from the leadership in ill health immediately after the 1887 election, and Laurier was chosen to succeed him. Whether the change in leadership had anything to do with the emergence in Ontario during the spring and summer of that year of a vigorous campaign for commercial union I do not know. At any rate commercial union quickly became the chief political topic of the day.⁴ After much discussion in the press and on party platforms at summer picnics, the Liberals under Laurier decided to adopt as the official party policy a modification of commercial union which they designated Unrestricted Reciprocity. Commercial union would mean a complete *zollverein*, the disappearance of all customs houses along the international border, and a tariff wall erected in common by the two countries against all overseas countries whose goods might enter by Atlantic or Pacific ports, with a pooling of the common revenue and a distribution of it between Ottawa and Washington on an agreed basis. Unrestricted reciprocity included free trade between the two North American countries, but each Government was to remain free to make its own tariff against overseas countries, and thus Canadian independence of Washington would be preserved in whatever tariff relations Canada should see fit to maintain with Great Britain. "We have adopted Unrestricted Reciprocity," Laurier wrote to Blake (in Europe) on March 29, 1888, "We are still engaged in the debate. . . . We have narrowed the issue to the mere commercial aspect of the question and we intend to keep it strictly on that line. There are political aspects which will spring up, but for the present it is better to leave them out."

The debate to which Laurier refers was that initiated by the official Liberal resolution moved in the House in the 1888 session by Cartwright and Charlton. It was in his speech on this occasion that Cartwright made the much-quoted statement that all that Canada owed to Britain was a great deal of Christian forgiveness for the way in which British Governments had handled Canadian-American questions. At the next session, in 1889, Cartwright moved a motion, similar to that of Blake in 1882, in favour of obtaining for Canada the power to make commercial treaties through her own plenipotentiaries; and he explained that he wanted this power so as to be free to treat directly with the United States for unrestricted reciprocity. In these discussions Liberal speakers admitted frankly that unrestricted reciprocity did mean discrimination against Britain in favour of American manufacturers; they maintained that Canada had different interests from those of Great Britain, that the mother country invariably looked after her own interests, and that Canada had a perfect right to look after hers.

Blake was away in Europe during the 1888 session trying to regain

³Charlton left a manuscript diary and autobiography. See an M.A. thesis on him by L. J. Curnoe, in the University of Toronto Library.

⁴Willison in his book, *Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party* (Toronto, 1903), has a good account of the commercial union movement. "It was a time," he says, "of gloom and doubt, of suspicion and unrest, of rash opinion and premature judgment, of failing faith in our institutions, of hostile examination of the central prop and pillars of the national edifice."

his health by a long holiday. So he was not on hand to be consulted when the party adopted unrestricted reciprocity, though he expressed objections by letter to Laurier. On his return he apparently had a good many discussions with Laurier and other leaders and protested strongly against the official trade policy of the party. But he yielded to their request not to bring the matter up in the party caucus. In their written correspondence Laurier more than once mentions to Blake his own preference for a bolder policy than unrestricted reciprocity, meaning thereby, one assumes, that he would like to come out for a complete *zollverein* with the United States.

In the 1890 session William Mulock moved an address of loyalty to the Queen, giving as his reasons the need, not to reassure anyone in Canada or Britain about Canadian sentiment, but to make clear to the American public that there was no basis for their feeling that Canadian institutions were breaking down and that the country was on the verge of either independence or annexation. The motion was passed unanimously after a very short debate in which Macdonald on behalf of the Government supported Mulock. Laurier supported him also but went on to declare: "Our connection with Great Britain cannot forever remain what it is at the present day. As long as the powers of self government which we now enjoy are adequate to our national requirements, for my part I endorse and will endorse every word of the resolution but . . . I do not expect that Canada will remain forever a colony." Blake, according to Willison, who was at that time the *Globe's* press gallery correspondent, walked out just as the division was about to be taken, declaring that he would not be party to a sham.⁵

We cannot tell how the difference between Blake and the party leaders might have been resolved had time been allowed for them to thresh the matter out at leisure and to watch American developments after the adoption of the McKinley tariff in May, 1890. One may remark in passing that it is extraordinary how thoroughly the party committed itself to unrestricted reciprocity without first trying to discover what terms could be obtained from the United States. Whether unrestricted reciprocity was making headway with the Canadian electorate after its apparent initial popularity in 1887 is very difficult to determine. At any rate, at the beginning of 1891 Macdonald decided to spring an election before another crop season should make Ontario and Quebec farmers still more dissatisfied with their loss of the American market under the McKinley tariff schedules.⁶ Parliament was dissolved on February 3 and the election date set for March 5.

This compelled Blake to make an immediate decision. Personally he wanted to explain in public his objections to unrestricted reciprocity. But Laurier and his friends had pressed him to remain silent lest he disrupt the party. If, however, he again ran in West Durham, he could not avoid a public declaration of his opinions. For the sake of the party he decided not to seek renomination. The story of how he was kept from speaking at the West Durham nomination meeting and from publishing a letter to the Reform Association of the constituency, which set forth his criticisms of unrestricted reciprocity has been told by Willison and need not be

⁵Sir John Willison, *Reminiscences political and personal* (Toronto, 1919), 225.

⁶See his letter of March 31, 1891, to Sir George Stephen, in J. Pope (ed.), *Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald* (Toronto, 1921), 485.

repeated here.⁷ Under pressure Blake yielded. But he felt that he was making a great personal sacrifice; he was giving up his own political career and doing so without a word of explanation to the public which had been accustomed for twenty years to regard Edward Blake as one of the chief men in Canadian public affairs. When the news of his retirement was known, a stream of letters from friends and political followers poured in upon him. He had to tell his correspondents that he was not free to say anything more at the moment. To some of his intimates he wrote bitterly: "I die dumb." As always happens in these party crises, the other party learnt pretty accurately about the differences between Blake and his fellow Liberals. Conservative speakers and editors began to say that Blake agreed with them in their interpretation of what unrestricted reciprocity really meant. Through all this excitement Blake had to keep his opinions to himself; his only part in the campaign was to send two brief messages, to be read at Liberal meetings, wishing success to his party. He determined to explain to the country at the first available opportunity his stand on the question. And so on March 6, the day after the election, in the same issues which announced that the Conservatives had won by a narrow majority, Canadian daily papers published a revised and elaborated edition of the letter which Blake had drafted on January 28 to the West Durham Liberals.

The West Durham letter is a long and closely reasoned analysis of the rival trade policies offered to the Canadian electorate in 1891. It occupies more than four columns of small print in the *Globe* of March 6. Blake begins by expressing his opinion that the best trade policy for Canada would be that of a moderate revenue tariff, approximating to free trade with all the world, coupled with liberal provisions for reciprocal free trade with the United States. But Canadian fiscal necessities make a high tariff inevitable, and the United States won't accept a limited reciprocity. So that what would be theoretically best is not practicable. Of the two party programmes, the National Policy of the Conservatives has failed so completely that its real tendency now is towards disintegration and annexation. The other alternative, the Liberal policy of unrestricted reciprocity with the United States, secured for a long term of years, would undoubtedly advance the material interests of Canada. But it involves several difficulties. One of these is the loss of revenue to the Canadian Treasury, a problem for which Blake can see no solution. Another is that it means differential duties against Great Britain, though Blake puts little emphasis on this point. More serious is the fact that it involves assimilation of the tariffs of Canada and the United States. Blake argues this at length and concludes that there is no essential difference between unrestricted reciprocity and commercial union. Assimilation of tariffs would mean that in practice Canada would adopt the tariff of the United States and would be dependent on Washington as to any future changes in tariff schedules. The more intimate trade and fiscal relations which would result from this condition would lead towards political union, a conclusion made more certain by the prevailing desire of the Americans for annexation and their willingness to use commercial pressure for political purposes. It is to be noted that Blake does not say that he thinks political union desirable, but he also does not denounce it as something which every patriotic Canadian should

⁷See Willison, *Reminiscences political and personal*, chap. x.

indignantly repudiate. This leads him to his final and most important objection to the Liberal policy. If his argument as to the ultimate political implications of unrestricted reciprocity is right, then the Liberal party should frankly acknowledge that political union is the end, and proceed to educate Canadian opinion towards this end, or it should drop the policy. "Assuming that absolute free trade with the States, best described as Commercial Union, may and ought to come, I believe that it can and should come only as an incident, or at any rate as a well understood precursor of Political Union; for which indeed we should be able to make better terms before than after the surrender of our Commercial Independence. Then so believing—believing that the decision of the Trade question involves that of the Constitutional issue, for which you are unprepared, and with which you do not even conceive yourselves to be dealing—how can I properly recommend you now to decide on Commercial Union?"

The West Durham letter fell with a resounding explosion into Canadian politics. Discussion on it overshadowed everything else in all the papers for some time. Commentators agreed that the letter was too negative and critical in character, and many called on Blake to state his own positive policy, since he had rejected both the main policies before the Canadian people. Willison, who had been familiar with Blake's line of argument for some time, immediately gave a lead in the *Globe* which most of the Liberal papers followed. He interpreted the letter as meaning that Blake favoured annexation and wanted the Liberals to be frank in pushing commercial union as a prelude to political union. "He is for absolute free trade on the distinct understanding that it shall terminate in political union without which it cannot be carried or even so much as obtained. . . . The Tory press which alleged that he was not willing to go as far as his party made a crucial mistake—his party is not willing to go as far as he." For the rest of his life Willison continued to maintain that this was the correct interpretation of the West Durham letter.⁸ But Blake's private correspondence shows that he bitterly resented the line taken by the chief Liberal organ. The *Empire* and most of the Conservative papers took the opposite line that Blake was repudiating the Liberal party because its policy necessarily involved annexation. The host of correspondents who wrote private letters to Blake in the next few weeks all took this interpretation for granted, and many Liberals revealed to him that, while they had stuck to the party through the election, they had been very uneasy about the trend of its policy.

In the midst of the controversy Blake wrote a second letter of one long sentence, which appeared in the papers on March 11: "The contradictory inferences to which a sentence in my Durham letter, detached from its context, has in several quarters unexpectedly given rise, conquer my reluctance to trespass again so soon upon your columns, and I crave space to

⁸Willison appears to have maintained in conversation in later years that Blake's original West Durham letter was much clearer in its expression of annexation sentiments than was the printed version which appeared in the papers on March 6. But Blake requested D. Burke Simpson, the President of the West Durham Reform Association, to whom the letter was addressed, to return it to him when, under pressure of his friends, he finally decided to say nothing during the election about the reciprocity issue. The original letter, dated January 28, is in the *Blake papers*, together with several typewritten copies, and examination shows that the printed letter of March 6 is only an elaboration of this one of January 28.

say that I think political union with the States, though becoming our probable, is by no means our ideal or as yet our inevitable future. This, however, like the main letter, was negative rather than positive. Many demands were made for further elucidation, but Blake remained silent in the midst of abuse and praise.

The silence was one of bitter agony of spirit. During these weeks after March 6, Blake received not a word from his intimates and late colleagues in the leadership of the party. Until the middle of July, save for one letter from David Mills in April, apparently not one of them wrote to him. Blake was profoundly shocked and depressed by the revelation of party feeling against him in the Liberal papers. (The Conservatives made great use of the West Durham letter in the by-elections which followed.) Then suddenly on July 20 came a letter from Laurier consulting Blake on a matter of constitutional law. "I venture to ask this favour, notwithstanding the apparent estrangement we are in. . . . I hope divergences of political views will not affect personal friendship. . . . You know how often and how sincerely I have offered you to resume the leadership of the party. My heart is no more now in the position which I occupy than it was four years ago; but since I am in it I must discharge its responsibilities to the best of my judgment. . . . May I not rely upon your indulgence and friendship . . . to give me help and assistance whenever you can do so consistently with your own views of public duty? Apart from the trade question I know of nothing in which we could not act as in the past."

Blake was greatly moved and replied immediately: "You say truly that you have often and sincerely offered to me the resumption of the lead. You know that the position has always been most distasteful to me. Neither of us has ever wanted that crown of thorns and no question can ever arise on that head." The two men resumed friendly relations and began to explore possible means by which Blake could return to political life as an active member of the party.

After the elections the Conservative Government had tried to get into direct touch with Blaine, the American Secretary of State, to find what the official American attitude was on trade relations with Canada. Laurier and Blake agreed that when the result of the negotiations was announced it would be desirable for the Liberal party leaders to consult as to a restatement of their party policy. It was not until February, 1892, that a Canadian delegation managed at last to have an appointment with Blaine, who resented the Canadian Government's tactics on trade, on fisheries, and on canals and who was anything but friendly. Blaine then made it clear that the United States would consider no reciprocity negotiations which did not include manufactured goods as well as natural products, which did not involve assimilation of the tariffs of the two countries, with discrimination by Canada against British manufacturers. These conditions, of course, could not be considered by any Canadian Conservative Government; and Foster, the Minister of Finance, announced a complete breakdown of negotiations when the delegation returned to Ottawa.⁹

To Blake this seemed to give the Liberal party a magnificent opportunity to escape from the embarrassing entanglements of its unrestricted reciprocity policy. He had always argued that unrestricted reciprocity was

⁹A full official report by the Canadian delegation on these negotiations is printed in the *Sessional papers of Canada*, 1893.

impracticable because it could not be obtained from Washington save upon conditions which would make Canada too dependent upon the United States and which would be intolerable to Canadians as a whole, including the overwhelming majority of the Liberal party. Now Blaine had officially stated that a reciprocity agreement was unobtainable save upon these very conditions. Blake began eagerly to urge these points upon Laurier, Mills, Davies, and a few of the other Liberal leaders. He told them that they should hail Blaine's declaration as a godsend. He drafted a paper in which he set forth the position as he saw it, and which he thought he might publish, if they agreed, as a preliminary to his reconciliation with the party and his return to public life. Laurier and Blake's friends at Ottawa were delighted with the prospects of reconciliation; and during March and April of 1892 almost daily letters passed between Ottawa and Toronto, with personal visits to Blake in Toronto by Laurier, Mills, and Charlton. The party leaders, however, rather than lose face by announcing their abandonment of unrestricted reciprocity, preferred to try to find an interpretation of the policy which Blake could accept. Mills and Davies wrote to him that the phrase "unrestricted reciprocity" must not be taken too literally, and that it had never meant to them anything more than the widest measure of reciprocity which negotiations at Washington might demonstrate to be obtainable; the word "unrestricted" was merely adopted to distinguish the Liberal policy clearly from any sham policy of partial reciprocity which Macdonald and Co. might take up for tactical purposes; it was to show the extent to which the Liberal party was prepared to go rather than to have no reciprocity treaty at all. Blake replied, with his usual comprehensive marshalling of quotations, that of this esoteric interpretation of party policy there was not the slightest hint in the speeches of the leaders from 1888 to the elections of 1891. Laurier, however, was convinced that a Liberal Government could do much better at Washington than the Conservatives had done, and that in fact the Conservative delegation had gone to Washington seeking the very answer which Blaine had given, so as to smash all possibilities of reciprocity. Davies had been sent to Washington on a mission from Laurier to see Blaine in 1889, and later John Charlton had gone on a similar mission; their reports were much more optimistic about the possibilities of a trade treaty than Blake thought was justified. Blake himself had heard privately from Edward Farrer, whose sources of information were very good, that the situation at Washington was exactly as Foster had reported it.

At this point the negotiations reached a deadlock. Laurier, Mills, Davies, and the Ottawa group would not abandon unrestricted reciprocity, though they might reinterpret what they meant by it. So, early in May, 1892, Blake brought the correspondence to an end. "I see that our impressions of the past, our notions of the present and our views of the future so differ that there is no use in the prolongation of this correspondence." It was while he was in this mood that a message arrived unexpectedly from Justin McCarthy, the leader of the majority faction of the Irish Nationalists, inviting Blake to take an Irish seat in the British House of Commons and to join in the struggle for Home Rule. Without consulting his party friends in Canada, Blake accepted at once and went off to spend the next ten years of his life struggling in the midst of a crew of Tim Healys and William O'Briens and Dr. Jamesons and Joseph Chamberlains. What the devil was Edward Blake going to do in that galley?

By a strange irony, no sooner had Blake left Canada than the Liberal party began to modify its trade policy in the direction he had urged. Already in the 1892 session of Parliament, Davies had moved (April 25) a resolution in favour of lower duties on goods mainly imported from Britain, the first sign of a shift of interest in party thinking from the United States to Great Britain. In 1893 the great Liberal Convention adopted a tariff plank which stressed tariff for revenue and passed over the question of reciprocity with the United States in a few pious but somewhat non-committal words. Blake wrote back from England to his late constituents in West Durham rejoicing that the new plank had ended his differences with the party. Gradually, between 1893 and 1897, the party moved further, and by 1897 it was prepared to institute not merely lower duties against Britain but discriminating duties which gave British goods an advantage in the Canadian market over American goods. The transition in the Liberal attitude can be traced in the editorials of the *Globe* about reciprocity, which between 1890 and 1894 fell from two or three a day to two or three a month, and which by 1895 had almost ceased completely.¹⁰

I do not know what took place in the inner party councils to determine this development. No doubt the successive tariff bills of the American Congress had their effect in convincing even the most enthusiastic exponent of reciprocity that it was useless to make further trips to Washington. Perhaps also some light is thrown on the process by which the party sloughed off its reciprocity policy by a letter from James Young, one of Blake's oldest personal and party friends, to Blake in England in 1895. "Mr. Laurier was in Toronto last week to meet Mr. Walker of the Bank of Commerce and other leading Reformers who had been estranged at the last election by the Trade policy. His visit is said to have done much good in this respect." But back of all other developments lay the expansion of the new West with its tremendous effects upon internal national integration and upon external trade. In 1890 the British market absorbed 41½ million dollars' worth of Canadian exports as against 36 millions going to the United States. By 1895 the relative figures were 58 and 36; by 1900, 97 and 58. This rapid expansion of exports to England and the out-distancing of American by British purchases of Canadian goods changed the tenor of Canadian thought. It was no longer necessary to debate whether closer trade relations with the United States held out the chief promise or the chief threat to the future of Canada.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Innis inquired whether the discussions which took place between Blake and the Liberal leaders constituted, in effect, an effort on the part of the party to get rid of its old leader.

Mr. Underhill replied that he was convinced, from the tenor of the correspondence, that the attempt to reach an agreement on policy was perfectly sincere on Laurier's part; but he agreed that party policy in respect of reciprocity changed radically after Blake's final retirement, and that this circumstance might leave the *bona fides* of the Liberal leaders open to some question.

¹⁰For an analysis of the *Globe's* editorial policies in these years I am indebted to an M.A. thesis on the *Globe* under Willison's editorship by W. Greening, in the University of Toronto Library.

PRESERVING CANADA'S HISTORIC PAST

BY THE NATIONAL PARKS BUREAU, LANDS, PARKS, AND FORESTS BRANCH,
DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND RESOURCES

The restoration, preservation, marking, and administration of historic sites of national importance and the commemoration of the public services of outstanding persons connected with the early history of Canada have been entrusted to the National Parks Bureau. The Bureau is advised in this work by the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, an honorary body, comprised of a number of recognized historians representing the various parts of the Dominion.

The personnel of the Board is as follows: *Chairman*, Brigadier-General E. A. Cruikshank, LL.D., F.R.S.C., F.R.Hist., Ottawa, Ontario; His Honour, Judge F. W. Howay, LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C., F.R.Hist., New Westminster, B.C.; J. Clarence Webster, C.M.G., M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S.C., Shediac, N.B.; Professor Fred Landon, M.A., F.R.S.C., London, Ontario; Professor D. C. Harvey, M.A., F.R.S.C., Halifax, N.S.; The Hon. E. Fabre-Surveyer, B.A., LL.M., B.C.L., F.R.S.C., Montreal, P.Q.; The Rev. Antoine d'Eschambault, D.S.T., D.J.C., St. Boniface, Manitoba; J. A. Gregory, M.L.A., North Battleford, Saskatchewan; F. H. H. Williamson, Controller, National Parks Bureau, Ottawa, Ontario.

The annual meeting of the Board was held in Ottawa from May 19 to 21, when a number of new sites were reviewed and a selection made therefrom for attention at a later date. Of the total number of sites considered by the Board to date, 276 have now been suitably marked and 178 additional ones recommended for future attention.

During the year the following sites were marked:

Mohawk Indian Fort, Annapolis Royal, N.S.

A bronze plate affixed to an iron pedestal was erected on lower St. George Street to mark the site of the fort built in 1712 by Mohawk Indians under Major Livingston, employed as allies of the British to intimidate the Micmacs. The tablet was unveiled on August 29, 1938, under the auspices of the Annapolis Royal Historical Association.

Battle of Grand Pré, Grand Pré, N.S.

A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected adjacent to the provincial highway to commemorate the engagement which took place on February 11, 1747, when New England troops under Colonel Arthur Noble were surprised and defeated by French and Indians under Coulon de Villiers, who had made a forced march from Beaubassin in a blinding snow-storm. The British commander was killed and the French leader died later of his wounds. The monument was unveiled on September 5, 1938.

Halifax-Castine Expedition, Halifax, N.S.

A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected on the grounds of Dalhousie University to commemorate the British military and naval expedition from Halifax in September, 1814, under Lieutenant-General Sir John Coape Sherbrooke and Rear-Admiral Edward Griffith, which occupied the portion of Maine between the Penobscot and St. Croix Rivers. Major-General Gerard Gosselin governed that district, from Castine, until April

26, 1815. The customs duties collected during this period were utilized by Governor Dalhousie for the endowment of the Garrison Library and Dalhousie College. The monument was unveiled on August 16, 1938, under the auspices of the Dalhousie Reunion Committee.

First Pictou Academy, Pictou, N.S.

A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected adjacent to Church Street to mark the site of the first Pictou Academy which was erected in 1818 and demolished in 1932. Under the leadership and example of Dr. Thomas McCulloch, it opened the door of opportunity to a hitherto neglected element of the population of the Maritime Provinces and gave many prominent men to Nova Scotia and the Dominion of Canada in journalism, literature, science, theology, education, and government. The monument was unveiled on August 15, 1938.

Major Thomas Dixson, Fort Beauséjour National Park, near Aulac, N.B.

A tablet was affixed to the outer wall of the museum building in honour of Major Thomas Dixson, who during the siege of Fort Cumberland by rebels under Jonathan Eddy in 1776, made a perilous journey to Halifax, securing the assistance of a force which helped to rout the enemy and to save Nova Scotia for the Empire. The tablet was unveiled on July 24, 1938.

Prehistoric Indian Portage, Baie Verte, N.B.

A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected adjacent to the Aulac-Port Elgin highway to mark the route from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Bay of Fundy which was the chief means of communication between Quebec, Isle Royale, and Chignecto. The portage connected the Baie Verte and Missaguash Rivers. The monument was unveiled on September 4, 1938.

First Postal Service in Canada, Montreal, P.Q.

A tablet was affixed to the outer wall of the new Postal Terminal building, St. James Street, to commemorate the establishment of this service. From 1693, couriers, the first known of whom was Pierre DaSilva, called the Portuguese, carried the mail between Quebec and Montreal. In 1763 Benjamin Franklin, then Deputy Postmaster-General in North America, established the first organized postal service in Canada.

Struggle for Hudson Bay, Ville Marie, P.Q.

A cairn with tablet was erected on the Court House grounds to commemorate the capture, in 1686, of three Hudson's Bay Company forts on James Bay, by a French force under Chevelier de Troyes, assisted by Canadians under d'Iberville, journeying overland by way of Lake Temiscamingue. The French retained possession until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The monument was unveiled on August 15, 1938.

Trent Valley Canal, Bobcaygeon, Ontario

A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected near the bridge over the canal to commemorate the construction, in 1833, of the first Bobcaygeon Lock by the Inland Water Commission, appointed by Sir John Colborne: the beginning of the improvement of the natural waterway connecting Lake Ontario with Georgian Bay.

First Cheese Factory in Canada, Ingersoll, Ontario

A tablet was affixed to the Post Office building to mark the site of the first cheese factory in Canada, established in the County of Oxford in 1864. The widespread adoption of the co-operative factory system in this and other counties marked the beginning of the modern dairying industry in Eastern Canada. The Canadian Dairymen's Association was founded at Ingersoll in 1867.

Sir Arthur Currie, Sir George Ross, and the Hon. Edward Blake, London, Ontario

Bronze plates in memory of each of these outstanding persons were erected in the Court House. The unveiling ceremonies were held on November 21, 1938, under the auspices of the London and Middlesex Historical Society.

Battle of Lundy's Lane, Niagara Falls, Ontario

Three tablets bearing the names of the officers and men who were killed in this battle, which took place on July 25, 1814, were attached to the large monument erected some years ago by the Dominion Government.

First Oil Wells in Canada, Oil Springs, Ontario

A tablet was affixed to the outer wall of the Community Hall to commemorate the discovery of oil in this locality. It was observed by early travellers and by the pioneer farmers who used it for medicinal purposes. In 1858, near Oil Springs, James M. Williams dug the first oil well in Canada and later established a refinery at Hamilton. In 1861, John Shaw, by drilling into the rock, opened the first flowing well, its situation being lot 18, concession 2, Enniskillen Township. From these beginnings developed one of Canada's most important industries. The tablet was unveiled on July 1, 1938.

Samuel Hearne, Churchill, Manitoba

A tablet was affixed to the outer wall of Fort Prince of Wales to commemorate the public services of Samuel Hearne, 1745-92. Travelling overland from Port Churchill in 1771 he succeeded, after two attempts, in discovering the Coppermine River. This demonstrated that a waterway did not exist between the Pacific Ocean and Hudson Bay. In 1774 he established Cumberland House, the first inland post of the Hudson's Bay Company. He became Governor of Fort Prince of Wales in 1775 and was in charge in 1782 when it was captured by La Pérouse.

Cumberland House, Cumberland Lake, Saskatchewan

A cairn with tablet was erected near the Hudson's Bay Company post to mark the site of this important trading house. From 1670 to 1774 all the posts of the Hudson's Bay Company were on the shore of Hudson Bay; but in 1774, as a result of the advent of the Montreal traders, the Company built Cumberland House. Its erection marked a new era in the fur trade and the commencement of the rivalry which continued until 1821.

Fort Assiniboine, near Barrhead, Alberta

A cairn with tablet was erected in the south-west quarter of section 1, township 62, range 6, west of the 5th meridian, to commemorate the

improvement in the early transportation system of Western Canada. In 1825 the old route across the continent by way of Churchill, Beaver, and Athabaska Rivers was changed to one by way of the North Saskatchewan as far as Edmonton, and thence by pack train to the Athabaska at Fort Assiniboine. This change resulted in greater speed, decreased cost, and increased safety.

Kootenae House, near Invermere, B.C.

A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected on lot 375, Kootenay District, to mark the place where in August, 1807, David Thompson of the North West Company built Kootenae House, the first trading post of the white man on the Columbia River or its tributaries. During the next four years he explored the Columbia River from source to mouth, and established trade with the Indians in southern British Columbia and in much of the country now known as the States of Montana, Idaho, and Washington.

The Canadian Pacific Railway, Port Moody, B.C.

A cairn with tablet was erected on the City Hall grounds to commemorate the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The "Last Spike" of this railway was driven November 7, 1885, and on the following day the first transcontinental train reached the terminus at Port Moody. On July 4, 1886, the first regular passenger train arrived at Port Moody from Montreal, thus completing the bond of union and making Canada independent in the matter of railway transportation. The monument was unveiled on October 1, 1938.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

By NORMAN FEE

The reports of the Secretary heretofore have contained only a brief account of the annual meeting and have left unrecorded for the general membership of the Association, matters which have been dealt with by the Council and by the Programme Committee. Now, however, that the practice of holding a Council meeting in the fall has become well established, it has been decided that the matters dealt with by Council are of general interest and should, therefore, be recorded in the annual reports.

Council is appointed at the general meeting of the Association and is so constituted that four members retire each year and four new appointments are made. It meets in the fall, usually in October, to transact the general business of the Association, and to consider the recommendations of the Programme Committee and arrange for the annual meeting. The Programme Committee is appointed by Council which may, as was done this year, authorize the incoming President to name the members of that Committee. This year the Committee, consisting of Professor E. R. Adair, chairman, and Professors A. B. Corey and D. G. Creighton, met in May and November and presented a draft of the programme at the November meeting of Council. The Committee did not, however, confine its work to the drafting of the programme. The chairman, on behalf of McGill University, invited the Association to meet in Montreal and outlined the arrangement made by which the Canadian Political Science Association would meet there at the same time, and presented plans for the accommodation and entertainment of members.

Council this year held two meetings, one in May immediately following the annual meeting and the other in November. One of the objects of the Association is to encourage historical research and public interest in history, an object broad enough to permit active interest in the work of a number of other societies. In May, 1938, Council named Dr. R. G. Trotter to represent the Association on the Committee to consider the formation of a Social Science Research Council and also on the Committee invited by the League of Nations Society to organize the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Dr. Trotter reported to Council that the organization of these bodies had been completed and at the annual meeting outlined the work being done by the Committee on Research in the Social Sciences and laid on the table a copy of the report of that body. Copies of this report are available and may be obtained on application to Dr. J. E. Robbins, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa.

In 1937, as a result of discussions with representatives of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, a general committee, having as members representatives from every province, was named to co-operate with the C.B.C. in the presentation of history through broadcasts. Professor G. deT. Glazebrook as chairman of the Committee, has had extensive correspondence with the C.B.C. and with members of his Committee. Difficulties in arranging suitable broadcasts and in the working of a committee with a membership so widely scattered were encountered. The Committee this year was, therefore, reconstituted with Professor Glazebrook as chairman, Mr. R. G. Riddell as English secretary, and Dr. Séraphin Marion as French secretary.

Council also received the report of Professor Adair, as representative of the Association and of the Public Archives to the International Congress of Historical Sciences which met in Zurich from August 4 to September 4. These Congresses, which are held every five years, are organized under the auspices of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, whose membership now includes nearly fifty countries, of which Canada is one. Canada's membership has been in the name of the Canadian Historical Association since 1930, and the membership fee of \$50.00 per year was paid by the Association until 1937 when the Dominion Archivist offered in the name of Canada to assume this obligation. The thanks of the Association to Dr. Gustave Lanctot was expressed in a resolution adopted at the annual meeting as follows: "Moved by Professor Adair, seconded by Dr. New, that the Canadian Historical Association express to the Dominion Archivist its appreciation of his generosity in paying the Canadian subscription to the International Committee of Historical Sciences in the name of this Association, and that this resolution be printed in the next annual report of the Association."

Council by authority of the general meeting is to take the necessary steps to see that a "national committee be appointed to represent Canada on the International Committee."

The publication of the annual report requires the services of an editor who collects the copy, edits it, and sees it through the press. Professor G. deT. Glazebrook, who has been doing this work for several years, presented his report, and on account of his work as chairman of the Radio Committee, asked to be relieved of his position as editor. Council, after expressing its appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Professor Glazebrook, accepted his resignation and appointed Professor D. G. Creighton editor for 1939.

ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the Association was held in Montreal on May 25 and 26, concurrently with that of the Canadian Political Science Association. The papers in each session related to a central theme. Those of the first session were concerned with French Canada: "The emergence of the *coureur de bois* as a social type" by R. M. Saunders, University of Toronto; "The illegal fur trade out of New France, 1713-1760" by Miss A. J. E. Lunn, McGill University; "Life and customs in the French villages of the old Illinois country, 1763-1939" by J. M. Carrière, Northwestern University. At a session on imperial relations and the issue of reciprocity with the United States, papers were presented by A. C. Cooke, University of British Columbia, Miss Joan Foster, Bryn Mawr College, and L. E. Ellis, Rutgers University. A third session on politics in the 1870's and '80's included papers on Hincks by R. S. Longley, Acadia University; on Macdonald by A. D. Lockhart of Toronto; and on Blake by F. H. Underhill. Joint sessions with the Canadian Political Science Association were held in the evenings of both days. Professor Herbert Heaton, University of Minnesota, read at the first joint session an amusing and informative paper on the transfer of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil during the Napoleonic Wars. The presidential address, read at the second joint session by Professor R. G. Trotter, Queen's University, was an interesting and original discussion of the important influence of the

Appalachian barrier in Canadian history. All the papers presented will be published in the annual report of the Association.

Professor T. F. McIlwraith, Royal Ontario Museum of Archaeology, addressed an informal session on the finding of the Viking pieces at Beardmore, northern Ontario, as described in the March issue of the *Canadian Historical Review* by Dr. C. T. Currelly.

The Association wishes to record its thanks to the authorities of McGill University for the courtesy extended in providing facilities for the meetings and for opening Douglas Hall and the Royal Victoria College for the accommodation of members; to Mr. W. M. Birks for his kind hospitality and tea at Mount Bruno; to Mrs. Grant of Royal Victoria College for tea at the College; to all who gave their cars and their services for the drives to local places of historical interest; and to the Canadian Press and press of Montreal for the attention given to the proceedings of the annual meeting.

A special word of appreciation is due to Professor E. R. Adair of McGill University, who was in charge of local arrangements and was also chairman of the Programme Committee.

Professor J. B. Brebner, Columbia University, was elected president for 1939-40 and Dr. Gustave Lanctot, archivist of the Dominion, vice-president. Mr. Norman Fee and Dr. Séraphin Marion, both of the Public Archives, Ottawa, were re-elected as English and French secretaries respectively. In its representative attendance and in the general level of interest this meeting was one of the best ever held by the Association and shows the effect of a cumulative improvement which has been observable for several years.

SÉRAPHIN MARION

French Secretary

NORMAN FEE

English Secretary

REPORT OF THE TREASURER

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1939

RECEIPTS

April, 1938—Balance on hand	\$ 117.91
May, 1938 } Membership fees and sale of <i>Reports</i>	1,321.06
to } Bank interest	1.68
April, 1939 }	

DISBURSEMENTS

Cunningham & Co., auditors	\$ 10.00	
Canadian Political Science Association	70.00	
The University of Toronto Press, <i>Printing Report</i>	\$ 487.02	
<i>Canadian Historical Review</i>	465.75	952.77
<i>Bulletin des Recherches Historiques</i>		91.00
Canadian Geographical Society		13.00
The Jackson Press (printing)		10.22
The Progressive Press (printing)		19.17
Dr. J. E. Robbins (Social Science Research Council)		10.00
C.H.A. meeting in Ottawa (expenses)		8.10
Canadian National Railways (freight)		2.97
Ottawa <i>Evening Citizen</i>		5.40
Ottawa <i>Journal</i>		5.40
<i>Le Droit</i>		3.50
Petty cash and postage		20.00
Administration— French secretary	\$ 50.00	
English secretary and treasurer and clerical assistance	145.00	195.00
Bank exchange		15.63
		<u>\$1,432.16</u>
Balance on deposit in Bank of Montreal		8.49
		<u>\$1,440.65</u> \$1,440.65

Examined and found correct,
CUNNINGHAM & Co., C.A.
Auditors

NORMAN FEE
Secretary-Treasurer

Ottawa, May 16, 1939.

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR LIFE MEMBERSHIP FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1939

RECEIPTS

April 30, 1938—Balance on hand	\$ 313.35
April 30, 1939—Bank interest	1.32

DISBURSEMENTS

April 30, 1939—Balance on deposit in Bank of Montreal	\$ 314.67	
	<u>\$ 314.67</u>	<u>\$ 314.67</u>

Examined and found correct,
CUNNINGHAM & Co., C.A.
Auditors

NORMAN FEE
Secretary-Treasurer

Ottawa, May 16, 1939.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

(A) AFFILIATED SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

- Acadia University Library*, Wolfville, N.S. Miss Mary K. Ingraham, Librarian.
- Antiquarian and Numismatic Society of Montreal*, Château de Ramezay, 290 Notre-Dame St. E., Montreal. Victor Morin, LL.D., President, 57 rue Sainte-Jacques ouest, Montréal; Pemberton Smith, Treasurer, 414 St. James St. W., Montreal.
- British Columbia Historical Association*. Dr. J. S. Plaskett, President, Victoria, B.C.; E. W. McMullen, Hon. Treasurer, Victoria, B.C.; Mrs. M. R. Cree, Hon. Secretary, Victoria, B.C.
- British Museum*, Dept. of Printed Books, London, W.C. 1, England.
- Canadian Military Institute*, 426 University Ave., Toronto, Ont. Col. F. S. McPherson, President; T. J. Jackson, Secretary-Treasurer; Lieut.-Col. J. H. Elliott, Hon. Librarian.
- Clark University Library*, Worcester, Mass., U.S.A. Edith M. Baker, Acting Librarian.
- Cleveland Public Library*, 325 Superior Ave., N.E., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. Miss Leta E. Adams, Order Librarian.
- Geology and Topography Library*, Dept. of Mines and Resources, Ottawa.
- Hamilton Public Library*. Mrs. Norman W. Lyle, Librarian, Hamilton, Ont.
- Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery*, San Marino, Calif. Leslie E. Bliss, Librarian; Max Farrand, Director of Research.
- Historical Society of Alberta*. Dr. A. C. Rutherford, President; W. Everard Edmonds, Secretary, 11146-91st Ave., Edmonton, Alta.; M. H. Long, Treasurer.
- Hudson's Bay Company*, Canadian Committee Office, Winnipeg.
- Institute of Historical Research*, University of London, London, England.
- Kingston Historical Society*. R. G. Trotter, President; Ronald L. Way, Secretary-Treasurer, Fort Henry Museum, Kingston.
- Legislative Library of Ontario*, Toronto, Ont. Legislative Librarian (vacant).
- Library of Congress*, Washington, D.C.
- Library of Parliament*, Ottawa, Ont. Parliamentary Librarian (vacant); Félix Desrochers, General Librarian, Ottawa.
- Literary and Historical Society of Quebec*. Col. Wm. Wood, President; D. S. Scott, Recording Secretary; Baron d'Avray, Corresponding Secretary; G. Henshaw, Treasurer.
- London and Middlesex Historical Society*. Dr. Edwin Seaborn, President; Fred Landon, Treasurer, University of Western Ontario, London; H. Orlo Miller, Secretary, Box 571, London, Ont.
- London Public Library*. Richard E. Crouch, Librarian, London, Ont.; James S. Bell, Treasurer.
- McGill University Library*. Gerhard H. Lomer, M.A., Ph.D., F.L.A., Librarian, Montreal, P.Q.
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